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Preface
This book is the ﬁrst in a series on “System Dynamics for Performance
Management.” The purpose of the series is to bridge the gap between system
dynamics and its applications in organizations, with a speciﬁc focus on performance
management.
Most contributions to this series are expected to come from the research and
teaching at the doctorate level program in “Model Based Public Planning, Policy
Design and Management,” which was started in 2007 as a double degree collab-
oration between the Universities of Palermo and Bergen. The collaboration is
further enhanced by the joint “European Master in System Dynamics,” which is
delivered as an “Erasmus Mundus” EU-funded program with the Radboud
University of Nijmegen and the University of Lisbon. The teaching work related to
the Master in Public Management, recently started by the System Dynamics Group
at the University of Palermo, also will contribute to such endeavor.
The purpose of the book is to support the reader’s understanding of how to
design and implement planning and control (P&C) systems that can help organi-
zations manage their growth and restructuring processes in a sustainability per-
spective. More speciﬁcally, the book shows how to develop system dynamics
models that can better support an understanding of the following:
• What is organizational performance and how to frame and measure it;
• How to identify and map the processes underlying performance;
• How to design and implement a dynamic performance management system and
link it to strategic planning;
• How to tie strategic resource dynamics to processes and performance indicators;
• How to link strategic resources and performance indicators to responsibility and
incentive systems.
The book builds on my work over the last 20 years in research, teaching, and
consulting in the ﬁeld of system dynamics modeling applied to performance
management, with a speciﬁc focus on public sector organizations and business.
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It also includes numerous case studies and dynamic performance management
models for providing examples of how such methods work in practice.
Reading the book is beneﬁcial to: (1) graduate students in business and public
management, (2) researchers in performance management and system dynamics
modeling, and (3) managers in business and public sector organizations in the ﬁelds
of performance management and planning.
The book is not designed to enable the reader to become an experienced system
dynamics modeler; rather, it aims to develop the reader’s capabilities to design and
implement performance management systems by using a system dynamics
approach. A literature review is included to provide a guideline for further
improvements to those readers who wish to develop relevant, speciﬁc, and detailed
system dynamics modeling skills and to establish the foundation for teaching
system dynamics applied to performance management in organizational and
inter-organizational contexts. This is particularly relevant for those graduate stu-
dents who have taken system dynamics courses and need to apply their own skills
to business and public management.
To this end, system dynamics students are often involved in case studies. In such
endeavors, most of them are often inclined to “ﬁt” the generic stock-and-flow
feedback structures and the model examples they have previously learned in system
dynamics classes to the issues framed by the cases. Based on such skills, they may
immediately look for the dynamic problem to model and the data from which
key-variables reference behavior modes could be identiﬁed. Though such structured
approach can be useful to help students in implementing the methodological and
technical skills they have previously acquired, there may be a risk to bound the
“potential market” for such skills to only those organizations which have speciﬁc
staff specialized in system dynamics.
The ﬁeld of performance management provides a potentially much wider
“market” for system dynamics skills, also in those organizations that do not have a
“system dynamics” staff and culture. In such contexts, the design and implemen-
tation of a “dynamic” performance management system, and the identiﬁcation (at a
corporate and departmental level) of performance drivers may foster dynamic
problem ﬁnding. A system dynamics model that “speaks” the same language as that
of people in performance management is the next step of this process.
Such approaches also are beneﬁcial to performance management analysts,
enabling them frame their professional ﬁeld within the broader context of the
system. Using a dynamic performance management approach can improve an
organization’s capability to: (1) understand and manage the forces driving perfor-
mance over time, (2) set goals and objectives that may properly and selectively
gauge results and match them to the key responsibility areas in the planning pro-
cess, (3) perceive the effect of physical and perception delays on organizational
performance, (4) frame and measure the indirect effects of intangibles on perfor-
mance, (5) detect and counteract possible unintended effects of performance mea-
surement on group and individual behavior, and (6) foster a learning-oriented—
rather than bureaucratic/incremental approach—to planning.
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This overcomes the risk that P&C systems are designed and used according to a
mechanistic and static perspective. Such risk may generate an illusion of control,
rather than an enhanced capability of organizational decision-makers to manage
sustainable development, to promptly detect symptoms of crisis, to look for the
causes of ﬁnancial results, to set sustainable restructuring policies, and to search for
consistency in different subsystems, sectors, departments, or governmental
functions.
The book consists of ﬁve chapters. The ﬁrst chapter introduces the topic of
dynamic performance management and the need for such approach. Basic system
dynamics concepts are introduced and linked to the performance management ﬁeld.
Chapters 2 and 3 respectively frame the ﬁeld of dynamic performance management
and illustrate how to operationalize dynamic performance management. Chapters 4
and 5 respectively illustrate how to use dynamic performance management in the
public sector and business.
I trust that this work will become a bridge between two ﬁelds of knowledge and
practice (i.e., system dynamics and performance management) from whose interplay
organizations can be better supported in their efforts toward sustainable growth and
lifelong endurance. I would like to thank many friends and colleagues for the support
they—either directly or indirectly—gave me in the process leading to this book.
I am indebted to Vittorio Coda and Carlo Sorci, respectively from Bocconi and
Palermo University, whose ideas have strongly influenced, since the mid-80s, the
way I could frame the linkages between performance, organizational development,
and sustainability. I also am indebted to Elio Borgonovi, from Bocconi University:
his scientiﬁc production has signiﬁcantly affected my conceptual framework on
performance and sustainable development in public sector organizations.
I wish to thank Pål Davidsen, from the University of Bergen. Since 1995, I have
shared with Pål innovative teaching projects, which enabled me to set up and
develop a System Dynamics Group in my department. I’m indebted to John
Morecroft and Kim Warren, respectively from London Business School and
Strategy Dynamics LTD: their research affected my view on strategic resource
dynamics and their effects on organizational performance. Also the research I
carried out with Graham Winch, from Plymouth University Business School, has
greatly contributed in this regard.
I also wish to thank the graduate students and the researchers of CED4 System
Dynamics Group at my department, Enzo Bivona, Federico Cosenz, and our Ph.D.
students, with whom I could share ideas, teaching and research experiences that
contributed to this book. I wish to pay special thanks to my good friends, Bill
Rivenbark and Salvatore Rotella, respectively from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and Riverside College. They both patiently supported me in
reviewing and criticizing the book. Also, the research ideas and teaching experi-
ences in the ﬁeld of public performance management I have carried out with Bill
greatly contributed to both improve the conceptual framework and the practical
relevance of this book.
Last but not least, I wish to thank Lilla, Floriana, and Alessandro. Lilla’s
patience and support made writing this book possible. This book is for her.
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Chapter 1
Managing Organizational Growth
and Dynamic Complexity
1.1 Complexity, Decision-Making and Human Error
Managers, entrepreneurs and administrators are often reluctant to invest time in
order to frame the future of their own organization. They may look too much
focused on reducing the complexity of current management. The vision of the
future they create in their own minds may remain unchanged even for many years,
or may incrementally and ambiguously change, with no effort on learning, on
perceiving the early symptoms of crises, and assessing the sustainability of orga-
nizational growth rate.
A bounded capability to frame organizational future is not only related to those
contexts where goals are made explicit through structured and long-term strategic
plans (Ansoff 1965). It can also be found in those organizations whose visions are
imbedded in the flow of current and inertial decisions, which often emerge through
a tortuous process characterized by bounded rationality, heuristics, rules of thumb
(Simon 1945), political bargaining (Lindblom 1959), and irrational decision-
making (Cyert and March 1963; Cohen et al. 1972). It may also emerge in those
organizations adopting a decision-making process based on incremental changes,
or on a mix of deliberate and emergent strategies.1
Complexity and delays between causes and effects provide major obstacles to
learning, early symptom perception, and sustainable growth management, regard-
less the strategic process model used to frame decision-making in organizational
settings.
Human beings are subject to decision-making that is often based on wrong
assumptions, due to bias towards the problems at hand. They also adopt a simplistic
1In the ﬁrst context, people making decisions want to “test assumptions and have an opportunity to
learn from and adapt to the others’ responses” (Quinn 1978, p. 9). In the second context, the
strategy process is a result of both a planned and an unintentional set of actions (Mintzberg and
Waters 1985).
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view of uncertainty. In fact, the less likely and infrequent events are often unper-
ceived, and unpleasant outcomes tend to be ignored.
Dorner (1997) pointed out a number of factors related to dynamic complexity,
that mostly give rise to human error in decision making, i.e.2:
– Linear (i.e. sequential) thinking, which disregards propagation and ramiﬁcation
effects between different variables affected by decisions.3 This often leads to a
misperception of feedbacks and delays, as well as to a poor recognition of
non-linear growth and decay processes;
– Weak information collection and hypothesis formation4;
– Thematic vagabonding, leading to a loss of coherence in thinking, where
multiple interacting themes are treated superﬁcially and independently, so that
people may “jump” from one theme to the next without any consistency.
As Simon (1957, p. 198) remarked, “the capacity of the human mind for for-
mulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the
problem whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real
world of even for a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality”.
Bounded rationality is intrinsic in decision-making, because of human cognitive
limitations. When people make decisions they portray bounded capabilities to:
(1) generate a set of hypotheses including all alternative courses of action;
(2) collect and process all the information that would enable them to predict the
consequences that choosing a given alternative would imply; (3) make an accurate
evaluation of such consequences and an objective selection among them (Morecroft
1985, p. 901).
Therefore, organizations are structured “to transform intractable problems into
tractable ones” (Simon 1979, p. 501). So, organizational decision-making is
rationally carried out under simpliﬁed conditions of choice. “One function that
organization performs is to place the organization members in a psychological
2A similar viewpoint has been developed by Hamel and Prahalad (1994, pp. 120–121), who
remark: “We often come across companies that have set an ambitious long-term goal, perhaps to
double revenue and proﬁts over ﬁve years, or to dramatically increase the proportion of revenues
coming from new businesses, but have devoted almost no intellectual effort to thinking through the
medium-term capability-building program that is needed to support that goal. In too many com-
panies there is a grand, and overly vague, long-term goal on one hand … and detailed short-term
budgets and annual plans on the other hand… with nothing in between to link the two together.…
There seems to be, in many companies, an implicit assumption that the short term and long term
abut each other, rather than being dovetailed together. But the long term doesn’t start at year ﬁve of
the current strategic plan. It starts right now!”.
3“When solving such complex tasks, most people are not interested in ﬁnding out the existent
trends and developmental tendencies at ﬁrst, but are interested instead in the ‘status quo’”. Dorner
(1980).
4“Most mistakes in information collection are ‘channeling errors’, which result from a preformed
image of reality. Subjects are not prepared to look at the whole range of information, but only to
the narrow part they—according to their image of the system—consider to be important”. Dorner
and Schaub (1994).
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environment that will adapt their decisions to the organization objectives, and will
provide them with the information needed to make these decisions correctly”
(Simon 1945, p. 92).
However, though this simpliﬁcation may allow seemingly rational choices made
by many individuals, it does not automatically guarantee that such “choices are
consistent and mutually supportive” (Morecroft 1985, p. 901). For instance, fac-
toring problems into sub-problems may simplify decision making over complex
issues; however, its shortcoming is that each specialized organizational
decision-maker involved in a fraction of a complex problem receives only a limited
part of the available information flow. If, on the one hand, this allows a prompt
evaluation and decision making in each business sector, on the other hand, it may
hinder a systemic perception of the problem itself.
1.2 Framing Trade-Offs and Policy Resistance in Dynamic
Complex Systems
It has been demonstrated that misperceiving dynamic5 complexity is a main cause
of poor organizational performance and crisis.6
Dynamic complexity should be distinguished from combinatorial (or static)
complexity.7 The latter is associated with a high number of variables and multiple
relationships, where both relationships and variables tend to remain stable over
time. The former is, instead, associated with unpredictability in such interconnec-
tions, because of delays, nonlinearities and multiple feedback loops whose domi-
nance affects the system’s behavior (Senge 1990; Morecroft 1998; Sterman 1994).8
5The term “dynamic” means changing in time and interactive with the process in which it occurs
(i.e., having a feedback characteristic). Its opposite, “static,” means conceptualized as abstract
from the process; thus, its value can change in time, but that leads to no consequences for the
process in which the static factor is found.
6Arie De Geus (1997, p. 2) has remarked how a full 1/3 of the companies listed in the 1970
Fortune 500 had vanished by 1983.
7“Most people think of complexity in terms of the number of components in a system or the
number of combinations one must consider in making a decision. The problem of optimally
scheduling an airline's flights and crews is highly complex, but the complexity lies in ﬁnding the
best solution out of an astronomical number of possibilities. Such needle-in-a-haystack problems
have high levels of combinatorial complexity (also known as detail complexity). Dynamic
complexity, in contrast, can arise even in simple systems with low combinatorial complexity”
(Sterman (2000, p. 21).
8Sterman (2002b, pp. 5–7) remarks that dynamic complexity can be detected in those systems
which are: (a) constantly changing over time, (b) tightly coupled and interacting, (c) governed by
feedback, (d) non-linear, with a changing dominant structure; (e) influenced by history,
(f) self-organizing, (g) adaptive, (h) counterintuitive; (i) policy resistant; and (j) characterized by
trade-offs.
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Framing a dynamic complex problem implies that policy levers are identiﬁed to
affect system’s performance. Performance indicators often portray counterintuitive
time behavior.
It also implies the need for identifying trade-offs over time (i.e.: between short
and long-term) and across space (i.e.: between a sub-system and another), in
relation to alternative policies.
Such trade-offs are due to policy resistance that dynamic complex systems often
portray. This phenomenon may imply that, after a given set of policies has been
adopted and implemented to ﬁx a problem, the system may respond by showing a
performance improvement in the short run. However, in the long run, problems may
bounce back, often stronger and more pervasive than in the past.9
For instance, unintended consequences underlying trade-offs over time may arise
when discretionary cost reduction policies are adopted. In order to ﬁx economic
losses, company policy makers may reduce Research & Development (R&D) or
training costs. In the short run, such policy may determine an improvement in the
income rate; this might allow the ﬁrm to plan an increase in discretionary costs for
the future (see the balancing loop implicit in the mental models of policy makers, as
depicted in Fig. 1.1a). However, this policy often causes a further reduction of
ﬁnancial performance in the long run. In fact, lower R&D or training investments
would respectively increase—after a delay—the company product portfolio and
human capital obsolescence rates. Figure 1.1a shows the short and long term effects
of such policy. In the short term, discretionary cost reduction counterbalances the
income shortage. This is expected to allow policy makers to restore discretionary
costs, after a delay, to their previous values. However, in the long run, discretionary
costs reduction depletes the company intangible assets, which will dampen the
perceived quality of products or services. This will further increase economic
losses. To counteract this problem, decision makers might be inclined to look again
for a symptomatic solution, i.e.: a new reduction in discretionary costs (“snowball”
vicious reinforcing feedback loop in Fig. 1.1a).
Figure 1.1b provides a similar example of policy trade-off over time, applied to
local government.
In this case, a Municipality implements an indiscriminate reduction of urban
renewal investments with the aim to counteract negative trends in its cash flows.
Similarly to the previous example, this policy may improve ﬁnancial performance in
the short run. However, in the long run it would reduce quality of life in the city and its
suburbs. In fact, a reduction of urban renewal investments might gradually worsen the
city infrastructures (e.g. concerning transportation, garbage collection, water
9“Policy resistance occurs when policy actions trigger feedback from the environment that
undermines the policy and at times even exacerbates the original problem. Policy resistance is
common in complex systems characterized by many feedback loops with long delays between
policy action and result. In such systems, learning is difﬁcult and actors may continually fail to
appreciate the full complexity of the systems that they are attempting to influence. Often, the most
intuitive policies bring immediate beneﬁts, only to see those beneﬁts undermined gradually
through policy resistance” (Ghaffarzadegan et al. 2011, p. 24).
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distribution, parks) and the quality of supplied services. Inertial forces characterize
such phenomena: the perception by citizens of the effects that such indiscriminate
investment cuts generate on quality of life is not immediate. As Fig. 1.1b portrays, in
the short run, reductions in urban renewal investments would not generate any major
change in urban quality of life. In fact, perhaps even over a few years after such policy
has been adopted, the functionality of city’s infrastructures might not be signiﬁcantly
affected by the lack of maintenance. Therefore, the adopted policy might look as a
good ﬁx to the ﬁnancial shortage (balancing loop dominance in systems behavior in
Fig. 1.1b). The unintended effects of this policy will be felt by the community, maybe
after long (physical and perception) delays, when quality of life will progressively
deteriorate due to the loss of functionality of the city’s infrastructures.
The outcome of such phenomenon will be a loss of attractiveness of the city and,
therefore, a reduction of its population. This will, in turn, affect the potential tax revenues
for the municipality. Therefore, in the long run the described “shift in loop dominance”
(from a balancing to a reinforcing loop) will further exacerbate ﬁnancial difﬁculties.
(a)
Fig. 1.1 a Unintended effects from indiscriminate discretionary costs cutting. b Unintended
effects from indiscriminate reduction in urban renewal investments. c Unintended effects from
overinvestment policies in the commercial sub-system
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(b)
(c)
Fig. 1.1 (continued)
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An example of policy trade-offs in space (and time), is portrayed in Fig. 1.1c.
In this case, in order to sustain a market growth policy, decision makers tend to
overinvest in the commercial system, while they disregard the production system.
Imagine a small business entrepreneur whose mental models (because of past
experiences and natural aptitudes) are focused on the idea that commercial growth
must drive capacity investments. Since the company has an unexploited production
capacity, the entrepreneur decides to hire more sales people, with the aim to
increase the company customer base, and sales orders. In a competitive system
where market coverage (i.e. the ratio between the company sales agents and the
potential customers) is a critical success factor, this policy may increase the sales
order and revenues rates. With the aim to sustain commercial growth, if the
entrepreneur is biased against capacity investments and if full capacity saturation
has not been reached yet, the company will reinvest a fraction of the higher rev-
enues in hiring more sales agents.10
Though in the short run such policy might be able to foster market growth, in the
long run it would prove to be unsustainable, because of the inertial effects caused by
an increasing sales orders backlog on capacity saturation and on delivery delay. If
delivery delay is another critical success factor in the competitive system, a rise in
perceived delivery delays beyond the thresholds tolerated by customers, would
reduce the sale orders rate (see balancing loop acting as a limit to market growth, in
Fig. 1.1c). Since a reduction in the sales orders rate would contribute to decrease the
sales order backlog and capacity saturation, this phenomenon might further
strengthen the negative bias of the entrepreneur towards capacity investments.
To the biased entrepreneur, it can be unclear the rationale of customers’
behavior, who have reduced their orders, in spite of aggressive commercial
strategies.
Such a sectoral perspective implies the risk that a further increase in the sales-
force, gives rise to a new sales increase, which could deceive the entrepreneur, who
might feel to have the problem ﬁxed. Nevertheless, on a longer time horizon, the
higher sales orders would gradually determine a further increase in the production
capacity saturation (i.e. the problem to ﬁx) and delivery delays (i.e. the symptom to
promptly and selectively perceive). This would in turn erode the business image,
thereby reducing sales again.
If one would analyze the above problem in a static and post facto perspective, it
might appear as self-explaining that, in order to satisfy a growing demand, it is
necessary to anticipate production capacity bottlenecks and to couple salesforce
increase with capacity investments. Nevertheless, the need of such policy could not
be so evident to a marketing-oriented entrepreneur who is not inclined to bear a
higher level of rigidity and economic risk, also due to ﬁnancial constraints. The
entrepreneur’s culture and personal traits and his full involvement in the continuous
bundle of current management activities might tackle a prompt perception of the
slow, although progressive, decline in production and delivery delay performance.
10The example is borrowed from: Forrester (1968).
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Unfortunately, when the weak signals of change become so evident to require a
prompt correction of the flow of events, it could be either more difﬁcult (and
expensive) than in the past, or too late to restore the lost business image.
As described by Senge (1990)11 business ventures are often destined to fail, due
to—rather than erroneous long-term decisions—a lack of selective perception of
weak problems that were becoming day-by-day more and more serious for the ﬁrm.
Very seldom, pure instinctive and emotional decision-making is likely to support
organizational growth. Creativity and “flair for business”, are a strength; however,
if they are not supported by the awareness of the relevant system in which the
organization operates, they are likely to give rise to a waste of resources.
Organizational crises are rarely generated by chance, or fate, as it might appear
at ﬁrst sight to those unsuccessful managers that are used to blame external factors,
such as the public sector or macro-economic cycles. Usually, the deep causes of
crises are far from being related to sudden and inescapable events. On the contrary,
they gradually arise as a product of the concurrent action over time of different
variables pertaining to the relevant system.
The relevant system, related to a given problem behavior (Forrester 1961;
Richardson and Pugh 1981, pp. 42–43; Sterman 2000, pp. 222–225), does not
usually coincide with the internal boundaries of the ﬁrm. It also embodies a wider
range of variables belonging to other external sub-systems, e.g. related to the
competitive and social environment.
1.3 Improving Mental Models and Fostering Strategic
Learning Through System Dynamics
It is not easy to detect weaknesses in mental models through only accounting or
statistical tools, as they may provide detailed and static pieces of information; they
also do not generally provide non-ﬁnancial information (e.g. delivery delay).
A signiﬁcant contribution to the analysis of mental models’ weaknesses has been
given by Argyris and Schon (1978), and Argyris (1985), who described how very often
people’s behavior in an organization system, is affected by internal inconsistences
11“Maladaptation to gradually building threats is so pervasive in systems studies of corporate
failure that it has given rise to the parable of the ‘boiled frog’. If you place a frog in a pot of boiling
water, it will immediately try to scramble out. But if you place the frog in a room temperature
water, and don’t scare him, he’ll stay put. Now, if the pot sits on a heat source, and if you gradually
turn up the temperature, something very interesting happens. As the temperature rises from 70 to
80 °F, the frog will do nothing. In fact, he will show every sign of enjoying himself. As the
temperature gradually increases, the frog will become groggier and groggier, until he is unable to
climb out of the pot. Though there is nothing restraining him, the frog will sit there and boil. Why?
Because the frog’s internal apparatus for sensing threats to survival is geared to sudden changes in
his environment, not to slow, gradual changes” Senge (1990, p. 22).
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between what a single “actor” asserts (so called espoused theory) and the way he or she
behaves (so called theory-in-use), which is affected by mental models.
Also, it has been demonstrated how people are often prone to keep their own
ideas, opinions and beliefs unchanged, even though contingent events seem to
contradict them. Usually such phenomenon, deﬁned as “cognitive dissonance”
(Festinger 1957), is a source of tension and anxiety, on which it is important that
learning facilitators are able to act.
Individual and organizational learning is always the outcome of a mental models
adaptation (and change) process, which is a result of an “intelligent” analysis of the
real world.
When an organization operates in dynamic complex systems, if mental models
are only supported by the use of accounting or statistical data, it is likely that
decisions will be affected by a conservative approach that will give rise to a “single
loop” learning process (Argyris and Schon 1978). Single loop learning implies that
decision makers do not question organizational routines for a relatively long period
of time. In such context, change mainly occurs through discrete events, which are
set by only formal plans. This view portrays strategic management as only a matter
of long-term decision-making; a sharp distinction is made between strategic design
and implementation. The perils of single loop learning are related to the rigidity of
decision-making processes, speciﬁcally when organizations operate in systems
characterized by a high level of complexity and unpredictability.
In order to overcome accounting and mental models’ weaknesses, it is necessary
to enhance a “double loop” (Argyris and Schon 1978) learning process, which
allows decision makers to evaluate consistencies in their mindsets, i.e. the way they
frame problems and strategic issues.
Double loop learning can be fostered by the System Dynamics (SD) approach, in
order to:
• make mental models explicit;
• assess mental models’ consistency, and
• improve mental models.
SD modeling allows one to implement a double loop learning process facilitated
by modelers. On the one side, the modeling process is rooted on the elicitation of
decision makers’ perceptions of the real world (i.e. the system’s structure under-
lying detected behavior). On the other side, decision makers’ mental models are
challenged through model validation (i.e. the search for a consistency between the
model hypotheses on the system structure and the simulated behavior).
Furthermore, SD modeling challenges mental models through simulation. Once
the model has been validated, decision makers are enabled—through the support of
a modeler/learning facilitator—to test in a “protected” environment the consistency
(e.g., in terms of robust trade-offs perception) of their own decisions.
Therefore, as Fig. 1.2 shows, through a virtual reality (i.e. SD modeling and
simulation) decision makers can be helped to perceive the role of the factors
shaping their own rationality. According to a “single loop” learning approach,
information feedback (e.g. reporting) directly affects decisions, which in turn affect
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the real world, and the information feedback again. Conversely, through a “double
loop” learning approach people may reflect how information is ﬁltered through their
mental models, which in turn affect organizational strategy, structure and decision
rules, leading to decisions, that will ultimately affect the real world. Detecting and
framing the hidden and lower portion of decision-making, as shaped in Fig. 1.2, can
signiﬁcantly improve the quality of performance management.
As remarked by Sterman,12 policies undertaken in a system often prove to be
unsustainable in the long run, because of decision makers’ inclination to frame in
their minds their past experiences as a sequence of events. For instance, in the
attempt to identify a problem to tackle, decision makers may stop their own analysis
to superﬁcial and contingent events and corresponding measures, like the following:
“inventory is too big”, or “sales turnover this month has dropped”. To look for the
causes of such events—and to counteract them at their own roots—decision makers
should be supported by learning facilitators to frame the relevant system underlying
the single patterns of dynamic behavior, as shown by accounting or statistical
reports. For instance, inventory might be too big because sales have suddenly
decreased. And this, in turn, might have been caused by competitors’ decision to
reduce their sale price. At this point, one might ask why competitors might have
dropped their own prices. The causes of competitors’ price reduction could be then
linked to other phenomena, and so forth.
Therefore, a linear way of thinking may lead policy makers to superﬁcially
diagnose a negative gap between budgeted and actual sales and to only identify
symptomatic responses to the perceived problem. For instance, this perspective
might suggest them to tackle a sales reduction (i.e. the symptom) by reducing prices
or by increasing incentives to salesmen, without questioning the problems that are
behind the detected symptom and the effects that the intended policy might generate
in the long run.
Decisions
Real 
World
Information feedback
Mental Models 
of Real World
Strategy, Structure,
Decision Rules
System
Dynamics 
Model
Fig. 1.2 System dynamics
modeling and double loop
learning (adapted from
Sterman 1994)
12Sterman (2000, pp. 10–11).
10 1 Managing Organizational Growth and Dynamic Complexity
A more careful analysis should suggest that the actions undertaken by the
company decision makers are not external to the relevant system generating the
detected symptom. Such policy makers rather belong to a wider system, whose
performance is also affected by the decisions of other players (e.g. competitors).
Therefore, though in the short run adopted decisions to affect the environment (e.g.
customers) might allow the ﬁrm to ﬁx the symptom, in the long run they might also
contribute to change the policies undertaken by other decision makers in the sys-
tem. For instance, the sales increase caused by the company policy might generate a
reduction in competitors’ sales (assuming a constant potential market). With the
intent to recover the lost sales volumes, competitors might then respond to their
sales reduction by also dropping their own prices or by undertaking other aggres-
sive commercial policies. The latter provides a second example of trade-off in space
(and over time) in policy making.
Figure 1.3 illustrates how, in order to avoid the phenomenon of policy resis-
tance, it is necessary to extend the boundaries of the perceived system and to
perceive the feedback loops generated over time by the undertaken decisions. Such
view of organizational performance can be supported through the SD approach.
By adopting such view, if policy makers operate in a dynamic complex system,
and their learning/decision making processes are supported by modelers (or
“learning facilitators”), they can be enabled to perceive the relationships between
the system feedback structure and its behavior (i.e. its time performance).
Fig. 1.3 The need of a
feedback approach to perceive
policy resistance effects
generated by short-term
policies in a dynamic complex
system (adapted from
Sterman 2000, p. 11)
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1.4 System Dynamics: A Methodology to Foster
Organizational Learning and Performance
Management
Understanding the causes underlying perceived phenomena, when one acts in
dynamic complex systems, does not require that systems complexity be simpliﬁed
(i.e.: reduced or ignored). It is, rather, needed an approach that enables decision
makers to manage (i.e. to explore or deal with) complexity (Morecroft 2002).
This implies that a learning-oriented approach is adopted, i.e. that human capital
development policies may enable decision makers to learn and practice systems
thinking.
It also requires that planning and control (P&C) systems13 are designed and used
(Bhattacharyya 1971; Chenhall 2003; Das 2011, pp. 22–28; Ferreira and Otley
2009; Flamholtz 1983; Flamholtz et al. 1985; Hofstede 1978, 1980; Maciariello
1984; Ouchi 1979) to enable decision makers to set a range of targets that are
compatible with the sustainable development of their organization, and to identify
the key variables and policies impacting on them (Otley 1994, p. 297).14
Though planning and control are usually described as different functions, if
organizations operate in dynamic complex systems (Lorange and Scott Morton
1974) the processes associated with: (1) setting goals and objectives, (2) assigning
responsibilities, (3) monitoring results through the use of feedback and feed-forward
mechanisms (De Haas and Kleingeld 1999; Nklit 2000), (4) motivating and
rewarding decision-makers, and (5) reporting performance cannot be conceived as
components of isolated systems. An integrated and systemic view of P&C, rather,
provides a sound basis for implementing performance management (Flamholtz
1996; Otley 1999, 2001). In this perspective, particularly in the last two decades,
research and practice on P&C have been emphasizing more the purpose (i.e. per-
formance management)—rather than the means—related to such systems.
Therefore, the term “performance management system” has been used more
intensively than the traditional one (i.e., “planning and control system”).
13The concept of “planning and control system” dates back to Robert Anthony’s taxonomy
(Anthony 1965). According to Anthony’s framework, the P&C system is identiﬁed as a set of
functions, consisting of three sub-systems (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007, p. 6), i.e.: Strategic
planning, management control, and operational control. All these subsystems are described as
processes aimed at affecting different, but interrelated, functions. In fact, (1) strategic planning
focuses on deciding the objectives of the organization, the resources to be used in attaining them,
and the policies for governing the acquisition and use of these resources; (2) management control
focuses on how “resources are obtained and used effectively and efﬁciently in the accomplishment
of the organization’s objectives”; and (3) operational control focuses on how “speciﬁc tasks are
carried out effectively and efﬁciently.”Maciariello (1984, p. 3) identiﬁes three main components of
a P&C system, i.e.: (1) organization/responsibility centers structure; (2) the performance measures
and rewards and the systems of information flows; (3) the process, which consists of setting
targets, evaluating performance, making decisions, and getting feedback from them.
14A more detailed analysis of this concept will be outlined in the next chapter of this volume.
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In this regard, Moynihan (2008, p. 5) deﬁnes performance management as ”a
system that generates performance information through strategic planning and
performance management routines and that connects this information to decision
venues, where, ideally, the information influences a range of possible decisions”.15
If related to an organization, the concept of performance can be synthetically
referred to the results in the implementation of policies over a given period of time.
Performance management should not be conceived as a mechanistic or bureaucratic
task. On the contrary, particularly those organizations operating in dynamic and
complex contexts, performance management can be enhanced by the use of a SD
approach.
The role of “learning facilitators”, whose skills should combine SD modeling
with performance management, should foster the shift of mind described in this
section.
This is the domain of dynamic performance management, which is the topic of
this book.
System Dynamics is a methodology that was developed since the 50s at MIT
(Cambridge, USA) by Jay Forrester and later spread in many Universities, research
centers and other organizations throughout the world.
Since a system is a group of interconnected variables, each of them performing a
speciﬁc function according to a common and superior goal, organizations can be
framed as systems of functional units (e.g. procurement, production, commercial,
R&D, ﬁnance), whose role is to contribute to business survival and sustainable
development, by pursuing excellence in ﬁnancial, competitive and stakeholder
relationships.
In fact, a business is an interconnected dynamic operations system made up of
several sub-systems, and interacting with an external environment consisting of
different sub-systems too.16
For instance, inside an enterprise one can identify the following sub-systems:
• Strategic business areas;
• Processes related to the management of speciﬁc resources (e.g. human, ﬁnancial,
etc.);
15Where referring to system performance, Forrester (1961, p. 116) says: “By ‘performance’we mean
here such measures of a system as proﬁtability, employment stability, market penetration, product
cost, company growth, price fluctuation, investment required, and cash position variations—those
characteristics that indicate the ‘desirability’ of system operation”.
16As remarked by Coda (2010, p. 17): “The aim of business scholars is to study not so much
economic phenomena per se, taken separately from the organized activities in which they occur,
but these very activities as they take place in organizations. These activities are essentially
management, organization, and accounting. Taken as an interconnected whole, this is what con-
stitutes the object of study for Management Theory, or, put another way, the science of business
administration (Zappa 1927)”. Zappa (1937, Sect. 4) stated: “An organization, like every economic
and regulated unity, is something more than the sum of its components; the complex has properties
that its elements do not have and which these elements do not help to deﬁne; and the features of the
complex cannot be given by a mere composition of the features of these elements either” (Dagnino
and Quattrone 2006).
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• Processes pertaining to speciﬁc functional areas (e.g. Finance, Marketing and
Sales, Production, R&D);
• Processes referred to the functioning of given operational mechanisms (e.g.
budgeting, rewards, careers).
Furthermore, examples of external sub-systems related to a wider environmental
system of a business can be referred to its competitive and stakeholders systems,
which could be further partitioned in sub-systems.
SD modeling can provide organizational decision-makers with proper ‘lenses’ to
frame dynamic complexity and to enhance traditional performance management
approaches.
Popular approaches to performance management involve spreadsheet models
and/or accounting packages. Spreadsheet simulation modeling, based on
balance-sheet data extrapolation on a periodical basis, can provide decision-makers
a limited support to plan for sustainable growth. In fact, spreadsheet models gen-
erally lack flexibility (Shrage 1991): they are usually based on a linear, static,
narrow, and unselective approach. Their perspective is linear and static, as it is
based on the projection of balance-sheet data and omits to consider feedback loops;
it is narrow as it is only focused on ﬁnancial measures and does not make explicit
how external variables (e.g. competitors’ policies) affect performance; it is unse-
lective, since—being based on analytical and hierarchical databases, which give rise
to detailed reporting—they lack to deliver prompt and relevant information for
decision making.
Simplifying systems analysis only apparently allows a reduction in complexity,
as complexity and unpredictability ought to be understood and properly handled
through modeling. This focuses on:
• Interdependencies between variables;
• Relationships (including non-linear) between policy levers and affected
variables;
• Delays.
SD also acts as a “bridge” connecting two broad domains which have been
traditionally kept separated, i.e.: the formal quantitative-mathematic approach
aimed at ﬁnding optimal solutions to business problems, and the concrete man-
agement world, which requires a better understanding of complex systems and
dealing with unpredictability.
Traditional Operational Research has been used to apply “optimizing” tech-
niques, which support a simpliﬁed analysis of reality (Forrester 1961, pp. 1–9).
When decisions are made in dynamic and complex systems, such input-output
models—which often provide the basis on which Decision Support Systems (D.S.S.)
are developed—do not properly allow decision makers to discern cause and effect
relationships between relevant variables and to focus on selected policy levers on
which to act in order to affect a system’s performance. They may allow one to detect
optimal solutions (i.e. to identify a set of policies that are supposed to meet the
maximum or minimum value of a given target parameter), based on systems’
14 1 Managing Organizational Growth and Dynamic Complexity
constraints. Through this perspective, the system is seen as a “black box”, from
which a given output is obtained from a set of inputs. However, at least three
problems can be associated with this view, i.e.: (1) a condition that will enable
management to convert inputs into the expected output is that the assumptions
behind the decision model will come true; (2) the output is not linked to any outcome
in the long run (therefore, a static and short term measurement of the effects of
decisions is enough to assess performance); (3) no other player, except from orga-
nizational decision makers, will be able to signiﬁcantly affect the results of imple-
mented policies.
On the use of such techniques, a remarkable problem is that when organizations
operate in complex and unpredictable systems, it is unlikely that all analytical
hypotheses on which an optimization model is based will be empirically veriﬁed.
When decision makers do not properly frame a system’s structure, modeling runs
the risk to be no more than a fallacious exercise, which is likely to generate a
dangerous illusion of control. In the described decision context, rather than opti-
mizing, it is much more important framing the system’s structure and behavior and
to learn from a continuous comparison between the real world and the model.
As Forrester (1961, p. 57) remarked: “The mathematical model is not necessarily
more ‘accurate’ than the verbal model, where by accuracy we mean the degree of
correspondence to the real world. A mathematical model could ‘precisely’ represent
our verbal description and yet be totally ‘inaccurate’”. The formalistic approach
characterizing rigid quantitative methods, whose main concern is the search for
such ‘precision’, may often lead to omit modeling many intangible variables that
strongly affect a system’s performance. They are claimed to be intrinsically outside
of the domain of modeling, since they cannot be objectively measured. However,
Forrester remarks (1961, p. 57) that “to omit such variables is equivalent to saying
they have zero effect—probably the only value that is known to be wrong!”.
Modeling for learning (De Geus 1994; Lane 1994) ought to be so flexible to
allow policy makers to continuously adapt the model to an ever-changing real
world. Since facilitated learning, enhanced communication among decision makers,
and mental models elicitation are the critical means to improve the quality of
planning and performance management, the modeling process (i.e. system’s map-
ping) takes a central role. SD modeling implies that decision makers participate to
model building. Their own explicit and tacit knowledge—that Forrester (1994)
deﬁnes as “mental database”—together with coded data from accounting models
and the wider information system in an organization (including external data), are a
prerequisite to build a SD model. Facilitated modeling sessions are a vehicle to raise
doubts and to foster a strategic dialogue on the hypotheses upon which past
decisions have been made, and to suggest how alternatively a given
cause-and-effect relationship could be modeled. Therefore, they can support out-
lining and assessing new hypotheses that may foster a more robust planning and
performance management.
In the described context, it would be much more supportive for the quality of
decision making and performance management a SD model, that has proven to be
‘wrong’ after its implementation—but that has been developed through
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decision-makers’ participation—than a theoretically ‘perfect’ SD model (i.e. able to
predict the future) that has been sketched from only outside the organization. The
purpose of SD is not the tool (i.e. the model), but the process (i.e. modeling and
learning).17 As remarked by Sterman (1985, p. 521), “Models rarely fail because we
used the wrong regression technique or because the model didn’t ﬁt the historical
data well enough. Models fail because more basic questions about the suitability of
the model to the purpose weren’t asked, because a narrow boundary cut critical
feedbacks, because we kept the assumptions hidden from the clients, or because we
failed to include important stakeholders in the process”.
SD models, rather than being prescriptive, are descriptive. They help people to
better frame the systems in which they operate and to ﬁgure out different possible
outcomes related to several sets of adopted policies, according to different
scenarios.
1.5 Framing Problems into Closed Causal Boundaries
Through System Dynamics. The “External”
and “Internal” Views as Complementary Perspectives
in SD Modeling to Support Decision Making
and Performance Management: Implications
for the Public Sector
SD models are based on a feedback view of systems, seen as closed boundaries, i.e.
embodying variables that explain system behavior. Inside model boundaries those
variables that mostly affect the problem being investigated are included, regardless
they are internal or external to the organization where decision makers perform the
modeling.
The relevant system often includes several decision-making units, operating in
different organizations; it is analyzed as a closed loop system.18 For instance, if the
17In this regard, Sterman (2002a, p. 521): “Because all models are wrong, we reject the notion that
models can be validated in the dictionary deﬁnition sense of ‘establishing truthfulness’, instead
focusing on creating models that are useful, on the process of testing, on the ongoing comparison
of the model against all data of all types, and on the continual iteration between experiments with
the virtual world of the model and experiments in the real world. We argue that focusing on the
process of modeling rather than on the results of any particular model speeds learning and leads to
better models, better policies, and a greater chance of implementation and system improvement”.
The same concepts are remarked in Forrester (1985).
18“Forrester’s use of the term ‘closed’ means ‘causally’ closed. His use is different from the notion
of a closed system in general systems theory, which refers to a system that is ‘materially closed’,
that is, does not exchange material or information with anything outside the system boundary.
Forrester’s ‘closed boundary’ systems are, in general systems theory terms, ‘open systems’
because they include little clouds representing sources and sinks of material outside the system
boundary” (Richardson 2011, p. 241). See also Richardson (1991, p. 298).
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purpose of modeling is to frame business image accumulation and depletion pro-
cesses, a SD model might both embody internal variables (in respect to the business
performing the modeling) and external variables, related to the market subsystem.
Figure 1.4 shows an example where business image is not only affected by
feedback loops that can be directly influenced by company policies (i.e. product
portfolio quality, salespeople efforts, and delivery delay). Image can be also affected
by competitors’ policies that may counteract its improvement through R&D
investments, aimed to improve competitors’ product quality and image. This would
reduce the business relative image (balancing loop).
If one takes the point of view of each decision maker on behalf of whom a SD
model is developed, such perspective could be deﬁned as “external”, since it does
not primarily reflect the observation point from which each involved player per-
ceives the system from inside the organization (i.e. the institution) where he or she
operates. In other words, an “external” perspective primarily implies an analysis of
the relevant system per se, rather than that of a speciﬁc decision maker.
A clear example of an “external” view in SD modeling is provided by the
seminal work of Jay Forrester, on industrial dynamics (Forrester 1961). In this ﬁeld,
the main focus of modeling is on the industry (rather than on a single business)
supply chain.
If speciﬁcally referred to the public sector, an “external” feedback systems view
suggests very insightful issues. Traditional public sector applications of SD have
Fig. 1.4 An example of a closed loop system
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been oriented to the study of industries, such as energy (Sterman and Richardson
1985; Davidsen et al. 1990; Ford 1999; Dyner and Larsen 2001), health care
(Vennix and Gubbels 1994; Wolstenholme 1999a; Lane and Huseman 2008),
housing (Goodman 1989, pp. 309–347), tourism (Honggang 2003), agriculture
(Thompson et al. 2007), ﬁshing (Moxnes 2000, 2005), water supply (Martinez
Fernandez and Esteve Selma 2004), education (Andersen 1990; Richardson and
Lamitie 1989).
Many of these studies have been focused on sustainability issues (e.g. urban
dynamics, tourism, ecology, energy) (Forrester 1969, 1970; Meadows et al. 1974,
1992, 2001; Saeed 1996; Sterman 2002c; Fiddaman 2007; Moxnes and Saysel
2009); others have been framing the problems associated with the lack of capacity
affecting systems performance (e.g. health care).
Other applications have been oriented to depict the structure and behavior of
multi-sectoral economic systems, in order to support public policy makers in
understanding how wealth is generated in a State or a Region, and what interde-
pendencies exist between different sectors of the economy (Kopainsky et al. 2009).
Among such studies, there are those focusing the topic of poverty and wealth
creation in developing and underdeveloped countries.
In addition, topics that are longitudinal to different sectors, and signiﬁcant on a
public policy/management point of view, e.g. crime (Homer 1993; Coyle and
Alexander 1997; Stephens et al. 2005; Jaen and Dyner 2008) or terrorism modeling
(Grynkewich and Reifel 2006), have been developed.
Also, SD applications to individual public institutions (or parts of them) have
been done, such as, for instance, in the cases of hospitals, Universities (Barlas and
Diker 2000) and even Courts (Bernstein 1994).
More generally, most SD applications into the public sector tend to be focused
on understanding the structure and behaviour of systems that usually embody
different players, ranging from public to private ones, from organizations to indi-
viduals. The main focus is on the wider system, and policy implications for each
player can be taken by the light of the responses that the observed system’s
behavior is likely to give, as a consequence of changes in its structure.
Though such analysis does not disregard the elicitation of the decision areas that
each player is in charge of, it does not primarily focus possible dysfunctions or
improvement areas inside each single organization belonging to the broader system.
For instance, such issues might be related to responsibility overlaps, unattributed
roles, inconsistencies, conflicts and ambiguities in decision-making processes, and
their consequences on the governance, management and performance of the
observed system. On the other hand, an “external” perspective analysis has the
merit to provide a neutral basis to frame cause-and-effect relationships underlying
the relevant system’s behavior, from a point of view that may go by far beyond—
both in time and space—that each of the involved players may take.
For instance, if the modeling goal would be understanding the impact on urban
life generated by European Union funded works (e.g. on transportation, education,
housing, water procurement and distribution infrastructures), and related accom-
plishment time delays, then an ‘external’ perspective would primarily focus on the
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aggregate physical, ﬁnancial and information stocks and flows associated with
projects execution. Such perspective would be likely to adopt a same level of detail
and scope in the analysis of factors (e.g. roles, constraints, structure of management
processes) impacting on each involved player (e.g. State, Regional and Municipal
administrations or other private sector institutions, such as enterprises fulﬁlling the
public works).
A complementary perspective can be deﬁned as “internal”. This focuses the wide
relevant system by primarily taking the observation point of one of the players (or
institution) affecting the system’s behavior (Zagonel 2002; Richardson et al. 2004).
If such view is adopted, modeling tends to devote a higher level of detail and scope
in the analysis of factors that speciﬁcally impact on decisions made by the single
player (or institution) in the perspective of whom the model is developed. If
compared to the “external” perspective, the “internal” one does not necessarily
imply the adoption of narrower boundaries for the relevant system in relation to a
given problem context. It, rather, implies a more unbalanced or asymmetric anal-
ysis, since it tends to focus attention on the way the observed player operates and
interacts with the other players within the relevant system.
Both the “external” and “internal” perspectives are necessary in SD modeling. In
fact, they complement each other. Although they both support analysis, diagnosis
and decision-making processes, the ﬁrst one seems to be more suitable for analysis,
while the second is likely to better foster diagnosis and decision making in speciﬁc
areas or domains.
Therefore, the two perspectives could be seen as sequential steps in SD modeling
to support decision-making and performance improvement (Fig. 1.5).19
‘EXTERNAL’ 
PERSPECTIVE
‘INTERNAL’ 
PERSPECTIVE
DECISION 
MAKING
(Analysis) (Diagnosis)
Fig. 1.5 The ‘external’ and ‘internal’ perspective as two sequentially-related steps to support
public sector decision making and performance improvement through SD modeling
19It is worth remarking that the distinction between the above two perspectives relates to the wider
methodological discussion in the SD ﬁeld about the inductive versus deductive nature of modeling.
In this regard, it is possible to observe that—though both the external and internal perspective
underlie a mix of inductive and deductive approach—the second approach is more ingrained into
the external perspective, while the ﬁrst approach tends to prevail if one moves towards the internal
perspective. So, the two perspectives can be seen over a continuum where each of them contributes
under a different viewpoint, towards the pursuit of a deeper learning process and better support of
decision making of the actors involved with different roles in public sector dynamic complex
systems. A similar kind of reasoning also applies if one considers the other important debate in the
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Today, an outcome-based performance management approach tends to attract
the interest of communities, professionals, and decision makers in both private and
public sector organizations. Particularly, if referred to the public sector, it implies a
rising attention towards the issues of value generation (Alford and O’ Flynn 2009;
Borgonovi 2001; Moore 1995; Mussari and Ruggiero 2010), user satisfaction
(Osborne and Gaebler 1993), joined-up government (Christensen and Laegreid
2007), and accountability not only on short, but also on long-term results.
In this perspective, traditional performance management practices seem to have
fallen short of expectations. Such practices are essentially based on ﬁnancial models
and static reporting; they are focused on an organizational sphere, implying a lack
of linkage between outputs and outcomes. They also imply that achieved results are
primarily assessed in relation to the effects produced by decision makers on their
own institutions.
The lack of framing linkages between outputs and outcomes in performance
measurement can lead to a breakdown in the coordination between elected ofﬁcials
and administrators and between different independent agencies, and generate a
fracture between managerial and political control. They may also tend to encourage
a sectoral and departmental view of administration.
Setting outcome performance measures in an organizational context (e.g. a
Municipality) often entails difﬁculties in framing the effects of the activities carried
out by a single agency on the outer local system. In fact, public sector organizations
are tightly connected to other independent (loosely coupled) public and private
sector institutions, whose policies may affect (positively or adversely) the imple-
mentation of organizational programs (Bianchi 2010).
Quite seldom is the area of influence and authority of a given ‘actor’ operating in
a public institution likely to cover the domain of the overall relevant system. The
outline of policies and undertaking of management decisions in the public sector is
often fragmented through different institutions. Therefore, to affect the behavior of
speciﬁc decision makers, it is necessary to ﬁnd a proper balance between the need
to model the relevant system in relation to the main problem(s) in the observed
sector, and the need to calibrate the analysis on what decision makers are enabled to
affect, i.e. by focusing the impact that the speciﬁc player could make on the system,
in his or her own perspective.
By using a combined “external” and “internal” view, SD modeling can play a
crucial role to enrich performance management, and to foster a common shared
view of the relevant system’s structure and behavior among stakeholders in local
strategic planning and execution.
This perspective implies that—for each organization unit—SD models foster a
better understanding of the relationships between performance and responsibility.
(Footnote 19 continued)
SD and sociological literature regarding the ‘structure vs. agency’ relationship. In this regard, the
‘social structure’ view appears more ingrained into the external perspective, while the ‘human
agency’ view better reflects the internal perspective viewpoint (Lane 2001; Grossler 2004, 2008;
Schwaninger and Groesser 2008).
20 1 Managing Organizational Growth and Dynamic Complexity
This entails the identiﬁcation of a self-consistent system of goals and objectives for
each unit. Such goals should be embodied in formal plans, together with the def-
inition of the activities that each unit will undertake, in order to build a resource
system providing a suitable basis to affect results in the short, medium and long
term (outcomes).
Framing problems through this perspective may foster a clear statement and a
better understanding of the goals and objectives embodied in the planning docu-
ments, and may support managers to ﬁgure out how internal processes carried out
by back ofﬁce units should contribute to performance outputs and outcomes.
Such a deeper level of knowledge and awareness that this modeling view pro-
vides also prevents dysfunctional behavior consequences that may happen when
formal P&C and performance evaluation systems are adopted. Among them: setting
easy-to-reach objectives,20 focusing attention on only a restricted number of
objectives to the detriment of others (related to the same goal), identifying the mere
accomplishment of activities as targets to reach, bounding objectives to only pro-
cess or output measures, and confusing means with ends.21 This behavior is often
due to both cultural reasons and lack of proper methods and tools that may foster
learning and a change in organizational culture (Busco and Riccaboni 2010)
towards the use of performance management as a means to frame dynamic
complexity.
Performance management systems designers, policy-makers and managers must
be aware of such mismatches in order to avoid a ritualistic or superﬁcial adoption of
budgeting and performance measurement, leading to an illusion of control and
opportunistic behavior. Conversely, broadening the observed system’s boundaries
can support a shift of focus from measurement to management, from data collection
to systematic use of information, from an input or output to an outcome view of
organizational results (Matheson et al. 1997; Moynihan 2008), thereby using per-
formance management systems as a learning tool (Moynihan and Landuyt 2009;
Vakkuri and Meklin 2006, pp. 240–242).
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 illustrate how a lack of awareness of the mismatch between the
system boundaries perceived at an organizational (or agency) level and those of the
broader system generating the outcomes can be a major cause of dysfunctional
behavior intrinsic to performancemanagement systems (Bianchi andWilliams 2015).
20This often implies the constitution of slack resources.
21On this regard, Flamholtz (1996) remarks the following: “Blau and Scott (1962) reported a study
of a public agency whose major goal was to serve workers seeking employment and employers
seeking workers. The tasks to be performed included interviewing applicants, helping them to
complete application forms, counseling them, and referring them to jobs. To control the inter-
viewers, the agency monitored the number of interviews conducted. The effect of this control
system was to motivate the interviewers. They paid attention to the instrumental goals (numbers of
interviews), while neglecting the overall (but unmeasured) goal of placing people in jobs”. Such
practices have been also deﬁned as gaming, i.e. a “deliberate manipulation of behavior to secure
strategic advantage” (Smith 1995, p. 298). Van Dooren et al. (2010, pp. 162–165) have qualiﬁed
similar phenomena as “measure ﬁxation” and “cream skimming”.
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For example, in order to be effective in the long run, crime prevention requires
collaboration and policy coordination among different institutions. In fact, the
effectiveness of a police department is, in the long run, subordinate to its capability
not only to prevent or repress crime, but also to the capability of the wider system
(schools, courts, other public safety institutions, non-proﬁt sector organizations) to
keep crime under control by reducing new and reiterated crime inflow and
increasing repressed and solved crime outflows.
As Fig. 1.7 shows, both prevention and suppression policies are relevant
leverage points to sustainable crime control. For example, if the police only focus
on dealing with uncontrolled—i.e., unsolved—crimes, and were made accountable
to only an output performance measure such as the number of crimes solved, even
attaining a target for this measure alone may not lead to a reduction in the stock of
uncontrolled crime in the region, which is an outcome. Though an increasing
pattern of solved crimes might signal police efﬁciency, it would not necessarily
imply that the police are effective. The ﬁgure also shows that crime is kept in
control through the “B1” and “B2” balancing loops, which enhance effective crime
prevention and suppression policies, leading to a steady reduction of the crime level
over time. Without synergy between the different actors involved in crime control
policy-making, there is a risk that the reinforcing loop “R” originated by repeated
crime would prevail over the balancing loops.
Fig. 1.6 The mismatch between the relevant system’s boundaries and the boundaries of each
agency’s performance management system
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Based on the analysis conducted in this section, to move toward this direction it can
be useful to combine an “external” view (which is primarily outcome-oriented) with an
“internal” view (which is primarily output-oriented) in the design of system dynamics
model-based performance management systems (Bianchi 2010, pp. 373–375).
1.6 Conceptual and Simulation Stock-and-Flow Models.
Insight Models
Like any other modeling approach supporting decision-making in organizations,
SD aims to provide decision-makers with a lens to frame the processes affecting
organizational performance, and to set robust policies in the long run.
This can be done through both conceptual (or qualitative) and stock-and-flow
simulation (or quantitative) models (Wolstenholme 1999b).
Stock-and-flow models use four main kinds of variables, i.e.: (1) stocks,
(2) flows; (3) inputs, and (4) auxiliaries (Fig. 1.8).
In a SD model the resources affecting a system’s performance are depicted as
level variables, or stocks. The rate at which they change over time is modeled
through flow variables.
Fig. 1.7 Combining an “external” with an “internal” view to foster sustainable crime control
policies by police (from: Bianchi and Williams 2015, p. 402)
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Levels are pieces of information concerning system’s conditions (stocks) at a
given time; they are a result of an accumulation process triggered by rates. Levels
cannot be directly affected, as they represent currently available resources. They can
be changed only through rate variables.
Rate variables measure the in-and-outflows affecting corresponding levels in a
given time span. They are the effect of management decisions or of external factors
impacting on organizations’ stocks (e.g. machinery obsolescence, personnel attri-
tion). Flow variables can also measure system’s results, which can be affected
through the deployment of resources on whose accumulation and depletion pro-
cesses organizational policies aim to generate an impact.
Those results that are measured by flow variables may influence system’s out-
comes, i.e. the dynamics of those resources whose corresponding flows cannot be
directly affected by the exploitation of other organizational resources. For instance,
the flow of new customers accumulating into a customer base (stock) can be
affected by the capability of a business to meet delivery deadlines, and therefore to
afford order shipping rates (outputs). While sales order shipping rates can be
directly influenced through capacity building, the delivery delay (i.e. the ratio
between the sales orders backlog and the sales orders shipping rate) and the cus-
tomer acquisition rate can be only affected by another (short-term, or output) result,
such as the shipping rate.
Auxiliary variables can be used to measure those intermediate results affecting
output or outcome results measured by flows. For instance, in the example that has
been discussed, both the delivery delay and the delivery delay ratio (i.e. the
organization delivery delay divided by the delivery delay desired by the market) are
measured though an auxiliary variable. Another example where auxiliary variables
can be used to gauge intermediate results is the price ratio (i.e. company
price/reference price), which may affect the sales orders rate.
Moreover, input parameters represent external constraints or even policy levers
on which key-actors may operate, in order to affect—through rates—levels.
Figure 1.9 shows an example of a stock-and-flow model, which frames capacity
acquisition policies aimed to affect a shipping rate that is compatible with a delivery
Fig. 1.8 Main kinds of
variables in system dynamics
modeling
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delay desired by the market. This simple model shows external constraints as input
parameters. The model boundaries and time horizon imply that capacity installation
and obsolescence time, shipping time and delivery delay desired by the market, are
considered as factors that decision makers cannot affect.
The same ‘diamond-shaped’ symbol is used to model policy levers, i.e. the
criteria based on which people aim to affect their resource endowment and
deployment, to influence system’s outputs, and (through them) outcomes. In this
example, the policy lever is the desired capacity level.
Based on the discrepancy between the desired and current capacity level, the
model depicts capacity acquisition rate as a valve triggered by a decision affecting
the resource, which in turn affects the shipping rate (i.e. the minimum between
capacity divided by the shipping time, and the desired shipping rate). The shipping
rate is a result since: (1) it can be affected through the resources upon which
organizational decisions and policies converge, and (2) it can in turn affect other
results over a longer time horizon. In fact, the shipping rate affects the delivery
delay, which in turn affects the customer acquisition rate, and therefore it both
affects the customer base (resource) and—through it—the sales orders rate.
Through the described perspective, SD stock-and-flow modeling can support the
planning process and performance management, since it allows policy makers to
Fig. 1.9 An example of stock-and-flow SD model including: results (intermediate results, outputs
and outcomes), resources, decisions, policy levers, and constraints
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track outcome measures, and backwards to identify the outputs and intermediate
results affecting them. Their identiﬁcation allows policy makers to further proceed
backwards, by outlining: (1) the resources affecting performance targets, (2) policy
levers, (3) constraints, and (4) decisions.
Conceptual models frame the investigated system’s structure as shown in the
examples portrayed in Fig. 1.1a–c, previously commented. Such models aim to
depict the feedback loops explaining system’s behavior, with no quantitative data or
simulation. For experienced system dynamicists such models may also allow
mental simulation, i.e. the expected time behavior of depicted variables can be
manually sketched as shown in the previously commented charts. A shortcoming of
such approach is that if a conceptual model embodies even more than two feedback
loops, the reliability of mental simulation can be bounded. Even for experienced SD
modelers it can be highly problematic to mentally simulate the system’s behavior as
an effect of feedback loop dominance and of different initial states of the investi-
gated system (e.g. in terms of initial values of resources, delays, or external
constraints).22
Although such kind of mapping has the advantage to be relatively simple and
time effective, its limitations imply that, when a more pervasive analysis is required,
qualitative modeling needs to be supported by simulation through stock-and-flow
modeling.
On the other hand, quantitative stock-and-flow modeling implies a level of
detail, an accuracy, and an extension of explored system boundaries which is
usually broader than in a qualitative analysis: this is at the same time an advantage
and a potential shortcoming, due to the time and costs that developing such models
generally implies.
To overcome these potential problems, and even frequently to ‘prepare the ﬁeld’
for a more extensive quantitative modeling in a later stage of introduction of SD to
support performance management in an organization which is new to this method, a
consolidated practice is to develop very simple—or ‘insight’—simulation models or
even conceptual SD models depicting simpliﬁed stock-and-flow feedback
structures.
The reason for developing such simpliﬁed models—rather than detailed ones—
is not only due to the time and costs that large SD quantitative models may imply. It
is also related to capacity and cultural issues. Since using the SD method implies a
shift of mind in problem framing and decision-making, it may take time for an
organization to learn how to use the SD method to enhance performance man-
agement systems. They may not have speciﬁc SD skills. Particularly small-medium
enterprises (SMEs) may have difﬁculties in providing reliable non-ﬁnancial and
external data to feed the modeling process (Bianchi 2002, p. 322).
The concept of ‘insight’ (or ‘policy-based’) model has been introduced by
Lyneis (1999). It has been argued (Arthur and Winch 1999) that if the real test of a
22“People cannot simulate mentally even the simplest possible feedback system” (Sterman 2000,
p. 29).
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model’s validity is based on its ‘usefulness’ to users (i.e., how effective they found
it in improving their understanding and stimulating their thinking), rather than on
how closely it mimicked reality of historic time series, then relatively simple
models might be valid, and just as effective as highly detailed models (Bianchi and
Winch 2006). If simple models can be useful and, particularly, if they could be
tailored to an individual ﬁrm by a simple and inexpensive process, then simulators
could be provided to individual ﬁrms to support their particular change manage-
ment issues. Insight SD modeling is now an established practice that can be used to
inform the understanding of processes and is highly dependent on graphic
demonstration (Warren 2000, 2008; Winch and Joyce 2006; Wolstenholme 1999b).
1.7 Structure and Behavior Feedback Analysis
Modeling feedback loops triggering organizational performance allows one to map
system structure, to capture and communicate the behavior driving processes and
the quantiﬁcation of the relationships to produce a set of equations that form the
basis for simulating possible system behaviors over time.
The principle is that, if a system’s structure determines systems behavior
(Davidsen 1991; Richardson and Pugh 1981; Sterman 2000, pp. 28–29)—i.e.
performance—then the key to developing sustainable strategies to improve per-
formance is acknowledging the relationship between structure and behavior and
managing the leverage points (Ghaffarzadegan et al. 2011).
The advantage of using this approach is that it places the measures portrayed by
the accounting models and embodied in the performance management cycle, within
the broader context of the system (Bianchi and Rivenbark 2014), responding to the
reality that even simple policy and process changes to impact speciﬁc outputs and
outcomes are not likely to be that “simple” in organizations (Bianchi et al. 2008).
The SD method allows one to carry out a structure-and-behaviour analysis based
on which the reinforcing loops underlying growth can be identiﬁed and fostered by
proper development policies. Also, reinforcing loops can be associated with cor-
responding balancing loops, which provide a source of limit to the growth or
stability in the investigated system. By promptly detecting and counteracting bal-
ancing loops, decision makers can foster sustainable development.23
A reinforcing (or positive) loop generates an exponential behavior in the key
variables, due to a virtuous or a vicious circle, leading to a growth or crisis process.
Two examples are portrayed in Fig. 1.10a, b, which combine a simple
stock-and-flow with a conceptual model (i.e. influence diagram) of customer
23Loop polarity is detected by multiplying the algebraic signs of each arrow, symbolizing a direct
or opposite relationship between variables. A reinforcing loop is determined by a positive polarity,
while a negative polarity implies a balancing loop. While a reinforcing loop generates multi-
plicative growth in the affected variable's behavior mode and implies instability in the system, a
balancing loop fosters a stable behavior.
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acquisition and interest accumulation processes, respectively. They also combine
the two model structures with a time graph showing an exponential growth in the
stocks.
A balancing loop may either underlie a draining or an adjusting process, in
respect to the affected resource.
Figure 1.11a, b show a draining and an adjusting process affecting the stock of
personnel, respectively.
Figure 1.11c combines in a same stock-and-flow diagram the two previous
loops. It shows that the adjusting process is dominant over the draining process.
Analyzing feedback loops in a system allows one to investigate on the sources of
its behavior, as a function of policies adopted by decision makers and of external
factors.
In a later development of the model, constraints can be converted into auxiliary
variables, if decision makers’ policies can affect them. This implies an extension of
model boundaries and often of its time horizon.
For instance, if we consider the last example, the personnel normal attrition time
is an input parameter (18 months). Regarding this, decision makers’ policies could
be oriented to increase such time, e.g. by adopting programs based on incentives,
career plans, and training.
An example of how the model portrayed in Fig. 1.11c could be extended to
capture such policies is shown in Fig. 1.12. This ﬁgure shows how the attrition time
is now a function of the normal attrition time and of a multiplier (effect of
investment policies on personnel attrition time). This is a normalized function that
is modeled through a graph variable identifying several possible multipliers (e.g.
between 0.5 and 1.5) in respect to the ratio between the average investment in
Fig. 1.10 a Reinforcing loop underlying word-of-mouth in customer acquisition. b Reinforcing
loop underlying accumulated interest on bank accounts
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personnel policies (resource) and the normal investment. The higher this ratio is, the
higher the multiplier will be, leading to a longer actual personnel attrition time.
The analysis developed so far has illustrated how an SD model is based on
explicit statements of policies underlying the decision making process, according to
conditions (information on levels, time delays and external input constraints)
arising within the system. In accordance with the systems feedback view, man-
agement (i.e. decision-making) is seen as a continuous process of converting
information into signals, which feed actions oriented to change levels, i.e. to affect
resources (Forrester 1961, p. 93, 1994). Such resources will in turn affect the
system’s performance, that will change the endowment of those resources whose
levels cannot be directly influenced by decision makers.
Fig. 1.11 a Balancing loop associated with personnel attrition rate (resource draining).
b Balancing loop associated with recruiting rate (resource adjustment). c Balancing loops
associated with recruiting and attrition rates (resource adjustment and draining)
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Such conversion process describing management is not always clear and explicit
in organizations; it may often involve many decision makers. Making decision
processes more explicit through SD modeling and improving them over time may
substantially help people to better understand the real world around them and helps
them achieve a common shared view.
The quality of policy making depends on information taken into consideration
by key-actors and on the way they convert it into action, according to a given set of
explicit or implicit “rules”. Concerning this, it has been observed that
decision-making problems are not usually related to a lack of information (Forrester
1971), but to a proper selection of it, which depends on the quality of mental and
information support models.
According to this perspective, decision-making can also be framed as a process
of ﬁltering different sets of internal and external pieces of information, related to
level and input variables (Fig. 1.13). Such organizational and cognitive ﬁlters can
be represented as concentric circles: the more they are positioned at the core of
decision function, the more they affect it. It follows that, of the many pieces of
information directed to a given decision-making unit, only a few of them reach its
core.
Fig. 1.12 Extending model boundaries
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1.8 System Dynamics Models in the Broad Context
of Models Supporting Organizational
Decision-Making Through the Planning and Control
Function
In order to better focus how SD modeling ﬁts in performance management, it can be
useful to position SD into a broader set of models and tools that an information
system may adopt to implement the P&C function.
To this end, a conceptual framework borrowed from the taxonomies developed
by Anthony, Simon and Keen and Scott Morton will be used.
Anthony (1965) framed managerial activities into three categories, which are
intrinsically different from each other, and therefore require distinctive (though
interconnected) P&C systems. Such activities are: strategic planning, management
control, and operational control.
Strategic planning is “The process of deciding on objectives of the organization,
on changes in these objectives, on the resources used to attain these objectives, and
on the politics that are to govern acquisition, use, and disposition of these
resources” (Anthony 1965, p. 24).
Lorange et al. (1986, p. 10) focused on the same concept by using the term
“strategic control”. They deﬁned it as “a system to support managers in assessing
the relevance of the organization’s strategy to its progress in the accomplishment of
its goals, and when discrepancies exist, to support areas needing attention”. They
also remarked that though different terms (and often separate departments) are used
to manage (strategic) planning and control, keeping the two activities disconnected
is a major cause of failure in the management systems of many organizations.
Concerning this, they warned: “That they are two sides of the same coin can be
Fig. 1.13 Embodying decision-making and information ﬁlters in stock-and-flow modeling (from
Morecroft 1988, p. 306)
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highlighted by the following argument. If we do not control against our plans, we
will never know if they have been achieved. Similarly, if we control only against a
ﬁxed, rigid set of objectives, we can miss the need to make the changes that mean
survival”.
In this book, the term “strategic control” will be adopted, to mean a management
process combining in a consistent system the broad and interconnected strategic
planning and control functions.24
The second category identiﬁed by Anthony is management control, i.e.: “the
process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively
and efﬁciently in the accomplishment of the organization’s objectives” (Anthony
1965, p. 27). Concerning the terms “control” and “controller”, Anthony remarked
that—though in their ordinary sense they may have unfortunate connotations—a
controller is not who should exercise control. People who have the title of controller
“should construct and operate a system through which management exercises
control” (Anthony 1965, p. 28). This role usually relates to a staff unit in the
organization chart. It should primarily support a strategic dialogue (De Haas and
Kleingeld 1999; Matheson et al. 1997) between the political and managerial level,
and the implementation of strategies in an organization. Again, though strategic and
management control are conceptually different activities, they need to be consistent
each other. The stronger dynamic complexity, the more strategic and management
control need interaction, to cascade strategic goals into the organization and to
enable management perceive weak signals of change through communication and
coordination. Such strategic conversation (Nilsson et al. 2011; Van der Heijden
2004) is fundamental for both designing and implementing policies. Ignoring this
approach may generate ‘administrative schizophrenia’. In fact, the setting of
managerial objectives, actions and targets should imply a deep understanding and
communication of the strategies outlined by the political level. On the other hand,
the design and assessment of policies cannot ignore the emerging problems and
opportunities that can be better perceived on a managerial level (Boyle 1999).
Therefore, outlining robust strategic plans and budgets requires that a controller
or P&C analysts facilitate the planning process with feedback (i.e. diagnostic—or
momentum—control) and feed-forward action (i.e., interactive—or strategic leap—
control).
Regarding the controller’s role in modern organizations, Otley (1994, p. 290)
made a very clear statement: “although Anthony had been very speciﬁc in sug-
gesting that the basic source discipline for the study of control should be the
behavioral sciences, this very rapidly become narrowed to accounting, albeit with a
behavioral flavor”. He clearly made the point that the control function should go
24Simons (2000, pp. 303–304) adopted an even broader concept of strategic control, in consid-
eration of the dynamic complexity that organizations are often expected to face. He wrote:
“Strategic control is not achieved through new and unique performance measurement and control
systems, but through belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive
control systems working together to control both the implementation of intended strategies and the
formation of emergent strategies”.
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beyond a focus on only management accounting practices and foster coordination
between strategy design and implementation (Kaplan and Norton 2008). This is due
to the need for survival by adaptation that organizations should perceive, particu-
larly today in times of turbulence and unpredictability.25 “The controller is no
longer embodied in the higher reaches of the organization; the control function now
needs to be embedded at all levels. Only in such a way can the contemporary
organization survive in its rapidly changing environment” (Otley 1994, p. 298).
Also, Otley remarked how a more sophisticated use of accounting and other
control information is necessary. In this regard, he advocated the need to focus
attention not only on (ﬁnancial) flows, but also on the stocks from which their
future dynamics will be affected.26 This is a key issue remarking how dynamic
performance management may enhance the ability of P&C systems to support
organizations to deal with complexity and unpredictability.
“The true ‘learning organization’ is concerned to enhance its overall capability to
respond to whatever the external world throws its way … So a capacity for flexi-
bility is also necessary, the type and amount of which can be investigated using the
techniques of simulation and scenario planning” (Otley 1994, p. 297).
Also Lorange et al. (1980, pp. 108–112) emphasized the role of SD modeling to
enhance what they deﬁne as “strategic leap control”, i.e. when “the challenge is to
reset the trajectory of the strategy as well as to decide on the relative levels of thrust
and momentum for the new strategic direction … This situation involves a mental
leap to deﬁne the new rules and to cope with any emerging new environmental
factors” (Lorange et al. 1980, p. 11).27
The third category of organizational activities identiﬁed by Anthony is opera-
tional control, i.e.: “the process of assuring that speciﬁc tasks are carried out
effectively and efﬁciently” (Anthony 1965, p. 18).
In order to further frame how SD can be positioned in respect to the broad set of
models/tools that can enhance the implementation of P&C systems, the commented
framework can be matched with H. Simon’s taxonomy on organizational decisions.
Simon (1960) distinguished programmed from non-programmed decisions.28
According to Simon, for non-programmed decisions there are “no speciﬁc proce-
dures to deal with situations like the one at hand”.
25“Only those organizations which match their capabilities to the changing needs of the market
place and which meet the requirements of other stakeholders will survive in the long-term” (Otley
1994, p. 296).
26“This might involve items as diverse as the morale of the workforce, the skill base it possesses,
the competitive posture and the capability of the organizational unit, and its potential for adap-
tation in the light of possible competitive challenges. In such ways it might be possible to counter
the bias towards short-termism that seems to exist where ﬁnancial flows are stressed” (Otley 1994,
p. 297).
27Also Kaplan and Norton (2001, pp. 311–313) advocated the beneﬁts of SD modeling to foster
performance management.
28“Decisions are programmed to the extent that they are repetitive and routine, to the extent that a
deﬁnite procedure has been worked out for handling them so that they don’t have to be treated de
novo each time they occur … Decisions are non-programmed to the extent that they are novel,
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To describe how information systems can contribute to decision making, in
respect to the level of complexity of organizational tasks, Keen and Scott Morton
(1978, pp. 86–88) built on Simon’s taxonomy. They proposed a slightly different
framework by distinguishing: structured, from unstructured and semistructured
decisions/tasks. As corresponding terms to Simon’s “programmed” and
“non-programmed” decisions, they identiﬁed structured and unstructured tasks,
respectively. “The degree of potential structure in the task predeﬁnes the proce-
dures, types of computation and analysis, and the information to be used. In a
highly unstructured task … the decision maker must often rely on personal judg-
ment, especially in identifying exactly what the problem is. By contrast, much if not
all of the decision process in a structured task can be automated”. Therefore, they
argue, to support the fulﬁllment of structured tasks, “the system will be designed to
provide far more ﬁxed routines and sequences of analysis, and to give answers”
(Keen and Scott Morton 1978, p. 86). Most structured decisions are carried out
through operational control, while most unstructured decisions are carried out
through strategic planning and control.
Keen and Scott Morton remarked how the distinction between structured and
unstructured decisions/tasks is not straightforward. In fact, organizational decisions
should be positioned over a continuum, over which one may deﬁne as “fully
structured” or as “fully unstructured” a relatively bounded set of tasks. In fact, also
in operational control there can be a component of decision-making implying
discretionary subjective judgment.29 Likewise, also strategic planning and control
may entail a—though limited—use of procedures.30
Therefore, Keen and Scott Morton identiﬁed semi-structured decisions/tasks as a
third possible typology in their taxonomy. “These are decisions where managerial
judgment alone will not be adequate perhaps because of the size of the problem or
the computational complexity and precision needed to solve it. On the other hand,
the model or data alone are also inadequate because the solution involves some
judgment and subjective analysis” (Keen and Scott Morton 1978, p. 86).
If we match the type of decisions that an information system supports (as deﬁned
by Keen and Scott Morton) with the P&C level (as deﬁned by Anthony) that
decision-making implies, we may further extend the scope of our framework to two
more viewpoints, i.e.: (1) the focus of modeling, and (2) the modeling approach.
The focus of modeling is the primary purpose for which models/tools are used to
support the P&C function. The modeling approach describes the perspective and
the characteristics of the tools adopted to support decision-making.
(Footnote 28 continued)
unstructured, and consequential … There is no cut and dried method for handling the problem
because it hasn’t arisen before, or because its precise nature and structure are elusive or complex,
or because it is so important that it deserves a custom tailored treatment” Simon (1960, pp. 5–6).
29E.g., for the interpretation of rules to apply to each problem.
30E.g., those which are formalized in the manuals that rule planning and reporting.
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Regarding the modeling approach, a distinction can be made between: trans-
actional systems, “information feedback” support, and “learning support” models.
Transactional systems (Koutsoukis and Mitra 2003, p. 38) are models/tools
supporting the accomplishment of structured tasks on which operational control is
focused. Their perspective is data gathering. They aim to collect detailed and
precise data for the fulﬁllment of current transactions (e.g. expenditure and revenue
cycles, payroll systems, inventorying). Collecting and storing such data feeds the
overall information system. In fact, both the models/tools supporting
decision-making related to management and strategic control draw from such
databases to elaborate information, to foster decision-making and systemic learning.
“Information feedback support” models, such as accounting and ﬁnancial bud-
geting aim to provide decision-makers with speciﬁc information for the fulﬁllment
of semi-structured tasks, related to management control, which is primarily based
on a feedback approach (i.e. a post facto analysis of performance discrepancies
between actual and budgeted results). The basic component of such models is the
general ledger, which is the backbone of the accounting system, generating
ﬁnancial information that is portrayed through balance sheets, income and cash
flow statements. It also supports product and process costing. Other components of
“information feedback support” models are related to ﬁnancial budgeting and
reporting. Though such tools may not be fully based on accounting data, they are
usually focused on a ﬁnancial dimension of organizational performance. Examples
can be related to spreadsheet modeling and cost accounting.
A third component of the information system, supporting unstructured (and
partially also semi-structured) decision-making to implement a strategic control that
is systemically connected to management control can be deﬁned as “learning
support” models. Such models aim to foster strategic organizational learning to deal
with uncertainty and discontinuity. To this end, they enhance organization’s
capabilities to manage dynamic complexity and to corroborate the traditional
feedback mechanisms on which management control is based, with proactive
feedforward control loops (De Hass and Kleingeld 1999, pp. 242–245; Hofstede
1978, p. 451; Kloot 1997, p. 52; Otley 1999, p. 369; Schreyand Steinmann 1987).
Likewise “information feedback support” models, also “learning support”
models draw ‘coded’ internal data from the organizational information system.
However, in this context, a different approach is followed in searching for such
data, and using it. Here, in order to generate information leading to strategic
learning, the main concern is on the promptness, relevance, synthesis, dynamic
pattern of behavior, and systemic consistency of such data, rather than on its (static)
precision, or detail (Amigoni 1978). Furthermore, a wider use of external databases
(e.g., related to market competition) and subjective/inductive data estimates, drawn
from decision makers’ experience and mental models (e.g., perception delays,
behavioral functions, intangibles) characterizes “learning support” models.
Examples of such models can be related to a quite wide variety of tools that rely
on artiﬁcial intelligence (Sauter 2010; Turban and Watson 1989), such as:
Executive Information Systems (Singh et al. 2002), expert systems (Brandon 1990),
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neural networks, fuzzy systems (Bidgoli 1998), Decision Support Systems (Keen
and Scott Morton 1978).
SD can be considered as a key component of such modeling approach. It can
strongly enhance strategic planning and control. Also it can facilitate a learning and
communication process by which strategic goals can be cascaded through the
organization structure, and trade-offs over time and space can be framed. SD
modeling can help controllers to design and operate consistent and
learning-oriented P&C systems and to align strategic with management control.
Figure 1.14 frames the analysis developed so far in this section.
1.9 The Process of System Dynamics Modeling. Double
Loop Learning in a Dynamic Performance
Management Context to Pursue Sustainable
Organizational Development
Figure 1.15 emphasizes the beneﬁts that can be achieved by combining SD models
with “information feedback support” models, to foster mental models’ elicitation
and improve organizational capabilities in assessing performance through a sus-
tainable development perspective (dynamic performance management).
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Fig. 1.14 Different modeling approaches supporting P&C systems and decision makers
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Though this topic will be analyzed in more detail in the next chapters, it is
possible here to remark how “information feedback support” models are mainly
based on a ﬁnancial perspective and on static performance measurement. Such
perspective may not allow decision makers to properly handle dynamic complexity.
To this end, a high selectivity and promptness is required to P&C systems. Not only
capital investment decisions are to be considered as those having a potential impact
on organizational sustainable growth, but also current decisions. In fact, though
current management takes place on an on-going basis, not all current decisions have
the same level of importance for the sustainable development of an organization.
Detecting weak signals of strategic change hidden in current activities implies a
level of complexity that is different from longer run decisions related to capital
budgeting. Even though, in the ﬁrst case, the structure of the system to manage can
more easily be deﬁned than in the second case, monitoring the strategic relevance of
current events implies a major difﬁculty in detecting in advance weak signals of
change. In fact, such signals are usually hidden in a wider range of daily occur-
rences in which decision makers can be fully involved.
Matching SD with “information feedback support” models may allow decision
makers to frame the processes underlying accounting information. Drawing up
plans only on the basis of single and static pieces of accounting information may
perhaps allow organizations to design policies which are effective in the short run,
but may also produce unintended negative effects on a longer time horizon, that
seriously prejudice sustainable organizational development.
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Fig. 1.15 Matching “information feedback support” models with SD models to foster mental
models’ elicitation and improve organizational capabilities to assess performance in a sustainable
development perspective
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Understanding causal relationships laying behind organizational performance
requires that double loop learning is fostered to enhance decision makers’ aptitudes
to detect inconsistencies in their mindsets and to pursue a common share view of
the real world (Winch 1993).
Improving mental models by matching “information feedback support” ﬁnancial
models with SD models enhances dynamic performance management, through
which decisions affecting development can be framed in an organizational sus-
tainability perspective.
Figure 1.16 shows how decision makers’ culture plays a central role in
influencing mental models, decisions and actions (including the design of P&C and
human capital development systems). In fact, the lens through which reality is
observed depends on values, beliefs and other personal traits. For instance, a
technocratic entrepreneur will be focused on the R&D and production areas, while
an autocratic entrepreneur will not be inclined to perceive his/her competitors and
workers as potential partners. At the same time, an entrepreneur who operates since
the beginning of his/her activity in an arena based on price competition and low
cost, will not be prone to think that among potential clients there may be some who
could be more sensitive to delivery delay or product scope, rather than price.
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Fig. 1.16 Enhancing organizational learning through dynamic performance management and
human capital development policies
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Particularly when an organization operates in dynamic complex systems, deci-
sion makers may be blinded by their own mental models in promptly perceiving
gradual changes occurring in the relevant system’s structure and understanding the
deep causes of organizational phenomena. Even though experience, intuition,
intelligence and entrepreneurial skills may substantially support decision-making,
cognitive limitations of human beings are often a primary cause of misperceptions
concerning feedback loops and non-linear relationships between relevant variables.
On the other hand, P&C and education systems may play a signiﬁcant role to
affect organizational culture and decision makers’ mental models. Business survival
and sustainable development can be enhanced by providing decision makers with a
relevant information set and strong learning support, to help them in eliciting and
communicating how they map the relevant system, to assess their mental models’
consistency.
Achieving a common shared view of the “real world” is not a symptom of
conformism (i.e. forcing people to adopt a common vision); it is instead, a result of
a learning process, which stems from the comparison and coherent combination of
the variety of frames through which things are perceived by different players in an
organizational context. Making mental models explicit and sharing them is not an
end per se (Vennix 1996); it is, rather, a means through which people are helped to
raise questions on relevant issues regarding trade-offs in time and space, related to
sustainable organizational development. The main concern of learning in and about
complex systems is not simply to ﬁnd the ‘right’ solutions to problems, but instead
to understand their deep causes (Sterman 1994).
Furthermore, learning should not to be conceived as a contingent or discrete
activity (i.e., to be fulﬁlled through only ad hoc task forces), but instead as a
continuous process. In fact, in a complex and dynamic context, ‘freezing’ such
learning process in a bounded time horizon could not allow decision makers to gain
an ability to affect organizational outcomes.
Improving organizational key-actors’ mental models is the goal of a continuous
learning process on which dynamic performance management should be focused.
Such goal can be pursued through an activity requiring a continuous effort, fostered
by a SD modeler/learning-facilitator, aimed to feed a circular process articulated
along the following interconnected phases: (1) observation; (2) reflection, knowl-
edge elicitation and communication; (3) diagnosing and sharing of a same picture of
reality; (4) decision making and action (Kolb 1984).
The process of SD modeling can support the performance management cycle
through the following phases: (1) mapping (framing the system); (2) planning;
(3) implementing decisions/operations; (4) measuring/evaluating results, and
undertaking corrective actions (Fig. 1.17).
SD modeling can support such cycle by fostering double loop learning. In fact,
SD model building31 starts with the identiﬁcation of a dynamic pattern of behavior
31A comprehensive analysis of different approaches describing the SD modeling process can be
fund in Martinez Moyano and Richardson (2013).
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related to reported results (data collection/measurement). Such results are an effect
of the current state of the organizational system. The goal of dynamic performance
management is to: (1) perceive such state, (2) sketch—through system’s mapping—
a model that may explain the hidden feedback structure underlying detected
behavior, (3) outline—through planning—a desired system’s state, (4) implement
the plan and undertake corrective action through feedback and feedforward control.
As previously said, the source of this data is not only from accounting or other
organizational databases. It can be also related to decision makers’ perceptions or
even external datasets.
The identiﬁcation of a dynamic problem behind detected reference behavior
modes over time, allows decision makers (through the support of the SD modeler)
to sketch a picture of the perceived system’s state. Such picture initially frames the
system through qualitative feedback analysis (i.e. influence diagrams are sketched
and shared among decision makers). Hypotheses on systems structure and behavior
are formalized. In a second step of SD modeling supporting planning, stock and
flow quantitative analysis is developed. As previously remarked, depending on the
scope of the analysis, as well as on the level of knowledge/SD culture and infor-
mation an organization holds, this step might be limited to the development of an
insight simulation model. Through model validation, and structure and behavior
analysis during simulation, decision makers can review their own initial hypothe-
ses. Based on this activity, dynamic plans can be sketched, and decisions can be
made.
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Fig. 1.17 Dynamic performance management and double loop learning
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Double loop learning is enhanced through all the described process. The
development, validation and use of simulation models supporting planning (with
the related “reflection-diagnosis” stages), and the measurement of achieved results
(with the related “implementation-measurement” stages) that will support further
improvements to the original model are the cornerstones of a continuous learning
process.
1.10 Applying System Dynamics Modeling
to Performance Management: Different Contexts
in Managing Organizational Sustainable
Development and Restructuring Processes
The “structure and behavior” principle, we have analyzed in this chapter, can be
helpful to outline possible contexts where SD modeling may successfully support
performance management in different stages of organizations’ life, to frame dy-
namic complexity.
Two main generic contexts can be distinguished on this regard:
1. Supporting decision makers to assess current performance levels, and to diag-
nose the current scenario patterns underlying the existing state of an organiza-
tion, and
2. Supporting decision makers to assess future performance levels, where planning
is expected to enhance the outline and implementation of strategies to manage
sustainable organizational growth or restructuring policies to ﬁx crises.
The two generic contexts are strongly related to each other. In fact, as previously
remarked, diagnosing the current system’s state is a fundamental step for policy
making.
More speciﬁcally, regarding the ﬁrst generic context, Fig. 1.18 frames four
scenarios where SD modeling can be applied to support organizational performance
management, i.e.:
(a) Growth;
(b) Restoring capacity;
(c) Crisis, and
(d) Divesting capacity.
The four scenarios emerge by matching the current strategic perspective of the
organization with the polarity of the dominant feedback loops explaining the
observed system’s behavior. They can be both related to the overall organization
system or to parts of it (e.g. strategic business areas).
Concerning the current strategic perspective of an organization, one may dis-
tinguish two opposite conditions, i.e.: Stability/Growth versus Downsizing.
1.9 The Process of System Dynamics Modeling … 41
If we take the ﬁrst condition, those organizational systems whose current
behavior is characterized by reinforcing loops underlying exponential dynamics in
the observed results (e.g. sales, change in the customer base, cash flows, proﬁts,
change in business image) can be related to a “Growth” scenario.
A second scenario, implying a strategic perspective characterized by the search
for stability, can be deﬁned as “Restoring Capacity”. This scenario underlies a
dominance of balancing feedback loops aiming to adjust the lost capacity (e.g. staff,
machinery, distribution network) to the desired levels.
If we consider the second condition (i.e., downsizing), those organizational
systems whose current behavior is characterized by reinforcing loops underlying
exponential dynamics in performance measures can be referred to a “Crisis” sce-
nario. In this case, the current state of the organization system is affected by a
progressive pattern of past negative results (e.g., in terms of loss of image, cus-
tomers, staff, employee motivation, proﬁtability, liquidity) that have been shrinking
the stock of strategic resources.
The fourth scenario, related to a current downsizing perspective, can be deﬁned
as “Divesting Capacity”. It implies a dominance of balancing feedback loops
aiming to drain capacity (e.g. staff, machinery, distribution network).
Regarding the second generic context (i.e. supporting decision makers to assess
future performance levels), Fig. 1.19 frames four speciﬁc scenarios where SD
modeling can be applied:
Fig. 1.18 Main scenarios associated to applying SD modeling to frame the current performance of
an organization
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(a) Crisis prevention;
(b) Stabilization;
(c) Restructuring, and
(d) Revitalization.
Each of the four scenarios can be considered as a logical extension of the
previously commented scenarios, regarding the current system’s state. They are
associated with two possible strategic perspectives for the future, i.e.: Maintenance
(i.e. preserving or consolidating current performance and the related system’s
structure) versus Re-design (i.e. changing the “logic model” behind current per-
formance and the related system’s structure).
If we take the ﬁrst strategic perspective, a “Crisis prevention” scenario can be
related to the use of SD modeling to support the continuous scanning of early crisis
symptoms that could be generated by unsustainable growth rates. As Chap. 3 will
illustrate, such symptoms are performance drivers that should be monitored in the
short run, in order to prevent crises in the long run. Examples can be related to
dominant (but still “silent”, at least in terms of effects on the end-results) balancing
loops associated with capacity bottlenecks or market saturation.
A second scenario can be deﬁned as “Stabilization”. It implies the pursuit of a
non-growth condition, based on the same principles we previously commented
about the “Restoring” scenario. “Stabilization” can be either intended to consolidate
a competitive or ﬁnancial position gained from past growth-oriented strategies, or to
maintain the current performance levels that in the past have been made possible by
adjusting capacity to the desired levels.
Fig. 1.19 Main scenarios associated to applying SD modeling to frame the future performance of
an organization
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“Restructuring” is a third scenario. In this context, SD modeling may support
policy makers in counteracting a current crisis condition. The dominant feedback
loops related to the outline of restructuring strategies can be proﬁled according to
two sequential stages, i.e. detecting and enhancing: (1) balancing loops that would
allow the organization to restore conditions that have been lost due to crisis (e.g.
ﬁnancial resources, capacity), and (2) reinforcing loops that will allow the orga-
nization to pursue new growth, after that the dominance of adjusting balancing
loops will have restored the lost dynamic equilibrium. Such reinforcing loops might
foster, for instance, commercial or R&D growth, or the development of intellectual
capital, or positive stakeholder relationships that should enable the ﬁrm to pursue
further ﬁnancial growth.
A fourth scenario is “Revitalization”. This is related to a current “Divesting”
condition, for instance concerning a speciﬁc strategic business area of a ﬁrm that
needs to be re-designed in order to generate future growth. In this context, SD
modeling can support decision makers to identify: (1) the draining balancing loops
that should be enhanced in the short run, to accelerate the dissipation of those
resources that are no more consistent with the new system structure (e.g. the
business model) that should be re-designed, and (2) the reinforcing loops that
should be enhanced in the long run, to foster new growth.
As shown in Fig. 1.19, for each of the four commented scenarios, SD modeling
may help decision makers in identifying the turning points in system’s behavior.
Such turning points would require prompt and purposeful action, to enhance the
dominance of feedback loops that will allow an organization to successfully design
and implement strategy. In terms of strategic and management control, this means
providing the P&C system with stronger feed-forward mechanisms that would
enhance the ability of performance management to deal with the speciﬁc dynamic
complexity embodied by each scenario.
For instance, “Crisis prevention” might imply the identiﬁcation of diminishing
returns from commercial efforts (in terms of sales order rates), due to market
saturation.
In the “Stabilization” scenario, turning points might be identiﬁed into negative
gaps between current (e.g. capacity, or product portfolio average age) and normal
resource levels, which would allow the ﬁrm to preserve a stable performance
condition.
“Restructuring” might imply the identiﬁcation of turning points associated with
the emerging effects on performance that could be ﬁrst originated by the balancing
loops and later by the reinforcing loops enhanced by adopted policies. For instance,
a reduction in the ﬁnancial losses could be generated in the short run by a lower
“debts-to-investments” ratio caused by equity investments, leading to diminishing
interest costs. Also, an increase in the customer base could be obtained in the long
run through R&D policies, enabled by the new equity investments, leading to
improvements in product performance.
A “Revitalization” scenario might imply the identiﬁcation of turning points
related to the draining effects in the short run generated by balancing loops on the
resources that are no more relevant for the new designed business model
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(e.g. competencies, technologies, suppliers). It might also imply the setting of
turning points related to the acquisition of new sources of competitive advantage
that can be fostered in the long run by company policies aimed to enhance rein-
forcing loops (e.g. new technology or market communication investments).
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Chapter 2
The Need of a Dynamic Performance
Management Approach to Foster
Sustainable Organizational Development
2.1 Organizational Growth, Strategy and Performance
The concept of organizational growth concerns the strategic domain of manage-
ment. It underlies the aptitude of an organization to attain a set of results leading to
its long-term success and continuity.
Growth, strategy, and performance are strictly related concepts. Strategic deci-
sions concern the constitution, improvement, or change of a set of structures, e.g.
involving organizational, production, distribution, and cultural assets (Flamholtz
1996; Flamholtz and Hua 2002; Langﬁeld-Smith 1997; Lorange and Vancil 1976;
Mintzberg and Westley 1992; Schreyögg and Steinmann 1987; Wernerfelt 1984).
Such decisions affect the relationships between an organization and its environ-
ment, to change performance (Henri 2006; Kloot 1997; Munro and Wheeler 1980;
Simons 2000).
The strategic decisions’ common denominator can be referred to the search of
performance targets on a set of measures portraying a balanced and sustainable
organization development (Fig. 2.1).
Organizational growth can be, ﬁrst, considered as a qualitative—rather than
purely quantitative phenomenon. In these terms, growth implies development, i.e. a
learning process, enhancing synergies with stakeholders (Ackoff 1986; Coda 2010;
Sorci 2007).
Organizational growth also can be studied under a quantitative (or dimensional)
perspective. This can be framed under both a structural and operational viewpoint.
Under the ﬁrst viewpoint, growth is measured in terms of investment stocks,
available in a given time. Under the second viewpoint, growth is measured in terms
of flows—e.g. sales volumes or revenues, personnel turnover rate, change in
machinery capacity or R&D investments. Such a different perspective of growth
gauges the aptitude of an organization to increase its structural endowment of
resources, over time (Fig. 2.2).
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Though an organization may be affected by a lack of dimensional growth over a
long time span, its survival and lifelong existence cannot disregard a continuous
search for qualitative growth, i.e. development (Greiner 1972). Particularly in times
of discontinuity, pursuing a hypothetical stable condition is a symptom of decline.
Every organization needs learning, which is—in turn—a pre-requisite for
development and growth. Managing sustainable organizational development
underlies an aptitude to match short with long-term, to combine efﬁciency with
effectiveness (Coda 2010).
This chapter prepares the ﬁeld for the analysis of a conceptual and method-
ological framework to support policy makers in framing and assessing performance
within the perspective of sustainability. It emphasizes the need of a SD approach to
enhance “intelligent” P&C systems so as to both manage performance and enhance
sustainable development.
2.2 Three Perspectives of Sustainable Organizational
Development
An organization’s growth rate is balanced if it crosses different perspectives
(Fig. 2.3). With respect to the organization itself, growth can be both assessed
under an internal and an external proﬁle.
Under the internal proﬁle, balanced growth emerges from the search for con-
sistency between different subsystems, sectors, and departmental/functional areas of
an organization, or of a system of organizations (e.g. an industrial network or a
system of public sector institutions). Therefore, an unbalanced growth rate could be
associated with either a size increase or improvement in operations in one area of
engagement to the detriment of another. For example, the performance of a strategic
Growth Strategy
Continuity/
Sustainability
Strategic Resources
Performance 
Fig. 2.1 Organizational
performance, strategy, and
sustainability
Organizational 
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business area (SBA) in a company could be improved by diverting the resources
invested in another SBA in the same company. Likewise, unbalanced growth in the
public sector may imply a too intensive effort towards investments in an industry
(e.g. chemical) to the detriment of another (e.g. tourism) in the same area.
Under the external proﬁle, a balanced growth should be associated with per-
formance rates crossing the three most relevant ‘dimensions’ of organizational
success, i.e.: (1) ﬁnancial; (2) competitive, and (3) social (Coda 2010). Such
dimensions outline the physiological goals of an organization. The ﬁrst dimension
relates to the ﬁnancial equilibrium and proﬁtability, or at least to the balance
between cash in-and-outflows in public and nonproﬁt organizations. The second
one relates to the capability of an organization to satisfy its customers’ needs with
its products or services at a reasonable price, and therefore to generate value to the
users’ beneﬁt. The third dimension expresses an organization’s capability of
meeting the expectations of its different stakeholders, e.g., workers, funders, and
community.
Another perspective in which to assess sustainable growth is time. As discussed
in the previous chapter, an improvement in short-term performance should not be
obtained to the prejudice of long-term results. For instance, the recovery of com-
pany losses by indiscriminate investment-reduction policies, i.e., related to dis-
cretionary investments such as advertising or R&D, can adversely impact company
proﬁtability in the long run. Linking and balancing the short with the long term in
planning and decision-making implies the need to adopt a strategic view of man-
agement. A strategic perspective is strictly related not only to classical long-term
strategic planning “capacity decisions” but also to an analysis of the impact of
current and often inertial decisions on the change in both organizational structures
and external environmental conditions (Hamel and Prahalad 1994, p. XI).
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Framing performance inclusively under ﬁnancial, competitive, and social
dimensions provides a reliable measure of organizational growth rate and sustain-
ability. Sustainable growth underlies a performance rate that is consistent with all
three perspectives, i.e., short versus long term, a given business area versus another,
and the results in ﬁnancial versus competitive versus social terms.
Leveraging on P&C systems to manage growth under the three said perspectives
implies that the following questions are raised:
• Is the P&C system able to support the coordination of different levels of anal-
ysis, decision-making and responsibility? Is performance management carried
out on only a bounded viewpoint or is there also a concern on whether (and
how) different viewpoints can be made coherent with each other? Are strategic
goals consistently cascaded to the lower levels of the organization? Is there a
strategic dialog (both vertically and horizontally) among different organization
levels?
• To what extent are decision makers made accountable on the outcomes pro-
duced by their own actions?
• To what extent are back-ofﬁce units aware of their contribution to the wider
organizational performance and to delivered product/service levels?
• Is the P&C system able to broaden the scope of analysis and evaluation from
ﬁnancial variables to the value generated by the organization into the wider
socio-economic system?
• How is discontinuity perceived and managed? Does the P&C system enable
decision makers to promptly perceive weak signs of strategic change, and to
deal with them?
• Is the organization able to match in its current decision-making processes the
need to keep strategic position with that of detecting and creating new growth
opportunities?
There is the risk that P&C systems are designed and used according to a
mechanistic, bureaucratic, and static perspective. Such risk may determine an il-
lusion of control, rather than an enhanced capability of organizational decision
makers to manage sustainable development, to promptly detect symptoms of crisis,
to look for the causes of ﬁnancial results, to set sustainable restructuring policies, to
search for consistency in different subsystems, sectors, departments or govern-
mental functions.
This issue has speciﬁc connotations in the public sector, where many reforms are
still struggling to tackle consolidated cultures and practices, which are mostly
focused on only the accomplishment of tasks and compliance to regulatory
frameworks, legal prescriptions and procedures (e.g.: data gathering and processing,
reporting results, calculating variances, respecting deadlines). Even an excessive
concern on single technical tools (e.g.: information systems, accounting, or statis-
tical computations) runs the risk of confusing means with ends, and misplacing
focus on the design and use of consistent and “intelligent” P&C systems.
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Today, because of resource scarcity and the proliferation of citizens’ needs and
expectations towards the public sector, P&C systems should be also focused on the
search for continuous process improvement, and the measurement/management of
outputs and outcomes. The need to outline strong political directives leading to
viable performance plans requires that P&C analysts facilitate the planning process.
They should play an active role inside political cabinets in fostering a strategic
dialogue with administrative levels and in identifying—with the collaboration of
departmental managers and the support of management control units—the opera-
tional objectives, as well as performance measures on which administrators should
be made accountable, to attain the strategic goals.
Unfortunately, lack of P&C staff and performance management skills are often a
major cause of blurred and of disconnect/unclear operational objectives formalized
in the performance plans. It is not uncommon for operational objectives to be
deﬁned merely as activity descriptions, rather than measurable targets (Bianchi and
Rivenbark 2012; Bianchi and Xavier 2014).
2.3 Framing Organizational Growth Sustainability:
The Institutional and Interinstitutional Levels
Although the origin of sustainability studies can be seen in the biological sciences,
more than to the managerial ones, a growing interest in the application of
sustainability principles to the management of organizations is evident now.
The literature on balanced scorecards and corporate social responsibility pro-
vides empirical evidence of this phenomenon (Kaplan and Norton 1996; Werther
and Chandler 2006), which is due to the rising dynamic complexity of the systems
in which decision makers now operate. It also can be associated with the scarcity of
available resources, both inside and outside a single organization.
Also, the topic of evaluating organizational performance within a sustainability
perspective is grabbing more and more attention in the ﬁeld of P&C studies and
applications (Dyson 2000; Radermacher 1999; Riccaboni and Leone 2010). One
may envisage two related levels for managing organizational performance under the
perspective of sustainability, i.e., an institutional and an inter-institutional level.
At the institutional level, performance is assessed primarily in relation to the
effects produced by decision makers on their own institution. At the
inter-institutional level, performance is assessed in relation to the effects produced
by decision makers on the wider system, e.g., either a local area or the industry to
which they belong (Bianchi 2010).
Assessing organizational performance on an institutional level maintains a tra-
ditional viewpoint when growth sustainability is evaluated for a business. With
respect to an enterprise, performance is associated primarily with company results,
e.g., sales orders, revenues, income, and cash flows. However, today, due to
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increasing dynamic complexity in the competitive and social systems where busi-
nesses operate, ﬁrms perceive a growing need to assess their performance also at an
inter-institutional level, e.g., when an enterprise takes a leading role in undertaking
vertical or horizontal strategic relationships with other ﬁrms located in the value
chain of its competitive system.1
Assessing business performance at an institutional level is a ﬁrst step toward
assessing performance at an inter-institutional level. In fact, a business that is able
to combine the generation of proﬁts with the creation of new employment, or of
creating new industrial knowledge while increasing product quality at a reasonable
price, is likely to contribute positively to the generation of value for the wider
system. Such value will be measured in terms of tax contributions, increasing
employment, shared knowledge with business partners, etc. This wider-system
value will provide the conditions for the generation of new value to the beneﬁt of
each institution, and hence will generate new growth on an institutional level. So
business growth can be considered as sustainable in the long run only if the ﬁrm
generates value to the beneﬁt of its local area or industry.
The relevant system’s boundaries for such analysis are much broader than those
associated with an institutional perspective. In fact, other public and private insti-
tutions are involved in such a system.
In an inter-institutional system perspective, assessing performance sustainability
requires not only a focus on the single organization’s results, but also on how such
results contribute to the wider system’s performance, a factor that will affect the
organization in the long run. Inside such a wider system, each organization can
build or share with others a given endowment of strategic resources (e.g., infras-
tructures, human capital, capacity, image, and environment). Both the aggregate
performance of a local area or industry and the speciﬁc performance of each
organization inside it are signiﬁcantly affected by the accumulation and depletion
processes of social capital2 and other strategic resources, e.g., infrastructures and
image. For instance, an opportunistic business behavior oriented to maximizing
proﬁts in the short run (e.g., without taking into account environmental pollution or
human capital development issues), will contribute to depleting the quality of the
local area’s social capital and other strategic resources. In the long run, this will
reduce the attractiveness and productivity of the region itself. A lower attractiveness
could be measured, for instance, in terms of a negative market labor-turnover rate
(resulting from the loss of population); a lower productivity could be measured in
1“Accountability may have to be interpreted as the development of mutual accountabilities
between different organizational participants (and indeed between different organizations) rather
than as solely a hierarchical process” (Otley 1994, p. 297. Italics added).
2Social capital refers to the connections among individuals and organizations, and to the norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness arising from them (Putnam 2000). Social capital is not just the sum
of the institutions in a society; it is rather the glue that holds them together.
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terms of yield reduction in the exploited local resources (e.g., labor, raw materials,
suppliers, and funders), and a drop in the level of synergy/collaboration between
different actors in the system. A reduction in the local area’s performance will also
determine—sooner or later—a reduction in the performance of the opportunistic
ﬁrm.
Figure 2.4 shows that strategic resources can be modeled as stocks of available
tangible or intangible assets at a given time. Their dynamics depend on the value of
corresponding in-and-outflows over time. Such flows are modeled as “valves”
which decision-makers can regulate through their policies, to influence the
dynamics of each strategic asset and therefore—through them—organizational
performance at both the institutional and inter-institutional levels (Morecroft 2007;
Warren 2008).
Managing strategic resources to affect performance is a dynamic and complex
task. In fact, intangible resources (e.g., organizational climate, trust, knowledge,
and image) are difﬁcult to identify and measure. Furthermore, processes of accu-
mulation and drain affecting the dynamics of strategic resources are inertial, since
delays underlying them are difﬁcult for decision-makers to perceive, and also
because effects generated by actions taken (or not taken) in a recent or remote past
are intertwined with each other, and single causes cannot be easily matched to
related effects.
A tipping point in managing strategic resources to affect organizational perfor-
mance is associated with the capability of policy-makers to (a) identify those
strategic resources that most determine success in the environment (i.e., competitive
and social systems) where an organization or different organizations operate,
(b) insure that the endowment of such resources is satisfactory over time, and
(c) keep a proper balance between the different relevant strategic resources.
Single organization system: 
Financial, Competitive and 
Social performance 
Multi-organization system: 
local area or industry 
performance
Organizational 
strategic resources 
Accumulation 
rate
Depletion 
rate
Shared strategic 
resources 
Accumulation 
rate
Depletion 
rate
Fig. 2.4 The institutional and inter-institutional levels for analyzing organizational growth
sustainability
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2.4 Framing Sustainable Growth Within
the Inter-institutional Level: Implications
for Public Management
Framing organizational growth sustainability at an inter-institutional level should be
a fundamental viewpoint to assess policy outcomes in public sector organizations.
Particularly, implementing performance management in local government requires
that an outcome view be adopted. This may allow local governments: (1) to assess
the sustainability of their strategic plans and budgets, (2) to evaluate service
delivery, and (3) to explore possible collaborative partnerships between different
institutions in the same region for generating overall public value.
The path toward an outcome-based performance management in the public
sector, however, is still difﬁcult both from a theoretical and practical perspective,
given the amount of effort involved in designing and operating performance
management systems that may frame the public sector’s speciﬁc complexity
(Rainey and Han Chun 2005).
Concerning this issue, while performance management provides a wide area on
which both research and practice have been working with speciﬁc reference to the
private sector since a long time ago, it seems that many experiences matured over
the years from success and failure in this ﬁeld cannot be easily transposed to the
public sector (Talbot 2005). In fact, the public sector is a complex and dynamic
system, which is characterized by speciﬁc features. It is complex since several
institutions (whose roles and competences cover different inter-related domains)
affect performance. Complexity also stands into the constraints imposed to the
public sector decision makers by the existing legal framework. Their decisions must
always comply with such framework, although diverging from them could imply
the achievement of better performance levels—e.g. in terms of efﬁciency and
effectiveness.
The public sector is also a dynamic system, since the effects produced on per-
formance by decisions made by the several (public and private) actors having a
stake on the system itself, can be often observed after long delays. Such delays are
due to the time it generally takes public sector decisions to generate their own
outcomes on the community. They also depend on the huge net of feedback rela-
tionships between different subsystems (for instance, infrastructures may affect
commerce or tourism, and in turn commerce or tourism can affect banking and—
through this last subsystem—infrastructure funding, in a given Urban Metropolitan
area).
Public sector performance has a major impact on the quality of life and may
constitute either an acceleration factor or a constraint for the growth of the
socio-economic sectors proﬁling a local area. A higher accountability of the public
sector, and capability to deliver better services and rules to the private sector and the
community, may generate economic and social value, in the system (Moore 1995).
Such value corresponds to an increase in tangible and intangible strategic resources
(e.g., infrastructures, funding, local area image, skilled workforce) that are available
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to the private sector. An improvement in such resources may result into a multiplier
of the private sector performance, i.e. can determine suitable conditions to deliver
products and services that can generate new value. Part of this value may, in turn,
feed back to the public sector again, not only in terms of taxes and other ﬁnancial
contributions but also in terms of consensus, image, etc.
Figure 2.5a3 shows how both the public and private sector are part of a same
system, and how the rules underlying the survival and development of both sectors
lie behind their own capability to generate value, to make growth sustainable. This
depends on the capability of public and private sector organizations to generate
results (e.g. in terms of products, services or rules), which tend to produce an
outcome whose value corresponds to an increasing endowment of available
resources.
Figure 2.5a also shows how public sector performance does not only feed back
under the form of taxes and ﬁnancial contributions from the community to the
beneﬁt of which a given set of services and rules is delivered, but also in terms of
external contributions.4
So, the private sector feeds back to the public sector: public opinion is primarily
affecting the political level, and income primarily affects the funds that the public
administration will be able to raise through taxes and other sources, to provide the
administrative level with resources to afford public expenditures.
In the described context, a public institution often takes a coordinating role in a
system characterized by multiple actors, i.e., public and private institutions. In
particular, if we aim to evaluate policy outcomes in such setting, the
inter-institutional system’s performance would not result from a mere sum of the
performance levels produced by each single institution. It would be, rather, the
effect of the net relationships and synergies among the different institutions linked
to each other.
For instance, to evaluate the outcomes of industrial district policies, a public
decision maker (e.g. a regional planner) needs to move the focus of analysis from an
institutional to an inter-institutional perspective (Bianchi 2010, pp. 378–381).
3Though Fig. 2.5 may look like a causal loop diagram, this is not properly the case here. In fact, it
tries to capture both the public and private sector into a single and abstract framework. Such
framework remarks the role of the public sector into the wider system where it operates, and
therefore underlies the main conditions for assessing its performance.
4Such additional resources correspond to those that a single public sector institution (or a group of
them) ruling a local area is able to procure from third actors (e.g. the Union funding for infras-
tructure building to the beneﬁt of European Regions). It is worth remarking that this analysis is
relevant not only for those public services generating a ﬁnancial value (e.g. in the case of
infrastructures, education, enterprise funding, local area marketing) but also for those generating a
qualitative value (e.g. in the case of health care, police or environmental care services, whose
indirect outcomes have, however, an economic value too).
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Fig. 2.5 a A systemic framework embodying both the public and private sector: value generation
as a focus for assessing performance and a prerequisite for sustaining growth. b Combining service
delivery improvement with public governance to generate value and trust in government, to deal
with ‘wicked’ problems and to pursue sustainable development of a community’s quality of life
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2.4.1 Framing Sustainable Growth Within
the Inter-Institutional Level (Continued):
The Governance of ‘Wicked’ Problems
The conceptual framework portrayed in Fig. 2.5a advocates the relevance of a value
generation and outcome-oriented performance management perspective as a pre-
requisite to pursue sustainable growth in a local area. Since the 1980s’ and 1990s’,
this model has inspired most international public sector reforms, aiming to pursue
excellent public service delivery as a means to generate value for a community.
Though such perspective is still today crucial for the pursuit of social and economic
sustainable development, it may not be sufﬁcient. In fact, the dynamic complexity
characterizing nowadays’ societies is a major cause of amplifying “wicked”
problems, whose solutions cannot be found only by service improvement in each of
the agencies concerned (Bovaird and Loffler 2003).
“Wicked” problems characterize most of governmental planning, with a speciﬁc
concern with social issues (Bovaird and Loffler 2007; Rittel and Webber 1973,
p. 160). These are complex policy problems featured by high risk and uncertainty
and a high interdependency among variables affecting them. “Wicked” problems
cannot be clustered within the boundaries of a single organization, or referred to
speciﬁc administrative levels or ministerial areas. They are characterized by dy-
namic complexity, involving multi-level, multi-actor and multi-sectoral challenges.
Examples of such problems include social cohesion, climate change, unem-
ployment, crime (Bianchi and Williams 2015), homelessness, healthcare, poverty,
education, societal aging (Bianchi 2015), and immigration (Laegreid and Rykkja
2014).
These problems are usually ingrained in major social issues of modern life,
whose interpretation is not univocal, because it depends on the adopted value
perspectives. Therefore, by simply gathering more information can be insufﬁcient to
understand and resolve them. This implies that there is not a deﬁnitive (i.e. true or
false) solution to them; there can be rather a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ way to frame them and
to proﬁle one or more consistent (or inconsistent) alternative decision sets (Head
and Alford 2013). Wicked problems also imply a multitude of stakeholders. Both
the different interests and the multiple mindsets or cultures related to the policy
makers who may affect a wicked problem imply that—in order to effectively deal
with it—decisions should be made based on a strategic learning process, focused on
conflict resolution and dialogue among the players.
Even material and information delays play a major role in characterizing the
hidden feedback structure underlying wicked problems’ behavior. Therefore,
enabling decision makers to promptly perceive weak signals of change and to
provide reliable keys to frame them is an important attribute for diagnostic and
interactive control systems (Simons 2000, pp. 207–229) in those public sector
organizations that should address wicked problems.
Public Administration has always experienced difﬁculties in dealing with such
problems: speciﬁcally with respect to its capability to support planning, policy
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design, decision making, results measurement, assessing policy outcomes, coordi-
nating decision makers and making them accountable to targets. Examples of such
difﬁculties are witnessed by hierarchical forms of organization and systems of
control, focused on input monitoring or process compliance, resulting into sharp
disconnections between different institutions and among agencies.
Although, since the 1980s, ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) reforms were
designed to ﬁx the described limitations of traditional Public Administration (Meier
and Hill 2005, p. 55), their emphasis on decentralization of power has produced
unintended effects on the capability of the public sector to affect the outcomes
associated with wicked problems. In fact, such reforms have been a major cause of
governance fragmentation (Christensen and Laegreid 2007a) and lack of commu-
nication in and among agencies.
Policy makers are prone to take symptomatic solutions to wicked problems. For
instance, in order to deal with crime, they may focus only input (e.g. police staff) or
volume targets (e.g. number of stop-and-frisks), rather than also outcomes; like-
wise, in order to counteract societal aging, they can be inclined to increase retire-
ment age.
The use of a short-term perspective and a sectoral approach in the formulation
and implementation of strategies lead to a static view of the system and to a lack of
coordination in policy-making between different public agencies, non-proﬁt and
other private stakeholders. This approach may not support governments to identify
sustainable actions, whose policy-making usually refers to several jurisdictions,
both in terms of level (e.g. national, regional, local) and domain (e.g. policing,
welfare, education, justice).
In the last decade, a number of countries have started to develop new approaches
that may enable them to improve cohesion, to effectively deal with wicked prob-
lems, and pursue a sustainable development of local areas under an
inter-institutional perspective. To describe and implement these processes, both the
scientiﬁc literature and practitioners have coined different terms. Among them are
the following: joined-up government5 (Christensen and Laegreid 2007b, 2013;
Christensen et al. 2014),6 whole-of-government (OECD 2005), integrated gover-
nance, outcome steering (Hood 2005), holistic governance, horizontal management
(Peters 2015), and new public governance (Osborne 2010).
5According to Pollitt (2003, p. 35), ‘“Joined-up government” is a phrase that denotes the aspiration
to achieve horizontally and vertically coordinated thinking and action. Through this coordination,
it is hoped that a number of beneﬁts can be achieved. First, situations in which different policies
undermine each other can be eliminated. Second, better use can be made of scarce resources.
Third, synergies may be created through the bringing together of different key stakeholders in a
particular policy ﬁeld or network. Fourth, it becomes possible to offer citizens seamless rather than
fragmented access to a set of related services’.
6Christensen and Laegreid (2013) describe the Norwegian experience in dealing with such wicked
problems, with a speciﬁc reference to welfare services. In 2005, Norway merged the central
pensions and employment agencies and creates a partnership with locally based welfare services.
In the years 2006–2009, Norwegian municipalities established local one-stop-shop welfare ofﬁces.
In 2008, regional pension units and administrative back ofﬁces were established in the counties.
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To implement such processes, three main sets of levers should be synergetically
managed by governments, that is, (1) institutional reforms, (2) organization struc-
tures and performance management systems, and (3) cultural/social systems
(Borgonovi 1996, p. 105).
The idea is to design and implement more flexible and pervasive governmental
systems that may foster a more pragmatic, less formal and intelligent collaboration
among different stakeholders, not only in the public sector sphere.7
The implementation of such reforms also implies the use of an outcome-oriented
view of performance to frame and assess the desirability of the effects produced by
the adopted policies. This approach does not only consider effects in the short run
but also in the long run. Furthermore, it does not only focus them in the perspective
of a single unit or institution but also under an inter-institutional viewpoint, i.e., that
of the relevant system structure generating observed behavior.
By focusing only single (i.e. isolated) input and output measures (e.g. pension or
long-term care expenditures, number of retirees, number of working hours), policy
makers may be inhibited to assess the aptitude of their own actions to ﬁnd sus-
tainable solutions that may deal with wicked problems. On the other hand, by
combining such measures with outcome performance indicators—for instance
related to the community’s quality of life (e.g. change in life expectancy from the
prevention of unhealthy behavior), labor participation, stakeholders’ perceptions
and public support to government policies—governments might better assess their
own policies’ sustainability in both time and space.
A third lever to implement such reforms refers to cultural/social systems.
A fundamental change, in terms of cross-sectoral collaboration and coordination, is
possible if a strong sense of values, team building, inclusion and trust is fostered
among stakeholders. Changing culture and building trust is not an easy and fast
process; it requires that a learning-oriented and systems approach can be adopted to
support the performance management cycle of each unit.
Figure 2.5b provides a synthesis of the discussion developed so far. It shows
that, in order to pursue sustainable growth, ‘wicked’ problems require that public
administrations adopt an outcome-oriented and inter-institutional perspective of
performance management, aiming to generate not only value to the beneﬁt of
individual institutions (e.g. enterprises or households), but also community value.
Such value does not only depend on excellent public service delivery (as remarked
in Fig. 2.5a). It also requires that both public and private sector institutions col-
laborate in public governance, i.e. “the ways in which stakeholders interact with
each other in order to influence the outcomes of public policies” (Bovaird and
Loffler 2003, p. 316). Therefore, ‘good governance’ can be meant as “the
7For instance, in the UK, the Blair government implemented intensive whole-of-government
programs, which led to a stronger role of the center (Christensen and Laegreid 2013). Australia and
New Zealand governments established new organizational units (e.g. cabinet committees,
inter-ministerial or inter-agency collaborative units, inter-governmental councils, task forces,
cross-sectoral programs) to foster coordination among different decision makers (Halligan and
Adams 2004).
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negotiation by all the stakeholders in an issue (or area) of improved public policy
outcomes and agreed governance principles, which are both implemented and
regularly evaluated by all stakeholders” (Bovaird and Loffler 2003, p. 316).
Likewise good services and rules provided by the public sector may generate
new value to the beneﬁt of the private sector (as shown in Fig. 2.5a), good public
governance and public service “co-production” (Bovaird 2007) may improve citi-
zens’ trust in government and—more broadly speaking—social capital. This is a
different kind of public value—in respect to the one that is produced by good public
services—since it refers to the quality of community participation to governance
and to the ability of a community to generate mutual beneﬁts coming from the
aptitude of each player to listen to the others. Such value is a prerequisite to
improve a community’s quality of life, which is a strategic resource affecting the
attractiveness of a local area. Improving the attractiveness of a region may generate
further public value, since it may foster more and better economic and social
activities, leading to local area sustainable development.
Such perspective of outcome-based performance management in the public
sector emphasizes the role of public governance as a means—i.e. as a policy—to
improve a community’s quality of life and local area attractiveness. In this per-
spective, both products and services delivered by the private sector (through the
support of the public sector) and local area attractiveness (as a local community
“product”) are able to affect the value each individual can earn in the society, both
in ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial terms. Fostering such value may both increase sus-
tainable taxation and citizen satisfaction and participation to public governance
(virtuous sustainable development circle).
2.4.2 Framing Sustainable Growth Within
the Inter-Institutional Level (Continued): Financial
Restructuring Planning in Local Government
Financial restructuring planning in local government can provide a second example
of how an outcome and inter-institutional perspective may foster sustainable
development through performance management in the public sector. The topic of
ﬁnancial crisis and growth sustainability in local government has become
increasingly signiﬁcant in the last decade, for Public Administrations. States are
struggling to balance objectives such as: GDP growth, employment, quality of life,
and ﬁnancial equilibrium. Municipal bankruptcies and the need to outline sus-
tainable restructuring plans are today crucial in many countries of the world.
The many targets Public Administrations attempt to address may look as diverging
from each other, if framed on a static and sectoral perspective. Such view is often
adopted by both law prescriptions and the professional practice. Often the primary
focus of analysis is on only ﬁnancial statements and on the adjustment of debts.
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In such perspective, the search for the causes behind the crises is primarily done
in ﬁnancial and juridical terms, strictly related to the institutional dimension of the
perceived problems. Such approach may not support policy makers to understand
how social and managerial phenomena in the wider system have affected the current
insolvency state of an institution. Therefore, it may not support them to outline
sustainable policies in the long run, to counteract the ﬁnancial crises at their own
roots.
Most of such factors can be outside the institutional domain and the control of
local government. Examples of such factors are: the rates at which the stocks of
population and enterprises change over time, employment rates, crime rates, per-
ceived public service levels (e.g. health care, education, transportation), image and
attractiveness of an urban area, trust and loyalty towards government, social capital,
quality of infrastructures, capability to network with other public and private sector
organizations. Public policy makers often misperceive even the delays affecting the
accumulation and depletion processes of local strategic resources. The endowment
and deployment of the strategic resources in a region may differently affect the
drivers of unsuccessful ﬁnancial results.
Therefore, the identiﬁcation of the leverage points on which to act in order to
design and implement sustainable restructuring plans in local governments should
go beyond the ﬁnancial and the institutional dimensions (e.g. increasing tax rates,
selling property, negotiating new loans, or bargaining debts maturity extensions).
In order to recover ﬁnancial equilibrium and competitiveness, many New Public
Management (NPM) reforms have been characterized by a sectoral and too partial
approach. If one considers the current practice in local strategic planning, one may
perceive how urban planners can be inclined to over-emphasize the architectural
and land-use perspectives associated with the development of metropolitan plans;
sociologists may devote more attention to the effects of group behavior and culture
on local performance; accountants and ﬁnancial experts may be too focused on the
technical aspects related to the drawing up of budgets and reports, often linked to
the formal procedures through which public sector decision makers are legitimated
to obtain the resources to implement policies; experts in regional studies may over
consider macro-economic aggregates (e.g. consumption rates, savings, employ-
ment); political scientists and lawyers may overweigh the role of rules and formal
institutional systems.
Though the viewpoint of each discipline may be considered as consistent with
the analyzed topic—if observed within the framework of a speciﬁc study-area—a
sectoral approach runs the risk not to be able to capture the systemic, complex and
dynamic structure of the problem context. Therefore, an inter-disciplinary and
learning-oriented system perspective is needed.
There is a gap, in both professional and organizational terms, in today’s Public
Administration between its current and expected capability to deal with dynamic
complexity. The use of SD modeling may signiﬁcantly enhance the capability of
governments to ﬁll such gap. SD can successfully support the drawing up of
restructuring and reorganization plans, at both local and central government, to
outline sustainable policies that look beyond a ‘debt adjustment’ perspective, and
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may support decision makers’ learning processes about a local area’s capability to
build up and preserve a sustainable competitive advantage and community
development.
2.5 Fostering Sustainable Organizational Development:
From Balanced Scorecards to Dynamic Performance
Management Systems
From the previous discussion, it is possible to observe two issues.
First, though different organizations may sharply differ from each other because
of various structural factors, the same conceptual framework should support their
own performance management cycle. In fact, performance should be evaluated
according to the aptitude of an organization to pursue a growth rate that balances
the short with the long term and is also consistent with the physiological goals of
the organization. These goals compose elements in a wider socio-economic system
to which an organization belongs and to whose continuity and sustainable growth it
must therefore contribute.
And second, the current knowledge and practice in strategic planning and per-
formance management are not able properly to deal with sustainable growth.
In particular, conventional ﬁnancially-focused P&C systems have been consid-
ered lacking in relevance (Johnson and Kaplan 1987; Kaplan and Norton 1996),
since they are not able to provide information that can support either dynamic
complexity management, the measurement of intangibles, the detection of delays,
adequate understanding of the linkages between the short and the long term, and the
setting of proper system boundaries in strategic planning.
To cope with such problems, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has been used by
many organizations both in the private and public/non-proﬁt sectors. The two main
concepts underlying the BSC framework are:
1. Organizational performance cannot be managed by focusing only on
end-results: one should understand how such results are generated, which fac-
tors affect them, and how decision-makers can be made accountable for them.
2. Performance cannot be gauged only in terms of ﬁnancial measures. Also, a
“customer”, a “process”, and a “learning and growth” perspective is needed.
These three additional BSC perspectives on performance may allow one to
understand to what extent ﬁnancial performance is sustainable in both time and
space.
According to Kaplan and Norton, the BSC enables companies to measure
ﬁnancial results while simultaneously monitoring progress in building capabilities
and acquiring the intangible assets they need for future growth (Kaplan and Norton
1996). Therefore, they explicitly recognize the BSC as a strategic tool for the
control of both lag and lead indicators (Norton 2001, p. 4).
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The increasing popularity of the BSC is due to the support it gives to man-
agement in avoiding disconnections between strategy and implementation.
The BSC also stresses the idea of cause-and-effect relationships between measures,
in order to avoid the possibility that performance improvement in one area may be
at the expense of performance in other areas. Kaplan and Norton, indeed, explicitly
stated the systemic interrelationships within and between the four key BSC per-
spectives, incorporating both lead and lag indicators, which impact on organiza-
tional performance (Martinsons et al. 1999, p. 83).
This approach aims at offering a systematic and comprehensive road map for
organizations to follow in translating their mission statements into a coherent set of
performance measures. These measures are not only intended to control company
performance, but also to articulate and communicate the organization’s strategy
(Mooraj et al. 1999, p. 490) and to help align actions from different levels of
management for the achievement of a common goal (Malina and Selto 2001, p. 54).
Furthermore, the BSC enhances managers’ understanding of strategies and
stimulates the creation of a common company vision. The BSC, indeed, forces
managers to elicit, compare and discuss their implicit assumptions and beliefs and
to articulate them for the formulation of company’s strategy (Malmi 2001, p. 210–
214). In fact, managers are requested to contribute to the implementation of the
BSC by identifying a set of objectives that are connected by causal relationships
that are consistent with the vision and mission of the company.
However, it has been remarked how—in order to encourage openness and
frankness of expression (Wisniewski and Dickson 2001, p. 1065)—the support of
an external facilitator leading the BSC construction process is often necessary. This
would also allow the elicitation of managers’ mental models.
In spite of its widely recognized advantages, even the BSC presents certain
conceptual and structural shortcomings. Linard et al. (2002) assert that the BSC
fails to translate company strategy into a coherent set of measures and objectives,
because it lacks a rigorous methodology for selecting metrics and for establishing
the relationship between metrics and corporate strategy.
Sloper et al. (1999) remark that the BSC is a static approach. Although Norton
and Kaplan stress the importance of feedback relationships between BSC variables
for describing the trajectory of a given strategy, the cause-and-effect chain is always
conceived as a bottom-up causality, which totally ignores feedbacks, thereby
conﬁning attention only on the effect of variables in the lower perspectives (Linard
and Dvorsky 2001).
In particular, the BSC approach does not help one to understand:
• How strategic resources accumulation and depletion processes triggered by the
use of different policy levers affect performance drivers;
• How performance drivers affect end-results (both output and outcome
measures);
• How end-results will affect strategic resource accumulation and depletion
processes.
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In order to provide decision-makers with proper lenses for interpreting such
phenomena, understanding the feedback loop structure underlying performance,
and identifying alternative strategies to adopt so as to change the structure for
performance improvement, SD modeling has been used (Bianchi and
Montemaggiore 2008; Kaplan and Norton 2001, pp. 311–313; Linard and Yoon
2000; Morecroft 2007; Richmond 2001; Ritchie-Dunham 2001; Warren 2008). SD
models can be properly linked to either accounting or ﬁnancial models to support
strategic planning and control (Bianchi 2002) and, also, to implement dynamic
performance management.
This topic will be illustrated in the next chapter of this book.
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Chapter 3
Fostering Sustainable Organizational
Development Through Dynamic
Performance Management
3.1 Designing Dynamic Performance Management
Systems to Enhance Sustainable Organizational
Development: Three Complementary Views
This chapter outlines a conceptual and methodological framework to support
organizational policy makers in managing and assessing performance within the
perspective of sustainability. It analyzes the role of SD to enhance P&C systems so
as to both manage performance and foster sustainable development.
The need for a dynamic performance management (DPM) approach is discussed.
To this end, the concept of balanced growth and the institutional and
inter-institutional levels of analysis that have been discussed in the previous chapter
will be now framed through three interconnected views of organizational perfor-
mance, i.e.: instrumental, objective, and subjective. Applications of such frame-
work, based on case-study analysis, are also illustrated.
Designing a P&C system to support decision makers to assess performance
under a sustainability perspective is the core of DPM. It requires a selective and
sequential method of inquiry.
DPM is an approach that enables organization decision makers to frame the
causal mechanisms affecting organizational results over time. Such a ﬁeld of
research and practice is based on two converging methods of inquiry: Performance
Management and SD modeling.
DPM takes its own premises from the literature that has demonstrated the lack of
relevance of conventional ﬁnancially focused P&C systems. Such systems are no
longer able to provide information that can support: the management of dynamic
complexity, measurement of intangibles, detection of delays, understanding link-
ages between short- and long-term, and setting proper system boundaries in
strategic planning. In order to cope with such problems, to provide decision-makers
with proper lenses to interpret such phenomena, to understand the feedback
structure underlying performance, and to identify alternative strategies to change
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the structure for performance improvement, SD modeling has been used to support
an understanding of: (1) how end-results can be affected by performance drivers;
(2) how performance drivers can, in turn, be affected by the use of policy levers
aimed to influence strategic resource accumulation and depletion processes; and
(3) how the flows of strategic resources are affected by end-results.
3.2 The Instrumental View of Performance
In order to apply DPM as an approach to enhance sustainable organizational
development, the “instrumental” view must be taken ﬁrst on a corporate or divi-
sional level, or both. This level of investigation allows one to frame a synthetic
picture of the key performance factors for the overall organization. Although it can
be considered as only an initial step, based on which a more detailed inquiry can be
later carried out on a departmental level, the results it delivers can effectively
introduce DPM in an organization whose culture or size may not be ready to sustain
a more challenging and pervasive investigation. Depending upon the cultural level,
size, available time and other resources of the client organization, this level of study
can also be conducted through insight stock-and-flow DPM modeling or even
qualitative mapping, based on DPM charts.
The “instrumental” view implies that alternative means for improving perfor-
mance be made explicit. In this regard, it is necessary to identify both end-results
and their respective drivers. To affect such drivers, each responsibility area must
build up, preserve, and deploy a proper endowment of strategic resources that are
systemically linked to each other.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how the end-results provide an endogenous source inside
an organization for the accumulation and depletion processes that affect strategic
resources. In fact, they can be modeled as in or out-flows, which over a given time
span change the corresponding stocks of strategic resources, as the result of actions
implemented by decision-makers. For instance, liquidity (a strategic resource) may
change as an effect of cash flows (an end-result); the image and credibility of an
organization towards citizens (strategic resources) may change as an effect of
changes in their satisfaction levels (an end-result).1 There also are interdependen-
cies between different strategic resources: image may affect the capability of an
organization to get funds from different stakeholders. Furthermore, both image and
ﬁnancial resources may affect an organization’s capability to recruit skilled human
resources and keep them.
So, each strategic resource should provide the basis to sustain others in the same
system. For instance, in a Municipality, both workers and equipment provide
1An interesting systemic-control model based on a different perspective, in respect to the instru-
mental view here discussed, has been proposed by Schwaninger (2009, p. 48).
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capacity, which influences the perceived service quality. This affects regional
attractiveness, which, in turn, influences population dynamics. A change in regional
population will affect workload and perhaps the stock of available ﬁnancial
resources, and eventually capacity and service. The feedback loops underlying the
dynamics of the different strategic resources imply that the flows affecting such
resources are measured over a time lag. Therefore, understanding how delays
influence strategic resources and achieved results becomes a key issue for managing
performance in dynamic complex systems.
Organizational growth can be sustainable if the rate at which end-results change
the endowment of corresponding strategic resources remains balanced. This implies
that management is able to:
• Gradually increase the mix of strategic resources, and not only a bounded group
of them, e.g., when a company fosters commercial growth only by expanding its
sales force and other commercial strategic resources, without gradually
increasing its production capacity. This concept leads to the institutional view of
growth, which was analyzed in the previous chapter.
• Resource increase is not obtained by reducing the endowment of the wider
strategic resources in the local area or industry. This concept leads to the
inter-institutional view of growth, which was analyzed in the previous chapter.
End-results can be measured over a sequential chain and positioned on several
layers (Fig. 3.2).
End-results on the ﬁrst layer are those that most synthetically measure the overall
organizational performance. They are flows that change the endowment of strategic
resources that cannot be purchased in the market, i.e.:
Resource 1
End Result 1 Resource 1
consumption
Resource 2
End Result 2Resource 2
consumption
Driver 1
Driver 2
End Result_2 End Result_1
STRATEGIC 
RESOURCES 
PERFORMANCE
DRIVERS
END 
RESULTS 
Fig. 3.1 The “instrumental” view of performance
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1. Liquidity and equity. Though both resources can also be negotiated through
loans and the issue of shares, respectively, a sustainable development implies
that an organization is able to increase them through its cash flows and proﬁts;
2. Resources generated by management (internal) routines.2
An organization can purchase physical resources (e.g. inventory, labor), or
production capacity (e.g. related to people, machinery, or computers). It can
alternatively negotiate contracts for their service use. It can also purchase or build
information resources. On the other hand, it cannot “purchase” stakeholders’ per-
ceptions, customer base, product portfolio, and—to some extent—even commercial
networks. In fact, though the property of patents and product models, or a branch
network can be purchased, only the organization’s capability to build on such
property and add value on it may allow a business to retain and perhaps to attract
customers.
So, end-results affecting resources generated by management (internal) routines
refer to intangible resources that can be associated with: (a) perceptions that
stakeholders in the competitive and social system have about the organization. Such
perceptions (e.g. regarding its reputation and solvency) can change because of the
overall performance—i.e. the organization’s end-results; (b) any other strategic
asset an organization cannot purchase through market negotiations, since they can
be built from only inside the business (e.g. organizational climate, employees’
burnout, morale, intellectual capital, capabilities, product quality, customer base,
and product portfolio).
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Net Cash 
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Revenues
Purchase 
Costs
Change in 
commercial NWC
Financial 
Costs
3rd
Layer
Purchases 
on debt
Sales on 
credit 
Change in 
Inventory 4
th
Layer
Sales volumes Purchased goods 5th 
Layer
Fig. 3.2 Further layers
affecting ﬁrst layer end-results
2Winter (1964, p. 263) deﬁned a routine as “pattern of behavior that is followed repeatedly, but is
subject to change if conditions change”.
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To affect the results positioned on this ﬁrst layer, further layers must be
identiﬁed.
For example, net income and cash flows can be affected by current income and
the current cash flow, respectively. Such flows can be further affected by third-layer
end-results, i.e., sales revenues, ﬁnancial costs, purchase costs, and the commercial
net working capital flow. These more detailed ﬁnancial measures are, in turn,
affected by non-monetary end-results. So, sales volumes affect sales revenues and,
through sales on credit and changes in inventory, also the net working capital flow.
They also affect purchase volumes, which impact on purchase costs and, through
purchases on credit and changes in inventory, on the net working capital flow.
Therefore, in this example, sales volumes can be located on a last layer of
end-results.
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between end-results and strategic resources,
related to the example here illustrated.
End-results should both include output and outcome measures. Since both kinds
of indicators are flow variables, their units of measure are deﬁned as a ratio
between: (1) the measure of the affected strategic resource (stock), and (2) time.
Though the metrics for measuring them is the same, there are strong differences
between the two of them.
Output measures are workload (or volume) indicators (Ammons 2001,
pp. 12–14), e.g.: number of processed applications in the last week, number of
students who passed an exam in the last semester, number of arrests performed by
police in a month, collected garbage or number of trees planted by a Municipality in
Net 
Income 
Net Cash 
flow 
Current  
Income 
Current  
Cash flow
Sales 
Revenues 
Purchase 
Costs 
Change in commercial
NWC 
Financial 
Costs 
Purchases 
on debt
Sales on 
credit 
Change in 
Inventory 
Sales volumes Purchased goods
Liquidity Equity  
Fig. 3.3 End-results
affecting strategic resources
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a quarter, production or shipping rates, sales or purchase orders rates, sales revenue
rates, purchase costs rates.
Outcome measures depict the aptitude of the recorded outputs to: provide the
users with the desired service levels (e.g.: quality, time, scope, and price), or to
generate a change in the endowment of strategic resources shared by different
institutions in a region. Also the previously said ﬁrst layer end-results—affecting
both liquidity and equity, and strategic resources generated by management rou-
tines—are outcome measures.
Though both typologies of performance indicators are end-results for an orga-
nization, outcome measures imply that a longer time horizon and broader system
boundaries are adopted to measure and manage them, in respect to output
indicators.
Lack of focus on both kinds of measures runs the risk of establishing myopic
P&C systems, i.e. that performance management systems may not be able to
support organizations to manage their own sustainable development.
End-results can be affected through performance drivers. Both end-results and
performance drivers are needed in a DPM system: while the former can be influ-
enced in the medium/long-run, the latter can be influenced in the short run. They
provide decision makers with measures of possible weak signals of future change in
the end-results: this allows an organization to perceive and measure the effects of
discontinuity on performance, and perhaps to counteract them. Therefore, such
measures can be useful in order to envisage possible changes in the ﬁnancial,
competitive, or social end-results. For instance, a decline in a competitive perfor-
mance driver might suggest that future sales orders, revenues, proﬁts and cash flows
might decline as well, in spite of a strong current ﬁnancial position of the orga-
nization. Likewise, an improvement in a performance driver (or in a set of them)
might suggest that a restructuring policy is producing beneﬁts that will allow the
organization to recover the targeted end-result flows in the future.
Competitive performance drivers are associated with critical success factors in a
strategic business area. They can be measured in relative terms, i.e., as a ratio
between the organizational performance perceived by clients and a benchmark or
target.
Such denominators are usually deﬁned as standard (or normal or desired) values.
They must be gauged in relation to either perceived past performance, or clients’
expectations, or competitors’ performance, or even as a function of the achievable
targets by the organization (budget values).
Competitive performance drivers can be related to any business functional area,
e.g.: R&D, production, commercial, etc.
R&D drivers refer to the acquisition of a competitive advantage, e.g. in relation
to:
• Quality (e.g.: rework, detected errors),
• Time, and
• Volume.
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Production drivers can be related to factors, e.g. in relation to:
• Quality. Examples are: (1) Project quality (% features ﬁtting with project
speciﬁcations); (2) Quality conformity, (defective products %, rework time %,
number of post-sale product faults); (3) Product reliability and maintainability
(number of post-warranty ‘rescue’ visits to customers, mean time between
failure, average product repair time); (4) Support service in product installation
and use (average time between customer call for assistance and service
delivery).
• Flexibility. Examples are: (1) Volume flexibility (aptitude to promptly change
production quantity); (2) Product mix flexibility (aptitude to promptly change
production mix); (3) Product scope and time to launch new products;
(4) Promptness (time to address customer requests, reliability of company
response time, aptitude to respond to sudden changes in purchase orders);
• Service. Examples are: (1) support and post-sale assistance, and (2) product
customization.
• Efﬁciency, i.e., the aptitude to saturate resource capacity and to maximize
throughput.
Examples of commercial drivers are: delivery delay, shipping rate, minimum
sales order, price, advertising spend, market coverage,3 physical distribution
proximity to clients.
Also social performance drivers can be measured in terms of ratios between
company strategic assets and a target, which can mostly be expressed in terms of
either stakeholder’s expectations or perceived past organizational performance. For
example, a social performance driver could be referred to the ratio between the
actual and planned number of perceived social initiatives undertaken by a ﬁrm.
Financial performance drivers also can be measured in relative terms. For
instance, the debts-to-total investments ratio often affects the change in company
solvency perceived by funders. Such driver is the ratio between two stocks.
Efﬁciency measures affecting operational costs can be gauged in terms of ratios as
well. For example, the employee’s time per unit of workload is an expression of the
ratio between two stocks—employees (unit of measure: people) and workload (unit
of measure: widgets per week), multiplied by a constant (working hours per people
per week).
Among ﬁnancial performance drivers, the cost accounting literature (Cooper and
Kaplan 1988) has devoted a speciﬁc attention to cost drivers. They are related to
factors generating cost variability, due the carried out processes. A cause-and-effect
relationship exists between the absorption of a production factor in the fulﬁllment
of processes and the sustained costs.
Two main kinds of cost drivers can be identiﬁed:
• Volume (or parametric) cost drivers, and
• Transaction cost drivers.
3I.e., the ratio between the company sales agents and the potential customers.
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While “parametric” cost drivers (e.g. the unit consumption rate of raw material
per widget produced) underlie a proportional relationship between the use of a
resource and its cost—as a function of activity volumes—“transaction” cost drivers
do not affect costs related to aggregated production volumes. They rather influence
costs related to the complexity that characterizes those organizations competing
based on their own capability to address a wide range of users and needs.
Transaction cost drivers can be related to:
• R&D and Production: e.g., number of runs/shifts and associated set-up costs;
number of engineering change orders and related product design costs; number
of products/models and related scheduling costs.
• Quality control: e.g., number of production batches or processes and associated
sample-testing costs.
• Distribution: e.g., number of stock keeping units and related warehousing and
transportation costs.
• Administration: e.g., number of customers/geographic zones of sales or number
of sales orders, or invoices, and related revenue cycle costs; and also: number of
purchase orders, with the related material inspection and expenditure cycle
costs).
If framed in a broader context than cost accounting, transaction cost drivers may
provide decision makers with useful insights for strategic analysis, such as the
possibility to frame:
• Trade-offs in time. For instance: higher set-up costs and capacity cost savings (in
the short run) versus technology investments/production flexibility (in the long
run).
• Trade-offs in space (and time). For instance: transaction costs savings (in the
short run) versus higher customer service in the long run; cost leadership versus
differentiation/service competitive advantage.
Figure 3.4 shows an example where competitive performance drivers are
“product delivery delay” and “product scope” (e.g. the number of product models in
a catalogue). A variable named “competitive performance” is also set as a synthetic
performance driver combining both “delivery delay” and “product scope”.4
The ﬁgure also shows two main ﬁnancial performance drivers, i.e.: the days of
sales outstanding (DSO) and the average inventory time. They, respectively, affect
sales volumes and ﬁnancial costs.
Figure 3.5 shows an example of how policies aimed to leverage on strategic
resources may influence competitive performance drivers.
4Since both are normalized (i.e. relative) measures, “competitive performance” would be a
weighted average between the two drivers, where the weight attributed to each of them is a
measure of its contribution to the competitive position of the ﬁrm.
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More speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure illustrates how delivery delay and product scope
are, respectively, affected by investments in production systems and R&D. Such
investments are, in turn, influenced by company liquidity.
Furthermore, the ﬁgure shows how the identiﬁcation of strategic resources may
allow one to detect further performance drivers. In fact, the relative company image
(e.g., in respect to competitor’s image) can be considered as a further variable
driving sales volumes. A better image, in respect to competitors, would act as a
multiplier of the sales orders and volumes that a company might get because of its
current delivery delay and product scope performance. Figure 3.5 also shows that
the customer satisfaction level (strategic resource) affects company image. The
change in customer satisfaction identiﬁes another competitive end-result, which is
in turn affected by competitive performance.
Figure 3.6 portrays an example of a stock-and-flow model mapping competitive
performance. It shows how a business strategic resource system affects two com-
petitive performance drivers, i.e., the “product launched on the market ratio” and
“delivery delay ratio.” The ﬁrst driver is a ratio between the “product launched on
the market” and a benchmark, which is modeled through an input parameter, i.e.,
the “competitors’ products launched on the market.” The second driver is a ratio
between the “delivery delay perceived by customers” and another benchmark, i.e.,
the “competitors’ delivery delay.”
Both drivers are weighted according to their relative importance in affecting
customer demand. So, the “competitive performance ratio” is a synthetic measure of
the previous drivers. This affects a multiplier, i.e., a normalized graph function,
named “effect of competitive performance ratio on sales.” This is multiplied by the
normal sales order rate (an input parameter) to determine the sales orders rate (an
end-result). The sales rate affects both desired inventory and the purchase order rate.
Inventory levels provide shipments, which allow the ﬁrm to manage the delivery
delay. Likewise, R&D investments affect the R&D policy intensiveness, which in
turn affects new-models development and product launching.
Fig. 3.6 A simpliﬁed version of a system dynamics stock-and-flow model mapping competitive
performance according to the “instrumental” view
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3.3 Operationalizing the Instrumental View. From Static
to Dynamic Performance Measures: A Shift of Mind
The analysis that has been carried out so far has emphasized how both end-results
(flow variables) and performance drivers (auxiliary ratio variables) provide orga-
nizations with measures on which to focus planning and reporting.
A shift of mind is needed when a dynamic view of performance management is
adopted. There are common errors and misunderstandings that may happen when
this approach is introduced to people who are used to static performance
management.
One of the main problems that tackle such a shift of mind is the lack of aptitude
by organizations to perceive the relationship between means and ends. Static
performance management tends to overlap the two things.
3.3.1 Resource Measures and Performance Measures
Resource measures should not be confused with performance measures. There is a
means versus ends relationship between the two. If a static view of performance
management is adopted, decision makers may not be enabled to frame such nexus.
In a static perspective, strategic plans run the risk to be a list of abstract and
non-measureable goals (in respect to the outcomes they should underlie), which are
disconnected with management objectives. On the other side, departmental budgets
and actions plans run the risk to be a description of activities.
By following this approach, one may include among the aggregate departmental
performance measures generic objectives related to the fulﬁllment of projects by the
lower responsibility levels. For example, a public sector organization which
embodies in a departmental budget targets such as “launching a website” or “ac-
complishing the highway XYZ”—measured in terms of project accomplishment
percentage or through a binary score (e.g. completed vs. uncompleted)—may not be
able to frame why and how the targeted strategic resources are expected to con-
tribute to the organization’s results. Such plans may not portray the performance
driver(s) that the exploitation of these resources will affect, and the end-results it
will influence in the long run.
Selective identiﬁcation of performance drivers avoids confusion between means
and ends. In fact, it engages planners in emphasizing the attributes on which project
management must focus to contribute to the achievement of organization targets.
For instance, launching a website might allow a department to communicate better,
quicker and more efﬁciently than in the past with service users. Likewise,
accomplishing a highway might allow a department to increase the carrying
capacity of the transportation infrastructure, and therefore to reduce delays and
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accidents. This might lead to a higher attractiveness of the region, which would
increase population.
By switching from static to dynamic performance management, one may shift
the emphasis from only measuring the implementation of performed actions to
measuring and managing their own effects over time, both in terms of outputs and
outcomes (see Fig. 3.7a, b).
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Fig. 3.7 a Example of a static and inconsistent of performance measures. b Example of a
consistent DPM
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3.3.2 Performance Drivers and Performance Indexes
A second problem—related to the previous one—that may happen when DPM is
introduced into organizations whose culture and practice are rooted into a static
view of performance management is confusion between performance drivers and
performance indexes.
Performance indexes are synthetic measures of the quality or state of a system.
Likewise performance drivers, they are usually expressed as ratios. While drivers
affect end-results or other performance drivers, indexes do not affect any speciﬁc
performance measure. They rather gauge a synthetic expression of speciﬁc aspects
regarding performance. Therefore, while performance drivers are relevant measures
for performance management, performance indexes can be relevant for performance
measurement only.5
When organizations try to “convert” static into dynamic balanced scorecards,
they can be inclined to make inversions of causality by confusing performance
indexes with performance drivers, and to connect them to the end-results. For
instance, indexes like “Return on Investment”6 or “Operating Leverage”7 can be
erroneously mapped as drivers of income, while they are an effect of it.
A few more detailed examples of common causation errors related to perfor-
mance indexes and hints on how to reframe indexes into drivers will be now
discussed.
3.3.2.1 Municipal Garbage Collection
Figure 3.8a, b show how the variables “Working time saturation” (the ratio between
the working hours per week and a maximum working hours per week) and “Tons
collected per .000 population” can be useful indexes to synthetically gauge efﬁ-
ciency and effectiveness in garbage collection by a Municipal agency. However, it
would be a causation error considering them as drivers of the “Tons collected per
week” (output end-result) and of the “Change in customer satisfaction” (outcome
end-result). In fact, both indexes are affected by organizational performance, but
they do not affect it.
As Fig. 3.8a shows, though the working time saturation is an efﬁciency index,
the performance measure driving the end-result (tons of garbage collected per
week) is “Tons collected per working hour”. By multiplying such measure by the
5There are cases of measures that are at the same time performance indexes and can be modeled as
performance drivers as well. This may happen when an index affect decision makers’ perceptions
and bias. An example is the “debts-to-total investments” ratio, which often affects the change in
company solvency perceived by funders.
6Operating Leverage is the ratio between the total contribution margin (i.e. Sales revenues–
Variable costs) and Operating income.
7ROI is the ratio between operating income and net investments.
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Fig. 3.8 a Identifying the performance drivers related to the working time saturation index in
garbage collection workers’ productivity modeling. b Identifying the performance drivers related
to the “Tons collected per .000 population” index in garbage collection service provision modeling
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working hours available per week (strategic resource), one may estimate the effect
on workers’ productivity associated with different alternative garbage collection
methods. Though backyard garbage collection is less efﬁcient than curbside pickup,
administrators might consider it as a preferable option, since it might ﬁt more than
the other option with community’s culture and identity.
A trade-off between efﬁciency (cost) and effectiveness (service) could be framed
through DPM.
On the efﬁciency standpoint, an increase in the backyard garbage collection ratio
(i.e. the percentage of garbage to collect from backyards on the total8) would
decrease workers’ productivity and vice versa. So the backyard collection ratio is a
second level performance driver, affecting the “Tons collected per working hour”
(ﬁrst level driver) and—through it—the “Tons collected per week” (end-result). As
shown in Fig. 3.8a, the effect of such second level on the ﬁrst level driver can be
modeled through a normalized graph function.
If observed from the effectiveness standpoint, an increase in the backyard gar-
bage collection ratio would increase customer satisfaction (and vice versa). So, in
respect to the change in customer satisfaction (outcome end-result), the backyard
garbage collection ratio is a ﬁrst level performance driver.
Figure 3.8b shows that, though the “Tons collected per .000 population” is an
index providing a synthetic measure of service provision effectiveness, the per-
formance measure driving the outcome end-result (change in customer satisfaction)
is the “Time to serve households ratio”. Such performance driver is calculated as
the ratio between “Perceived time to serve households” and a benchmark (i.e., a
reference, standard or desired time). As previously commented, the effect of such
ratio on the end-result can be modeled through a normalized graph function.
The change in the perceived time to serve households (end-result) is in turn
affected by the current “time to serve households”, which is calculated as a ratio
between the total garbage to collect and the tons collected per week.9
The ﬁgure also shows that a change in customer satisfaction will affect popu-
lation dynamics, which will in turn affect the total garbage to collect, that will
influence service levels.
From the discussed example it is possible to argue that the feedback loops
proﬁling the structure and behavior of the investigated dynamic system could not be
properly framed by simply linking performance indexes to end-results.
The next examples will give more insights on how to “convert” the performance
indexes that information system’s statistics may periodically deliver, into perfor-
mance drivers that can be embodied by DPM charts and stock-and-flow simulation
models.
8Both “Total garbage to collect” and “Garbage to collect from backyards” are here modeled as
strategic assets, since they are information resources based on which the organization will make
decisions aimed to combine efﬁciency with effectiveness.
9The change in the time to serve households equation is: (Time to serve households-Perceived time
to serve households)/time to serve households observation time. This is a flow related to an
information delay.
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3.3.2.2 Terms of Payment Policies
This example relates to a ﬁrm that is a supplier of other ﬁrms. With the intent to
increase sales, it allows them longer terms of payment (TOP) than its competitors
(normal TOP). However, while sales increase, the ﬁrm also experiences bad debts
problems.
The table portrayed in the upper section of Fig. 3.9 shows that the ﬁrm is able to
collect punctually only the 13 % of its sales on credit. The 30 % of credits is
collected with a delay between 2 and 4 weeks. A stock-and-flow diagram, based on
an instrumental view of DPM, can be sketched to portray how the terms of payment
allowed by the ﬁrm to its customers drive sales orders and revenues on a side, and
sales collections on another side. In such diagram, the values reported as percent-
ages in the table are re-framed as performance drivers.
If the value of A/R at the beginning of the survey providing such indexes were
Euro 150,000, then the days of sales outstanding (DSO) could be estimated as an
average of the collection time in each of the three clusters, weighted by the value of
outstanding A/R for each cluster.
Fig. 3.9 Indexes from overdue accounts/receivable statistics and related performance drivers
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This is a ﬁnancial performance driver, since it affects A/R collection flows (see
the stock-and-flow diagram in the lower section of Fig. 3.9).
This performance measure is still too aggregate to support trade-off analysis and
policy making on the effects generated by aggressive terms of payment policies on
the competitive (commercial) and the ﬁnancial performance of the ﬁrm. In fact, the
DSO is a sum between the reference terms of payment allowed by the ﬁrm10 to its
clients and a collection delay (second level ﬁnancial performance driver) related to
the clients’ aptitude not to honor debts at the maturity date (CRIBIS 2014, pp. 142–
157). Such collection delay can be estimated as an effect of a third level perfor-
mance driver (in respect to A/R collections), i.e. the TOP ratio. This is calculated as
a fraction between the perceived terms of payment allowed to customers and the
normal TOP. The effect of such ratio on the collection delay can be estimated
through a normalized graph function. The output of such variable will be the
number of extra days—in respect to normal—customers would take to honor their
overdue debts. In this case, the higher the TOP ratio is, the higher the clients’
inclination to postpone their overdue debts’ payment will be. In fact, by increasing
allowed TOP, the ﬁrm will run a higher risk to sell its product to insolvent
customers.
The TOP ratio is also a commercial performance driver, since it affects sales
orders through another graph function that is a multiplier, similarly to the graph that
was shown in Fig. 3.8a. Therefore, the sales on credit (end-result) will be equal to
normal sales on credit multiplied by the effect of perceived TOP on sales on credit.
3.3.2.3 Product Portfolio Management Policies
This example relates to a ﬁrm that aims to expand its product maturity lifecycle. It
pursues this goal by leveraging on marketing spend. Figure 3.10 shows the
“marketing spend” parameter as a decision lever. It also depicts the perceived
marketing spend as a strategic resource, since it is a measure of the company’s
marketing effort intensiveness perceived by the market in a given time. The mar-
keting spend ratio (Average marketing spend/Normal marketing spend) is a second
level performance driver, which affects (through a normalized function) the product
time to reach late maturity.11 This is a ﬁrst level performance driver affecting the
flow named “Mature products to late maturity” (end result). A reduction of such
flow over time12 (assuming a constant mature products stock) measures an
improvement in product portfolio management.
10This is modeled in Fig. 3.9 through the variable named “Perceived Terms of payment”. This is a
delayed information variable through which the input terms of payment allowed by the ﬁrm are
smoothed.
11The equation of “Time to reach late maturity” is: Normal time to reach late maturity x Effect of
MKTG spend on time to reach late maturity.
12The equation of “Mature products to late maturity” is: Mature Products/Time to reach late
maturity.
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To calibrate the model functions measuring “Time to reach late maturity”, the
company information system may provide modelers with mature product models’
lifetime indexes, like those depicted by the last column of the table in the upper
section of Fig. 3.10. These indexes show that the 30 % of the stock of mature
models reaches late maturity in less than 2 years; the 50 % in a time between 2 and
4 years; the remaining 20 % in a time between 4 and 6 years. If the number of
mature models at the beginning of the survey leading to the measurement of such
indexes was 20, the past time to reach late maturity could be estimated as an
average between the average survival time of the models in each of the three
clusters, weighted by the number of models going to late maturity for each cluster.
3.3.2.4 Telecom Industry
With the intent to support intellectual capital policies and to strengthen its customer
base, a telecom service provider started a project aiming to “translate” its static BSC
into an insight DMP model, based on an instrumental view.
Figure 3.11 frames the “competency index” as shown in the company BSC. The
skill level and the knowledge level affect this measure. Training can influence both
of them. The skill level gauges staff capability in reducing the time to: (1) ﬁx billing
Number of models to
late maturity
%
>0 yrs<= 2 yrs 6 30%
>2 yrs<= 4 yrs 10 50%
>4 yrs<= 6 yrs 4 20%
20 100%
Fig. 3.10 Indexes from statistics on number of product models becoming late mature and related
performance drivers
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complains, (2) install a ﬁxed line, and (3) restore a ﬁxed line. The knowledge level
gauges the staff capability to respond to customer inquiries and to effectively deal
with them. Such delays contribute to determine the “customer service index”.
In order to understand the impact of those indexes on the change in the customer
base, we considered the competency index as a too aggregate measure to outline a
set of performance drivers that could describe how and why customers could be
gained or lost over time.
We started modeling the skill level as a normalized intangible asset, with values
between zero and ten. As Fig. 3.12 shows, the skill level dynamics is governed by a
balancing loop based on: (1) the desired skill level; (2) the gap between the current
and the desired skill level, and (3) the percentage of the total training time allocated
to skills versus knowledge improvement.
The skill level and the knowledge index are strategic resources affecting the
main intellectual capital competitive performance drivers that influence customer
acquisition and loss rates (end-results).
Figure 3.13 provides a comprehensive view of such factors impacting on cus-
tomer base dynamics.
Concerning the customer acquisition rate, Fig. 3.13 shows the “combined pro-
duct awareness and attractiveness ratio” as a ﬁrst level performance driver. This is,
in turn, affected by two second level performance drivers, i.e.: (1) the advertising
spending ratio, and (2) the product awareness ratio. Other third level performance
drivers affect the product awareness ratio, i.e.: (1) the “price ratio”, (2) the “time to
restore a ﬁxed line ratio”, and (3) the “time to install a ﬁxed line ratio”. The skill
level and the knowledge index influence the last two drivers.
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Fig. 3.11 Factors affecting the “competency index” in the telecom company’s BSC
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Fig. 3.12 Balancing loops affecting the skill level
Fig. 3.13 Competitive performance drivers affecting the customer base
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Concerning the customer loss rate, Fig. 3.13 shows that the “customer service
management ratio” is a driver affecting the customer loss percentage. Other second
level performance drivers affect such ratio, i.e.: the “time to respond an inquiry
ratio” and the “time to ﬁx billing complaints ratio”.
For reasons of space we will now show how we modeled only one of the
previously mentioned performance drivers related to the competency index. The
approach we used has been the same for all of them.
The “time to restore a ﬁxed line ratio” is a fraction between the average time and
the target (or normal) time to restore a ﬁxed line. The average time to restore a ﬁxed
line is the ratio between the total inquires to handle and the flow of restored ﬁxed
lines in a given time span (end-result). The main driver affecting this end-result is
the skill level ratio: the more skilled staff is the less time ﬁxing a landline will take.
Figure 3.14 also shows that another end-result (i.e., “new inquiries to restore a
ﬁxed line”) is relevant to model the average time to restore a ﬁxed line. In fact, it
accumulates into the numerator of such measure: the more inquiries are received,
the higher the time to ﬁx them will be, other things being equal. Two more per-
formance drivers affect such end-result, i.e.: the “network congestion ratio” and the
“network reliability ratio”. Improving them requires network investments and
promptness in changing network capacity, respectively.
Fig. 3.14 Performance measures affecting the time to restore a ﬁxed line
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3.3.3 Applying the DPM Instrumental View to Competitive
Performance Management on a Corporate Level
In this section two examples will be provided, in order to illustrate how an
instrumental view of performance can be applied to competitive analysis in
case-study class discussion.
“Systems Gear LTD” (Bianchi and Bivona 2002) produces and commercializes
industrial machinery and equipment. The performance problem focused in the case
is that—in spite of aggressive commercial efforts (price discounts, salesforce hiring,
and product customization)—company sales orders have been declining. At the
same time, the rising sales orders customization has generated production bottle-
necks and increasing staff burnout.
The case discussion through an instrumental DPM approach, aimed to support
planning and decision making to frame and solve the problem, helps class partic-
ipants mapping the competitive drivers of sales orders and revenues and the
strategic resources affecting them (Fig. 3.15). The analysis of key success factors in
the business helps students identifying delivery delay, technology for production
flexibility and invoicing errors as performance drivers which counteract the
potential beneﬁts on the sales order rate that aggressive commercial policies were
expected to generate.
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Fig. 3.15 DPM chart with an instrumental view: “Systems Gear” case-study
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In a second step of the case analysis, a more detailed insight stock-and-flow
DPM model—based on an instrumental view—is sketched and discussed
(Fig. 3.16). This framework allows participants to outline the customer base as a
strategic resource affecting the sales orders rate. They discover that a sustainable
growth policy is not only related to the possibility to boost the acquisition of new
customers (through commercial policies), but also to the need to drop the loss of
existing customers. Therefore, two more end-result variables are added to the
original map into the new insight stock-and-flow model.
In order to counteract the customer loss rate, a drop in the perceived delivery
delay by customers must be fostered. Since a reduction in the sales orders rate is not
an option, this requires that the product-shipping rate be increased. To this end, the
company needs more production flexibility (leading to more capacity), which
would allow the production department to deal with the rising customized product
sales orders rate. Students then discuss how technology investments might increase
production flexibility, which would increase the production and shipping rates. As
Fig. 3.16 shows, the end-results are also depicted in the upper section of the DPM
model, which frames strategic resources. To distinguish such flows from the others
related to decisions (hiring/ﬁring sales agents, accepting/fulﬁlling sales orders,
investing in technology) aimed to affect directly strategic resources, end-result
flows have been depicted by using a chessboard symbol.
Fig. 3.16 Insight stock-and-flow DPM model based on an instrumental view: Systems Gear
case-study
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Related to this model, class discussion leads participants to frame trade-offs in
time and space. As a next step in this analysis, students are asked to convert the
insight stock-and-flow conceptual model depicted in Fig. 3.16 into an insight
simulation model.
The same method will be now used to frame another case, i.e.: the Saturday
Evening Post (Hall 1976; Maciariello 1984, pp. 56–62; Wynne 1985).
The case describes the rise and fall of a magazine publishing ﬁrm. In this
industry, competition is based on four main policy levers, i.e.:
(1) The annual price of the magazine (i.e. the annual subscription price);
(2) The price per insertion (i.e., the price paid by advertisers). The absolute value
of the advertising rate is not the factor directly influencing the number of
purchased advertising pages per issue. In fact, advertisers’ decision depends
not only on the advertising rate but also on the circulation of the magazine, i.e.
on its total readers.
(3) The annual promotional spending, aimed to raise both trial and regular sub-
scriptions (i.e. circulation promotion);
(4) The volume of the magazine (i.e. the pages per issue).
Since most publishers establish a ratio between the number of advertising pages
and the total size of the magazine, the number of cumulative pages published in a
year (and related costs) may signiﬁcantly fluctuate over time.
Similarly to its three main competitors, the company was vertically integrated,
with large capacity investments; this required a focus on a high sales volumes and
revenues, coming from both a massive diffusion among subscribers and advertisers.
This focus implied that—particularly in the ‘50s—the company undertook
aggressive commercial policies, based on low subscription and advertising rates, as
well as on massive promotional campaigns.
In spite of a progressive increase in the company magazine’s total readers (which
jumped from 3.25 millions in the 1940 to 6.30 millions in the 1960), the magazine’s
publication was discontinued in the 1960 because of the economic losses incurred
by the ﬁrm. Such losses were caused by a rapid increase in production costs, which
was not offset by a sufﬁcient increase in the revenues.
As previously described, this case may be also used in class discussion by
adopting an instrumental DPM approach, with the goal to enhance participants’
capabilities to model the counterintuitive dynamic behavior of variables impacting
on revenues and costs, and to enhance “intelligent” strategic and management
control. Again, the key to conduct this analysis stands into a selective identiﬁcation
of performance drivers. The DPM chart depicted in Fig. 3.17 illustrates that—as a
result of this ﬁrst step in the case discussion—students identify different “layers” of
end-results. This analysis allows one to measure such results not only through
aggregated ﬁnancial variables, but also through quantitative measures describing
the organization’s ability to build up strategic resources through management
routines. These measures are: (1) the number of advertising pages sold per issue,
(2) the number of article pages published per issue, (3) the change in the stock of
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readers (customer base), and (4) the change in the stock of advertisers (i.e. the
number of customer ﬁrms from which advertising revenues come).
The set of strategic resources included in the upper section of the DPM chart
embodies the factors affected by the mentioned end-results, i.e.: (1) the cumulative
number of pages of articles in a year; (2) the stock of advertisers (customers);
(3) the number of readers (trial and regular subscribers); (4) company liquidity and
equity. The identiﬁcation of the other strategic resources is made possible after the
competitive performance drivers have been analyzed.
The chart illustrates the four most important drivers, i.e.: (1) the “advertising
price/readers” ratio; (2) the “circulation promotion spending” ratio; (3) the “cu-
mulative number of article pages” ratio; (4) the “subscription price” ratio.
The ﬁrst driver affects the change in advertising customers and the number of
advertising pages sold (and consequently the number of article pages) per issue. It
also affects the advertising revenues. To increase such end-results, it is not enough
to reduce the advertising rate. It is also important to increase the number of readers.
The other three drivers affect the change in readers, which in turn affects the
circulation revenues.
In order to influence such drivers, the company policies should identify the
strategic resources to build, deploy and combine for each of them. So, readers and
the advertising price perceived on the market are the assets affecting the ﬁrst driver.
The circulation promotion budget spending is the resource affecting the second
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Fig. 3.17 DPM chart with an instrumental view: “Saturday Evening Post” case-study
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driver. The cumulative number of article pages and the total number of pages
published in a year influence the third driver. The perceived subscription price
affects the fourth driver.
An aggressive commercial policy may, on the one hand, increase readers,
advertisers, revenues, and the total number of pages published in a year. However,
the total number of pages published in a year also increases production costs. In
order to reduce such costs, the company may decide to reduce the percentage of
articles pages on the total published pages per issue. If such policy may lead to a
higher income in the short run, it might generate stronger losses in the long run. In
fact, publishing the magazine with higher percentage of advertising than com-
petitors’ magazines would reduce the company image (strategic resource). This
would make commercial policies less effective. For instance, a drop in the regular
subscribers might generate not only a reduction in circulation revenues, but also a
higher “advertising price/readers” ratio. This would lead to a reduction in adver-
tising customers and in the revenues.
Figure 3.18 illustrates the reinforcing loop (R1) related to the growth of readers
and the magazine volume. It also illustrates the balancing loop (B1) providing limits
to the commercial growth from the surge in production costs. This last loop implies
that, to react to a lower income—due to higher production costs—the company
erratically reacts by increasing the advertising price. This generates a reduction in
the magazine volume and production costs.
In order to support policy making aimed to set sustainable development policies
in the analyzed case, as a second step, students are asked to sketch a more detailed
insight stock-and-flow DPM model, based on an instrumental view.
Figure 3.19 frames the loss of regular subscribers as an effect of the subscription
price ratio (driver), which is affected by the perceived subscription price (strategic
Readers
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Fig. 3.18 Feedback loops
associated with limits to
commercial growth:
“Saturday Evening Post”
case-study
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resource).13 The loss of regular subscribers is also mapped as an outflow from
“Regular subscribers” (strategic resource).
Figure 3.20 illustrates the trial subscribers acquisition rate as an effect of the
circulation promotion-spending ratio (driver), which is affected by the circulation
promotion budget spending (strategic resource).14 The trial subscribers acquisition
rate is also mapped as an inflow to the “Trial subscribers” and as an outflow from
the “Potential subscribers” (strategic resources).
Figure 3.21 shows the number of advertising pages sold per issue as an effect of
the “advertising price/readers” ratio (driver), which is affected by the total number
of readers (i.e., trial and regular subscribers) and the perceived advertising price.
Change in perceived 
subscription price 
Perceived 
subscription 
price 
Subscription 
price 
Time to change 
Perceived 
subscription price  
Reference 
Subscription price 
Subscription 
price ratio 
Regular 
subscribers  
Effect of Subscription 
price ratio on regular 
subscribers loss rate   
STRATEGIC RESOURCES
PERFORMANCE DRIVERS
Normal regular 
subscribers loss 
rate %  
Regular 
subscribers 
loss rate 
Regular 
subscribers 
loss rate 
END-RESULTS
Fig. 3.19 Insight stock-and-flow DPM model based on an instrumental view: variables affecting
the regular subscribers loss rate at “Saturday Evening Post”
13The equation deﬁning the perceived subscription price is the same that is used in system
dynamics to model information delays (Richardson and Pugh 1981, pp. 113–115), i.e.: Perceived
subscription price = (Subscription price − Perceived subscription price)/Time to change perceived
subscription price. Subscription price is the policy lever; time to change subscription price is a
parameter measuring the speed at which subscribers are responsive to changes in price.
14Also the circulation promotion budget spending is a resource that should be modeled as an
information delay.
3.3 Operationalizing the Instrumental View. From Static to Dynamic … 97
Figure 3.22 shows the regular subscribers acquisition rate as an effect of the
“cumulative number of pages” ratio (driver), which is affected by the cumulative
number of pages in a year.15 The regular subscribers acquisition rate is also mapped
as an inflow into the “regular subscribers” and as an outflow from the “trial sub-
scribers” (strategic resources).
DPM analysis supports learners in identifying the main cause of the company
crisis, i.e. lack of control on the Advertising “price/readers” ratio, which is the
driver depicted in Fig. 3.21. In fact, an increase in the magazine readers, caused by
the company’s commercial policies, generates an increase in advertising demand,
even though the advertising rates are kept constant by the ﬁrm. The consequential
surge in advertising pages—and, consequently, in the number of article pages—is
the main cause of the experimented instability and crisis. By growing less rapidly
than it did (i.e. by increasing advertising rates when the magazine circulation rises)
the ﬁrm might have been able to contain the surge in the magazine volume and in
production costs (see again loop “B1” in Fig. 3.18).
Change in circulation 
promo budget spend
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Circulation promo 
budget spend
Time to change 
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Trial subscribers 
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END-RESULTS
Trial 
subscribers 
acquisition  
rate
Fig. 3.20 Insight stock-and-flow DPM model based on an instrumental view: variables affecting
the trial subscribers acquisition rate at “Saturday Evening Post”
15The “published pages per issue” variable is calculated as follows: Pages of advertising sold per
issue (1 + % Articles pages).
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This policy is framed in Fig. 3.23. The balancing loop “B2” illustrates that—by
setting a desired Advertising “price/readers” ratio—an increase in the readers,
leading to a decrease in the advertising price/readers ratio, would generate a negative
gap between the desired and actual value of this ratio. Such a negative gap would
suggest the ﬁrm to increase the advertising price. This would increase the
Advertising “price/readers” ratio up to an—although transient—equilibrium state.
The consequential reduction in the advertising pages might be beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm.
Figure 3.24 summarizes through a stock-and-flow diagram the end-results
affecting the dynamics of subscribers and the three main drivers impacting on them.
3.3.4 Cascading the DPM Instrumental View
from a Corporate to a Departmental Level
The examples discussed in the previous section have shown how to apply an
instrumental DPM chart to competitive performance management on a corporate
level.
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Adverts Price/Readers ratio
Fig. 3.21 Insight stock-and-flow DPM model based on an instrumental view: variables affecting
the advertising pages sold per issue at “Saturday Evening Post”
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In this section we will analyze how to cascade it from a corporate (or divisional)
to a departmental level.
Figure 3.25 shows a simpliﬁed version of the DPM chart that was previously
illustrated in Fig. 3.5. It deﬁnes, on a corporate view, the product scope ratio and
Regular 
subscribers  
STRATEGIC RESOURCES
Reference 
Cumulative number 
of pages ratioCumulative number of 
pages ratio
PERFORMANCE DRIVERS
Regular 
subscribers 
loss rate
Potential 
subscribers
Effect of cumulative number of pages ratio on regular 
subscribers acquisition  rate
Trial 
subscribers 
acquisition  
rate
Trial 
subscribers
Normal regular 
subscribers 
acquisition rate % 
Regular subscribers 
acquisition rate
END-RESULTS
Regular 
subscribers 
acquisition 
rate
Pages of adverts 
sold per issue
Published pages per 
issue
Cumulative 
number of 
pages in a year
% Articles pages
Fig. 3.22 Insight stock-and-flow DPM model based on an instrumental view: variables affecting
the regular subscribers acquisition rate at “Saturday Evening Post”
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the relative company image as performance drivers. Several strategic resources
affect the ﬁrst driver.
Although such corporate DPM chart may have the merit to be synthetic, it might
not be very helpful in understanding how management may build up and deploy
such resources in order to affect the product scope. This issue refers to the problem
we have discussed in the ﬁrst chapter of this book about the need to coordinate
strategic and management control. To this end, performance drivers should be
Potential 
subscribers
Trial 
subscribers 
acquisition  
rate
Trial 
subscribers
Regular 
subscribers 
acquisition  
rate
Regular 
subscribers
COMPETITORS Total Readers
Circulation Promo 
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Cumulative number of 
Pages of Articles ratio
Subscription 
price ratio
Fig. 3.24 The dynamics of subscribers and related performance drivers at “Saturday Evening
Post”
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Fig. 3.25 A synthetic instrumental DPM chart on a corporate level
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cascaded into the lower hierarchical levels of the organization, to understand how
each department is expected to contribute to their achievement.
Figure 3.26 shows how a product scope measure, deﬁned as a target on a
corporate level, might be cascaded to three organization departments, i.e.: R&D,
Marketing, and Commercial. An instrumental DPM view is replicated to the lower
organizational levels.
The ﬁgure illustrates that, in order to improve the product scope, the commercial
department might affect the company sales if the end-results delivered by the
Marketing department will increase the stock of total models launched on the
market (strategic resource). The Marketing department, in its turn, will be able to
affect a target of new models launched on the market in a given time span (e.g. a
1-year budget) if: (1) the departmental drivers affecting such end-results will be
identiﬁed and managed, and (2) the R&D department will allow Marketing to
exploit a targeted stock of total new models to promote on the market.
This implies that R&D will set as a departmental end-result a given target of new
designed and tested models in a given time span. It also implies that departmental
performance drivers affecting such result and corresponding strategic resources will
be identiﬁed.
Figure 3.27 clariﬁes how focusing end-results on a departmental level—as a
consequence of cascading strategic corporate performance drivers—may allow one
(in a third stage of the planning process) to better outline on a corporate level the
performance drivers and end-results that will enable the ﬁrm to build up the
strategic resources that cannot be purchased, such as in the case of the product
models launched on the market.
A synthetic view of the analyzed feedback process is depicted in Fig. 3.28.
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Fig. 3.26 Cascading the instrumental DPM chart to a departmental level
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Fig. 3.27 Enhanced instrumental DPM chart on a corporate level
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Fig. 3.28 A synthetic view of the instrumental view DPM process: from a corporate to a
departmental level
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3.3.5 Cascading the DPM Instrumental View
from a Corporate to a Departmental Level
(Continued): “Mosaicoon” Case-Study
Cascading a DPM instrumental view from a corporate to a departmental level may
also allow an organization to start focusing the main “administrative products” that
departments are expected to deliver in the fulﬁllment of the processes leading to the
targeted end-results. This analysis prepares the ﬁeld to the “objective” view of
DPM, which will be discussed in the Sect. 3.4 of this chapter.
To provide another example of how this analysis can be performed, a case-study
will be now discussed.
Mosaicoon is a small company whose core business is the development of
innovative advertising “models” that combine the components of traditional
advertising campaigns with those of interactive videos. This is referred as ‘viral
advertising’ (Bianchi et al. 2015).
The company’s product portfolio includes: (1) design, creation, distribution and
tracking of viral videos; (2) development of web pages and institutional websites;
(3) design of interactive tools for existing websites; (4) creation and promotion of
interactive products; (5) viral diffusion of existing advertising videos on the web.
Figure 3.29 illustrates how liquidity, company image, quality of videos, and the
capability of the ﬁrm to submit new commercial proposals, are the strategic
resources that mostly affect both the flow of proposals accepted by customers and
the rate of implemented projects. Such end-results pertain to the “Creative” area of
the business. To pursue them, relevant performance drivers that this area should
affect and constantly monitor are: (1) the relative price, and (2) the relative quality
of videos.
The stock of total commercial proposals submitted by the ﬁrm is a precondition
to improve accepted proposals and to implement projects. The commercial area
affects the availability of such resource. To this end, the commercial area focuses on
Fig. 3.29 Applying a DPM instrumental view on a departmental level: Mosaicoon case-study
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the following performance drivers (ratios): commercial contacts, commercial staff,
and time to gain new contacts.
Once a viral video has been made, it is ready to be broadcast on the web through
a seeding process. Both the company and external partners share the videos on the
web (e.g., on social networks and blogs), with the goal to deliver its customers a
high quality service. This end-result is measured in terms of number of Internet
views. While getting more views allows Mosaicoon to increase cash flows (which
are proportional to the viral effect of the video), at the same time it improves its
market image.
To affect such end-results, the “Seeding” area of the ﬁrm should influence the
relative quality of videos (performance driver). This measure is affected by
investing on intellectual capital (both staff development and selection of seeding
partners).
3.3.6 Cascading the DPM Instrumental View
from a Corporate to a Departmental Level
(Continued): University Management
A second example, mostly related to public management, will be now discussed.
Figure 3.30 shows how an instrumental view of DPM may help a University in
coordinating departments with central ofﬁces and faculties to sustain growth in
research, teaching, and the placement of graduates.
Fig. 3.30 Applying a DPM instrumental view on a departmental level: University management
(adapted from: Cosenz and Bianchi 2013)
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From the DPM chart it is possible to argue that the end-results generated through
scientiﬁc publications by the University departments contribute to the improvement
of three main strategic resources, i.e.: (1) University image; (2) researchers and
teaching staff skills, and—if research is committed by funding stakeholders or its
outcomes are transferred to them at a price—(3) liquidity.
Main performance drivers that may allow departments to pursue such end-results
are related to the volume, quality and time through which research is carried out.
Relevant strategic resources to affect such drivers are: staff (both in terms of size
and skills), equipment, and liquidity.
University image, trainers’ skills, and liquidity are strategic resources on which
the outline, the promotion and delivery of quality teaching curricula can be carried
out. Other strategic resources are: teaching equipment and administrative staff.
The better the quality and coordination of such resources is, the higher the
number and level of skilled enrolled students and graduates will be (outcome
end-result). Other output end-results related to the “Education” area are: (1) the
number of enrolled students in a year, and (2) the change in the offered curricula.
Main performance drivers affecting these end-results are related to: (1) quality of
teaching, (2) time allocated to teaching and tutoring, (3) available equipment
capacity (e.g. classrooms, labs), (4) time allocated to promote teaching curricula on
the market, (5) innovativeness of curricula, and (6) University image.
The stock of the University graduates and their skill level are strategic resources
on which the central ofﬁces may build to promote placement.
A ﬁrst important end-result (an outcome) related to their activity is the graduate
recruiting rate, which is an outflow from the stock of graduates looking for a job
and an inflow into the stock of recruited graduates.
The main performance drivers affecting the volume of recruited graduates in a
given time span are related to: (1) the graduates’ skill level, (2) the size and scope of
the university network with various stakeholders (e.g. enterprises), and (3) the
University image.
A second outcome affected by the placement of graduates is the change in
University image. This is affected by: (1) the percentage of recruited graduates of
the total, (2) their skill level, and (3) the size and quality of the stakeholders’
network.
A third end-result related to the “Placement” area is the change in the stake-
holders network. This is an output measure that is affected by: (1) the time allocated
by staff to develop the network, (2) the staff skill level, and (3) the University
image.
A fourth outcome end-result measure through which “Placement” affects
departmental scientiﬁc research is the flow of new applied research projects funded
by networked stakeholders. Though this is not a result that can be explicitly linked
to the graduates’ placement promotion activity, it is strongly related to it. In fact, the
previously commented measures (graduates recruiting rate, change in stakeholders
network, change in university image) affect strategic resources that will, in turn,
influence the probability that the University will agree with stakeholder partners to
start new applied research projects funded by them or by third institutions.
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3.3.7 Modeling Strategic Resources
The analysis developed in this section has identiﬁed ﬁve different kinds of strategic
resources, i.e.:
1. Physical resources (e.g.: employees, machinery, inventory, points of sale).
Such resources (or the services they provide) can be purchased. They are
measured in units.
2. Capacity resources (e.g. manpower, machinery). They measure potential bot-
tlenecks in the process of either transforming raw materials into end products or
delivering a service. They are measured in units of production capacity per time
(for instance: number of products/week).
3. Information resources (e.g.: orders backlog, expected demand, total working
hours done). They are referred to either reports (including “coded” information)
or organization decision makers’ perceptions (implying “non-coded” informa-
tion). Their unit of measure is the same as the reported or perceived variable.
4. Resources generated by management (internal) routines (e.g.: knowledge,
business image, delivery delay perceived by customers, product quality, product
portfolio, customer base). They cannot be purchased on the market. They are
associated with: (a) perceptions that different stakeholders in the competitive
and social system have about the organization. Such perceptions (e.g. regarding
its reputation and solvency) can change by affecting the “ﬁrst layer” end-results
of the organization; (b) any other strategic asset the organization cannot pur-
chase on the market, and can be built only inside on it (e.g. organizational
climate, employees’ burnout, morale, intellectual capital, capabilities, product
quality, customer base, and product portfolio). If such resources refer to
stakeholders’ perceptions, their unit of measure is the same as the perceived
variable. If they refer to assets that can be built up from only inside an orga-
nization, their unit of measure can be either dimensionless (as in the case of all
intangibles) or in terms of units (such as for product portfolio and customer
base).
5. Financial resources (e.g.: bank balances, equity, machinery value, inventory
value, accounts receivable, accounts payable). They are reported in the orga-
nization’s balance sheet (i.e. assets, liabilities, and equity). Their unit of measure
is in currency terms.
Management implies that different types of strategic resources affect each other.
Figure 3.31 shows an example of how to model physical and capacity resources.
The rates at which the capacity stock changes over time are affected by the physical
resource co-flows, multiplied by a “unit capacity” parameter.
Figure 3.32 shows that a physical resource depletion rate can be affected by:
• Information resources (e.g. raw materials inventory depletion rate depends on
the sales orders backlog, which is an information resource);
• Capacity resources (e.g. raw materials inventory depletion rate is also affected
by human and/or machinery production capacity);
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• Resources generated by internal routines (e.g. human resources attrition time
can be affected by workers’ motivation or morale, or by organizational climate).
The example in Fig. 3.33 shows how a physical resource can affect the outflow
of a “coded” information resource. For instance, product-shipping rate from
inventory (physical resource) can affect the depletion rate of the sales orders
backlog (“coded” information resource). The ﬁgure also shows that the inflow of a
“coded” information resource can affect the flow changing another “non-coded”
information resource. For instance, the sales orders rate accumulating into the sales
order backlog (“coded” information resource) may change the perceived sales
orders rate.
Figure 3.34 shows an example of information resources affecting a resource
generated by management (internal) routines. For example, product reliability
perceived by customers (resource generated by internal routines) is affected by the
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Fig. 3.31 Relationships between physical and capacity resources
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Fig. 3.32 Possible kinds of resources affecting the depletion rate physical resources
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“product failure rate” (driver), which is the ratio between two information resour-
ces, i.e.: (1) “Accumulated product failure rate” (numerator) and a benchmark
(denominator), and (2) Accumulated sales.
Related to the previous example, Fig. 3.35 shows another example framing
possible relationships among resources generated by internal routines. The perceived
product failure rate by customers (“non-coded” resource), may affect—through a
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Fig. 3.33 Relationships between physical resources, “coded”, and “non-coded” information
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Fig. 3.34 Relationships between information resources and resources generated by internal
routines
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performance driver (ratio between such resource and a benchmark)—the average
time to lose customers, which is the denominator of the customer loss rate, i.e. an
outflow of the customer base (“coded” resource).
The structure portrayed in Fig. 3.36 shows how physical resources affect
ﬁnancial resources. This is possible through co-flows. For instance, equity (ﬁnancial
resource) is affected by income (inflow to such resource), which depends on the
revenues from quantities of shipped physical resources (outflows from end-product
inventory) and costs from purchased physical resources (inflows to raw material
inventory). We may use the same structure to frame how: (1) liquidity (strategic
resource) is affected by cash flows; (2) accounts receivable (strategic resource) is
affected by the revenues from widgets sold on credit, and (3) accounts payable
(strategic resource) is affected by the costs of raw materials purchased on credit.
Figure 3.37 shows how ﬁnancial resources can affect physical resources. For
example, the machinery acquisition is affected by available liquidity, as well as unit
costs and the time to build up such resource.
Figure 3.38 frames how a ﬁnancial resource can affect another ﬁnancial
resource, which in turn affects a resource generated by internal routines, that will
affect a physical resource. For example, available liquidity affects the average
intellectual capital investment (ﬁnancial resource). This affects employees moti-
vation (resource generated by internal routines), which affects the stock of per-
sonnel (physical resource) through the attrition time.
Example:
Customer base (customers), 
whose retention rate is affected 
(through the time to lose 
customers) by the perceived 
product failure rate.  
Resource 
generated by 
internal routines
Change in resource generated 
by internal routines
Time to change 
resource generated 
by internal routines
Effect of performance driver
(Information to filter)
Resource 
generated by 
internal routines
Performance driver
Benchmark
Change in resource 
generated by internal 
routines
Time to change 
resource generated 
by internal routines
Effect of performance driver
(Information to filter)
Fig. 3.35 Relationships among information resources
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3.3.8 Implicit Modeling of Performance Drivers in System
Dynamics
To conclude the analysis of how to model performance drivers through a instru-
mental view of DPM, a few more thoughts can be useful in relation to the possi-
bility to identify implicit performance drivers in SD models.
Figure 3.39a provides an example.
This stock-and-flow model shows the sales orders rate (end-result) as an effect of
the stock of sales agents (strategic resource) multiplied by and the average sales
orders per agent (parameter).
This simpliﬁed model only apparently does not embody a performance driver
affecting sales orders through sales agents.
It, rather, underlies a number of implicit hypotheses, i.e.:
1. The ﬁxed parameter measuring sales agents’ unit productivity (“Avg. Sales
orders per agent”) is related to an implicit standard performance driver. If, for
example, the parameter equals to 100 «widgets/agent/week», and if the initial
stock is 10 «agents», then—at the beginning of the simulation—the driver (i.e.
the “sales agents ratio”) will be equal to the ratio between the company’s and
“normal sales agents”, which equals 10 salespeople.
Example:
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Fig. 3.38 Relationships among ﬁnancial resources and between them and: (1) resources generated
by internal routines, and (2) physical resources
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2. A linear relation exists between sales agents and sales orders. Therefore, the
sales orders multiplier measuring the effect of the “sales agents ratio” on sales
orders is proportional to the “Avg. Sales orders per agent” parameter.
This modeling approach has, undoubtedly, the merit to provide a simple feed-
back structure in respect to the alternative one that would make the performance
driver explicit. To develop a SD model supporting DPM, this approach can be
recommended if: (1) non-linear relationships (e.g. due to market saturation and
competition) regarding the effect of salesforce on sales orders are not signiﬁcant,
and/or (2) the sales agents stock is not subject to signiﬁcant changes in simulation
time horizon.
If these conditions do not occur, such modeling approach implies a risk of
oversimpliﬁcation, particularly when a DPM approach is adopted. In fact, it both
lacks emphasizing the process through which sales agents would allow the ﬁrm to
receive sales orders, and it also implies that a linear relationship between sales
agents and sales orders exists.
On the contrary, there might be diminishing returns in such relationship. For
instance, an alternative performance driver—such as the “market coverage ratio”
Sales orders rate
Sales orders 
backlogSales agents
Hire rate Attrition rate
Avg. sales orders 
per agent
Visits rate
Total 
visitsNumber of 
museums
Museums 
opening rate
Museums 
shutdown rate
Normal visits 
rate
Effect of number of 
museums on district 
attractiveness 
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3.39 a Implicit identiﬁcation of performance driver in modeling how sales agents affect the
sales orders rate. b Implicit performance standard identiﬁcation in modeling the effect of the stock
of museums on the visits rate
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(Agents/Potential customers)—that might improve the capability of such model to
explain how hiring salespeople can affect sales orders.
Also, an additional performance driver affecting sales orders might be identiﬁed;
e.g. “market share” (customer base/total customers), which might affect sales agents
productivity as a multiplier.
A similar example (Fig. 3.39b) refers to the effect of the number of museums in
a region (strategic resource) on the visits rate (end-result).
Deﬁning a graph function (such as the “Effect of number of museums on district
attractiveness”) that is multiplied by the “normal visits rate” (ﬁxed parameter) to
affect the flow of visits implies the following:
1. The graph function implicitly embodies a performance driver (i.e. ratio between
the number of museums in the district and the “normal number of museum”). In
this simpliﬁed model, the total number of museums in the district directly affects
the attractiveness multiplier. Therefore, the “normal number of museums” will
be the value in the “x” axis of the graph function to which a value of 1 will
correspond in the ‘y’ axis. For instance, if the value of 10 museums corresponds
to a multiplier of 1, this will be the performance standard for this strategic
resource.
2. If the parameter equals, for instance, 100 “visitors/museum/week”, this will be
the volume of visits (end-result) that is expected if the number of museums
(strategic resource) equals to the normal (i.e. the standard of 10 “museums”).
The comments to this feedback structure are very similar to those related to the
previous one. Therefore, the structure has the advantage to be simple—and there-
fore—easy to frame, particularly if it is embodied into a much larger model.
However, also this structure may imply the risk of hiding an important performance
standard, and the process through which the end-results can be affected.
3.3.9 Comparing the Instrumental View of DPM
to the Dynamic Resource-Based View
The literature and practice on SD applied to strategic management has developed a
complementary approach to the described “instrumental” view of DPM, implying
the study of the dynamic conditions leading an organization to build up and defend
its competitive advantage over time. Such an approach has been deﬁned as
Dynamic Resource-based View (DRBV).
Previous studies adopting a DRBV of organizations have conﬁrmed that the
management of strategic resources, and more speciﬁcally the maintenance of an
appropriate balance between such assets, is the key to sustainable development
(Morecroft 2007; Warren 2008).
The emerging models all focus on the building up and decline of core assets,
including workers, equipment, population, workload, perceived service quality, and
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ﬁnancial resources. Each of the strategic resources can, to some extent, be con-
trolled in isolation of the others; however, where there is not balanced growth or
coherence in the assets, then organizations will likely be unable to grow to achieve
their own potential, or might grow in a non-sustainable way. The two common
features in strategic resource management, as shown in Fig. 3.40, are the require-
ment for consistency between strategic assets and the need to actively manage each
strategic asset to maintain balance.
A synthesis of both approaches is portrayed in Fig. 3.41. The ﬁgure emphasizes
how the primary focus on resource consistency and on competitive advantage
related to the DRBV may enhance an analysis of how performance drivers and
related strategic resources can be modeled through the instrumental view of DPM.
On the other hand, the primary focus of DPM is not on the analysis of the
conditions ensuring a ﬁrm to build up and defend its competitive advantage. It is,
rather, on enhancing P&C systems through a “dynamic” and “intelligent” reporting
of performance measures, and on providing decision makers with suitable keys to
frame how and why such measures may change over time, as a function of adopted
policies and of external factors.
Given the focus of DPM on performance measures, the conceptual starting point
of this modeling approach is provided by the identiﬁcation of the end-results and, as
previously shown, of the related performance drivers, based on which strategic
resources will be identiﬁed. The focus of this approach on performance measure-
ment/management (at both the ‘end-results’ and ‘drivers’ levels) may allow
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Fig. 3.40 A dynamic resource-based view
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controllers to enhance formal planning, reporting, and accountability on such
measures. It may also allow them to improve the design of performance manage-
ment systems.
Based on these remarks, the described logical sequence “end results → per-
formance drivers → strategic resources” related to an “instrumental” DPM analy-
sis, can be deﬁned as a P&C perspective. In fact, it primarily aims to feed planning,
reporting and performance evaluation.
On the other hand, if one considers the decision-making perspective, related to
the implementation of plans, and to the undertaken actions to generate results that
will be framed into performance reports, then the logical sequence to implement an
instrumental DPM view is the opposite. In fact, decisions will build up, deploy and
combine strategic resources, to affect drivers, which will influence the end-results,
which will in turn affect those strategic assets that cannot be purchased through
market negotiations. Both perspectives complement each other (Fig. 3.42).
End-Results
Strategic Resources
Performance Drivers
P&C perspective
Decision-making Perspective
Fig. 3.42 Sketching an
instrumental DPM view: a
P&C and a decision-making
logical sequence
Fig. 3.41 A synthesis of a DRBV and the instrumental view of DPM as complementary
approaches to manage organizational growth in a sustainable development perspective
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3.4 The Objective View of Performance
In the previous section it was observed that a corporate or divisional level of
analysis through the instrumental view may allow one to deﬁne aggregate rela-
tionships affecting organizational performance. It has been also remarked that, by
cascading corporate performance drivers on a departmental level, a closer analysis
can be carried out.
Applying the instrumental view could be considered as an exhaustive way to
implement DPM if:
• A simple organization structure (both in terms of responsibility levels and
disaggregation of roles) does not require any further detail. This is a typical
context that can be found in small businesses.
• The impact of back-ofﬁce and support activities on performance drivers is
marginal,
• The organizational culture towards a “dynamic” view of performance man-
agement is weak, and
• The client-organization cannot rely on sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources and pro-
fessional skills to sustain a pervasive DPM project.
The main goal of designing and implementing only an instrumental view is not
to integrate DPM into formal P&C and evaluation systems. It is, rather, to support
strategic planning by framing (also through insight SD simulation) the aggregate
causal relationships among factors portraying organizational performance over
time.
By integrating DPM into formal P&C and evaluation systems, one may better
identify: (1) the performance drivers which mostly affect the end-results, (2) how
decision-makers can concretely affect them, and (3) how decision-makers can be
made accountable on them.
However, to pursue these goals, it is necessary to extend the instrumental view
and to link it to two other views of performance management. Such views refer to:
• How the organization is expected to meet the performance drivers and the
end-results identiﬁed through the instrumental view (the objective view of
performance), and
• Who, in an organization, is responsible for the fulﬁllment of the activities that
will allow one to deliver the associated “products” (the subjective view of
performance).
This section will illustrate the objective view of DPM. Such view adopts a
combined external and internal perspective (in respect to the organization). In fact,
ﬁrst of all it requires the identiﬁcation of the clients/users or, more broadly
speaking, the stakeholders with whom it interacts. It also requires that the products
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or services and social beneﬁts it delivers be outlined. The “clients-products” of an
organization should be identiﬁed under a competitive and social proﬁle.16
Under the competitive proﬁle, such analysis must focus on the deﬁnition of both
the groups of clients or users whose needs are satisﬁed by an organization, and the
products or services delivered to them.
Under the social proﬁle, such analysis must focus on the deﬁnition of different
groups of stakeholders towards an organization, and of the social beneﬁts provided
to them.
Identifying a “clients-products” system allows one to better focus the output and
outcome end-results related to the instrumental view. The concept of “product”
should not be restricted exclusively to the ﬁnal result of manufacturing or com-
mercial activities. Also, when an organization delivers a physical product, the
service outcome can often be extended to a wider product system, i.e., an “offer
package” that is consistent with key success factors for excelling in competition to
serve clients and other stakeholders.
That is the case with pre and post-sale assistance. The concept of “product” also
relates to the support of clients in inventory management, invoicing, and more
broadly in collection-cycle management. In all these cases, although the main
product might have its own autonomous proﬁle, other collateral and intangible
products can be identiﬁed in the assistance and consulting services provided to
clients. The quality of such “products” and their consistency with client’s expec-
tations often signiﬁcantly affect the main product performance.
The analysis of clients/products must be complemented by an internal one. This
implies the identiﬁcation of management processes, i.e., groups of homogeneous
and inter-related activities, so as to generate a well-identiﬁed intermediate result
oriented to the attainment of a ﬁnal product.
Identifying a process system allows one to better focus the performance drivers
related to the instrumental view.
In this regard, the concept of “product” is extended to what we can deﬁne as
intermediate product, i.e., to the services provided by back-ofﬁce units to their own
internal clients (Fig. 3.43). Performance in delivering one or several sequential
intermediate products will affect the performance of the internal clients receiving
them, and will also influence the performance of other internal clients who are
sequentially located along the value chain leading to the delivery of the ﬁnal
product (Bianchi 2010, p. 366).
16Though the “clients-products” framework may seem more compatible to an enterprise than to
public-sector and non-proﬁt organizations, the competitive viewpoint also can be effectively
applied to such institutions. In fact, just as with businesses, so with a public institution: strategy is
characterized by a set of goals implying the identiﬁcation of stakeholders (e.g., community,
citizens, users) for the satisfaction of whose needs a given ‘service delivery system’ is carried out.
Similarly, just as with an enterprise, so too with a governmental institution: a set of strategic
business areas can be deﬁned, and the different units of service delivery (e.g., the policies carried
out to satisfy groups of community or citizens’ needs) which proﬁle the strategic ﬁeld where public
institutions operate, can be outlined.
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For instance, research and development acts as an internal service unit with
respect to marketing. So, the new product models that R&D ﬁrst delivers to the
beneﬁt of the second unit are intermediate products. Likewise, a purchase order or a
maintenance response is an intermediate product delivered by back-ofﬁce units to
the beneﬁt of their own internal clients.
A ﬁnal product, which is delivered to an external client, can provide the basis for
the delivery of a set of other ﬁnal products to the same external client (Fig. 3.44).
For instance, in a bank, a client’s bank account number can be considered as a
“ﬁnal” product, which allows the bank to deliver a package of related “ﬁnal”
products, such as:
• Statements of account;
• Financial consulting;
• Financial transactions (e.g. bonds subscription);
• Sale of collateral services (e.g. ATM and credit cards, POS).
In a University, a Masters degree is a “ﬁnal” product. However, in order to
deliver such product to students at the completion of their studies, a University must
also provide them with a wider ﬁnal products “package”, such as:
• Student ID number and enrollment certiﬁcate;
• Certiﬁcate of enrollment to the next year;
• Certiﬁcate of approval of the student’s curriculum of studies;
• Transcript of records;
• The completion of internships or project works, or periods of study abroad (e.g.
Erasmus programs).
Also in the public sector, an administrative product (Knoepfel et al. 2007, p. 206,
236) may take on a different connotation when seen as a function of the client17 or
user to whom it is delivered. Of course, if one refers to the external client, i.e., to a
subject operating outside the public administration and receiving the outcome of
processes fulﬁlled by different public sector institutions in the value chain, a ﬁnal
product can be identiﬁed.
Final Product
Intermediate
Products
1st Level Intermediate Products
2nd Level Intermediate Products
Fig. 3.43 Identifying a ﬁnal
product and the related
intermediate products through
the objective view
17‘Clients’ are here meant as the subjects in the interest of whom each public sector unit delivers its
services.
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However, many public sector activities result in the delivery of intermediate
products, to the beneﬁt of units operating either inside the same institution or in
other public institutions. Therefore, in relation to a ﬁnal product, one can identify a
system of intermediate products resulting from the fulﬁllment of processes by each
decision unit whose clients are internal to the public sector.
Particularly in the public sector, understanding the impact of back-ofﬁce units on
delivered services is a necessary step toward improving performance and fostering
accountability. This is not an easy task, because a bureaucratic perspective tends to
be adopted when the contribution of such units to public service is considered
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Chap. 6). Provided that back-ofﬁce units take a major
role in delivering such service (Millard et al. 2004), this perspective signiﬁcantly
tackles efforts to make public-sector decision makers accountable. Overcoming this
problem requires the identiﬁcation of ‘administrative products’, i.e. the measurable
results generated by the tasks fulﬁlled by both back and front ofﬁce units.18
This allows one to shift the view of public administration from a bureaucratic to
a citizen and community-oriented one (Barzelay 1992, Chap. 8). In fact, perfor-
mance targets can drive the activity of public-sector units and the evaluation of
achieved results.
One implication of this analysis is that focusing objectives and performance
measures exclusively on front-ofﬁce units and related products delivered to external
clients might well generate an unbalanced attribution of responsibility (Bianchi
2010. pp. 362–363). In fact, back-ofﬁce units would not be held accountable for the
impact of the results produced by their fulﬁlled activities on other units and so on
the ﬁnal products provided to external clients.
Therefore, the design of a performance management system requires that the
chain of ﬁnal and intermediate products delivered to both external and internal
clients be fully mapped. It also requires that the underlying processes, responsibility
areas, assigned resources, and policy levers be made explicit. These design
requirements can be described as an objective view of performance management.
As depicted in Fig. 3.45, such a view implies that products generated by man-
agement processes and activities are made explicit.
Final 
Product “E”
External 
Client
Final 
Product “A”
Final 
Product “B”
Final 
Product “C”
Final 
Product “D”
Fig. 3.44 Identifying a ﬁnal
“product” package in relation
to an external client
18The identiﬁcation of administrative products is one of the building blocks of the so-called ‘New
Steering Model’, i.e. a reform package introduced in Germany in the 1990s (Pollitt and Bouckaert
2000, p. 239).
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The identiﬁcation of “products” and of the related macro-processes character-
izing the objective view enhances the planners’ ability to improve the focus of
performance drivers that were initially outlined on a Corporate/Divisional and
Departmental level, according to the instrumental view.
Figure 3.46 frames how the objective view is rooted on a departmental level. By
adopting this view, one may understand not only what performance measures each
department should affect in order to contribute to corporate performance, but also
how this will be made possible. A proper level of synthesis through the objective
view is provided by the identiﬁcation of macro-processes.
Identifying macro-processes also supports a focused in cascading corporate
performance drivers on an operational level, through the instrumental view
(Fig. 3.47).
3.4.1 Mapping Products, Processes and Performance
Measures in a Retail Bank: Case-Study
DPM has been used to map the product system, processes and performance indi-
cators in a bank delivering a deposit service to so-called “Personal” clients (i.e.
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“PRODUCTS”
To the external client
To the internal client
Fig. 3.45 The “objective”
view of performance
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Fig. 3.46 Focusing the
objective view on a
departmental level
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whose savings are higher than €100,000). Such service is characterized by a system
of inter-related sub-services, among which ﬁnancial consulting is an important
component. “Financial consulting” is a ﬁnal product, delivered to the external
client. In relation to such product, in a budget session, the Retail Division explores
alternative strategies to attain a set of end-results, in terms of: (1) change in the
customer base; (2) change in customer satisfaction, and (3) gross operating income
from services to personal clients.
In respect to these end-results, the underlying processes through which ﬁnancial
consulting is delivered have been mapped. This allowed us to ﬁnd out the drivers,
strategic resources and policy levers to manage such resources, to affect ﬁnancial
and competitive performance.
Each branch of the retail division delivers such services. Within each branch, a
Personal Banker/Consultant is made accountable on the achievement of the targets
included in the operating budget at divisional level. To this end, the bank con-
sultants outline a plan of meetings with the branch’s Personal Clients, with the goal
to analyze with each of them his/her current ﬁnancial position and investment
needs, based on four main kinds of needs, i.e.:
• Liquidity the client will have to hold in his deposits, to face short term ﬁnancial
expenditures;
• Speculative investments on potentially proﬁtable ﬁnancial tools, which do not
provide any guarantees;
• Possible speciﬁc objectives (e.g., property purchase) to plan;
• The increase of invested capital, based on the expectation of proﬁtability and
risk.
After an analysis of ﬁnancial decisions made by the client in the past has been
done, the consultant estimates the customer’s risk proﬁle. Through an interview, the
level of risk the client is willing to tolerate is assessed. For each client, the con-
sultant tries to pursue an equilibrium point be-tween the objective to maximize
MACRO PROCESS 1 MACRO PROCESS 2 MACRO PROCESS n
End
Results
Drivers
Resources 
End
Results
Drivers
Resources 
End
Results
Drivers
Resources 
Fig. 3.47 From an objective to an instrumental view: cascading performance drivers on an
operational level
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yield and the need to minimize investment risks. In order to optimize the
“Risk/Yield” ratio on a medium-long time horizon, the consultant uses an “efﬁcient
frontier” ﬁnancial tool. Such tool supports the consultant in setting the pool of
ﬁnancial portfolios maximizing yield or minimizing risk, given a pre-deﬁned yield.
This is called the efﬁcient frontier, i.e. the ﬁnancial portfolio that the consultant
proposes to the client, based on his risk proﬁle and investment time horizon.
This implies that the consultant is always in contact with clients, and periodically
visits them, to understand their needs and to examine the consistency of the allo-
cation of their ﬁnancial portfolio with market opportunities.
The macro-processes underlying the ﬁnancial consulting service delivery to the
Personal Client are: (1) interview; (2) analysis of the client’s portfolio; (3) sale of
ﬁnancial products; (4) post-sale assistance. Each macro-process underlies the
delivery of instrumental products, which are the results of the activities carried out
by back-ofﬁce units, in order to attain the ﬁnal product (“consulting”) to the beneﬁt
of the client. The different processes are outlined in Fig. 3.48.
Based on this analysis, the “products” generated by the listed macro-processes
can be identiﬁed; planned/achieved results can be tracked, and responsibility areas
can be made accountable on them. Figure 3.49 shows how the goal of the
Macro-process 1  Interview:
• Contact
• Setting the interview date
• Interview
• Customer profiling: risk orientation is analyzed. 
Macro-process 2 – Exam of the client’s investment Portfolio:
• Details on each single asset of the clients are inserted in a software to define the 
client’s positioning on a “risk/yield” diagram, with respect to the “efficient frontier”
• A report positioning the client on the efficient frontier is printed
• The report is analyzed with the client
• A sale proposal is outlined. 
Macro-process 3 – Sale of Financial Products:
• A follow up to the sale proposals is done through phone contacts
• A meeting with the client is agreed to propose a sale of financial products 
• The client is met and products are sold
• Sale order data is inserted in the computer system
• The sale contract is printed and signed.
Macro-process 4 – Post-sale assistance:
• The market is monitored through periodic reports
• The client is periodically contacted     
• The client’s anxiety is managed
• New contracts are signed with post-sale assistance clients. 
– 
Fig. 3.48 Process detail in ﬁnancial consulting delivery
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macro-process-1 can be referred to as “customer proﬁling”. This is an intermediate
product, in respect to the ﬁnal goal of the described processes, i.e., ﬁnancial con-
sulting contracts subscription.
The number of proﬁled clients is a performance measure that can be associated
with such intermediate product. In order to affect this measure, a 2nd level inter-
mediate product is identiﬁed, i.e., “contacts with customers to proﬁle”.
A performance measure related to this product is the “number of interviews to
proﬁle clients”.
Therefore, the identiﬁcation of two levels of intermediate products supports
corresponding performance measures. Regarding such measures, if we consider the
Retail Division, the ratio between “Proﬁled clients” (actual performance) and
“Clients to interview and proﬁle” (planned performance), deﬁnes a “Proﬁling effort
ratio”. Since client proﬁling is a competitive success factor, this ratio is a driver of
the Division’s end-results. It affects the “Clients to contact loss rate”, which in turn
affects the “Change in the customer base”. This “last layer” of divisional end-results
provides a synthetic measure of competitive performance and determines the new
level of the “Customer base” stock (Fig. 3.50).
Also, if we consider a single branch in the Retail Division, the described product
and process analysis allows us to understand how to affect the proﬁling effort ratio.
If we analyze process-1, we can observe how the number of proﬁled customers is an
end-result for such process, and its driver is the “number of interviews to customers
to proﬁle”. Such end-result is a flow in the “Proﬁled clients” strategic resource,
which is used in process-2 (Fig. 3.51).
The same reasoning applies for the other macro-processes. So, regarding
process-2, the sale proposal and customer positioning on the “efﬁcient frontier” are
ﬁrst and second level intermediate products, respectively. Their corresponding
performance measures are, respectively: the “sale proposal ratio” (i.e. between
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Fig. 3.49 Sequential product conceptual levels in ﬁnal product delivery
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actual and planned sales proposals) and the ratio between the actual and planned
number of clients positioned on the “efﬁcient frontier”. If observed on a divisional
perspective, the “sales proposal ratio” is a driver of the “clients to contact loss rate”.
Since process-3 and process-4 are closer to the ﬁnal “product” delivery, only one
level of intermediate products has been outlined. Such products are, respectively
related to the “meetings setting up for sale proposal” and to “post sale assistance
contacts”.
More speciﬁcally, concerning process-3, corresponding performance measures
are, respectively: the “contract subscription ratio” and the ratio between the actual
and planned number of meetings with clients to sell ﬁnancial products (volume
measure). If observed on a divisional perspective, the “contract subscription ratio”
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Fig. 3.50 Strategic resources, performance drivers and end-results on a divisional level
Fig. 3.51 Strategic resources, performance drivers and end-results on a process/branch level
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is again a driver of the “clients to contact loss rate”. It also affects the gross
operating margin per client, which in turn affects the total gross operating margin
flow from “personal” clients.
Concerning process-4, a performance measure corresponding to the detected
intermediate product is the “assistance effort ratio” (i.e. between actual and planned
meetings with clients). If observed on a divisional perspective, the “assistance effort
ratio” is a driver of the “clients in assistance loss rate”, which affects the change in
the customer base. The “assistance effort ratio” also affects the change in customer
satisfaction (end-result), which affects the company image stock.
To show the usefulness of SD in mapping the described products, processes, and
performance measures, a simple stock-and-flow model will be discussed now. The
model structure will not be described with the purpose to identify alter-native
policies from problem behavior. The purpose is, rather, to show how SD can add
rigor to performance analysis by implementing the conceptual framework here
discussed. The value SD adds to the design of performance management systems
refers to a proper identiﬁcation of: performance measures, strategic resources,
policy levers and performance standards, and budget objectives.
The model portrayed in Fig. 3.52 describes the four macro-processes previously
commented. Through a stock-and-flow chain it identiﬁes the factors affecting
ﬁnancial consulting performance management. The unit of measure of stocks is
“clients”; the unit of measure of flows is “clients/time”.
Performance standards are a percentage of maximum potential workload. For
instance, in “process-1”, to get the budget objective “Clients to interview and
proﬁle”, the “% STD Clients to proﬁle” is multiplied by “Total Clients Proﬁling”
(i.e. the sum of the three stocks in the process).
Performance drivers are ratios between a stock representing a delayed infor-
mation value of the “product” volume resulting from each process and the corre-
sponding objective. So, drivers (e.g. the “Proﬁling effort ratio”) are expressed in
relative terms. The effect that each driver generates on corresponding end-results is
gauged through normalized graph functions, which take the driver as an input. Such
functions are expressed as multipliers. For instance, the driver named “Effect of
proﬁling on customer loss” is a value comprised between 0 and 0.2. It represents a
percentage of the “Customers to contact” stock which is drained as a client loss rate
in a given time.
The “Clients to contact loss rate” is also affected by two other multipliers, i.e.:
“Effect of subscribed contracts on Customer loss” and “Effect of sale proposal on
Customer loss”. The performance drivers affecting the two multipliers are respec-
tively originated in process-2 (“Sales proposals ratio”) and process-3 (“Contract
subscription ratio”).
The other performance driver, originated in process-4 (“Assistance effort ratio”),
affects the “Clients in assistance loss rate”. It is a ratio between the number of
agreed meetings with clients in assistance, and the corresponding number of clients
to assist in a given time.
126 3 Fostering Sustainable Organizational Development …
SD modeling also contributes to dynamic performance management since it
helps managers to avoid common errors in BSC practice in the identiﬁcation of
causalities between measures. For instance, in static BSCs, performance indexes are
Fig. 3.52 A stock-and-flow depiction of products, processes, and performance measures
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often confused with performance drivers. An example is provided here by the
customer retention rate. This variable is a synthetic expression of performance,
which cannot be confused as a driver in this context. In fact, it does not affect the
customer loss rate. It is rather an effect of it.
3.4.2 Mapping Products, Processes and Performance
Measures in a Public Utility: Case-Study
A second case will be now illustrated to show how the objective view has been
applied in a public utility water company.
In this company, not only the water provided but also the billing service can be
considered as a ‘product’ according to which external clients may have a number of
expectations. They may expect that billing be done according to proper accuracy,
transparency and reliability standards. Therefore, billing errors and irregular
updates of consumptions will result in a poor service, though the quality, avail-
ability or cost of supplied water is satisfactory. Likewise, the billing ‘product’ will
be considered as poor, if uncollected invoices—due to unreliable billing—will
reduce the public utility cash flows.
Related to billing (as a ﬁnal ‘product’), relevant ‘intermediate products’ for such
organization, could be referred to: meters inspection, billing issuing, checking
billing errors and compulsory credit collection.
Although most of such ‘products’ are delivered by back-ofﬁce units, they have a
direct impact on the delivered ﬁnal product (i.e. billing), resulting in a higher or
lower customer satisfaction and utility solvency.
Most of the above ‘intermediate products’ are delivered to ‘internal clients’. For
instance, the performance of a ‘customer complaints ofﬁce’, receiving requests from
clients, due to bad invoicing and/or meters checking, are affected by the speediness
and accuracy of activities carried out by various back-ofﬁce units, such as those
fulﬁlling operations related to the inspection of the correct recording and billing of
consumed water.
This analysis suggests the need to track management processes and underlying
activities, in order to explain how to improve results associated with the ‘products’
delivered to both internal and external ‘clients’ related to a given public sector
organization.
All activities pertaining to the periodical check of meters/bills issuing, aimed to
assess consumptions, can be grouped into a process, whose result (i.e. meters
inspection) affects the accuracy and predictability of billing. The water utility
company’s ‘services charter’ prescribed that the average time between two
inspections should have been 6 months. Since in this case, due to an excess of
workload on the staff in charge of checking meters, this time was increasing, in
spite of the automatic resort to overtime, this caused a poor service. In fact, for
those customers whose meters were not regularly checked, billing was done based
on past water consumption.
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Therefore, actual consumption was randomly updated and many clients found
signiﬁcant unexpected and unpleasant extra-charges in bills, which were instead
punctually issued every 2 months. This phenomenon increased the percentage of
uncollected bills and their collection time.
Likewise, also those activities regarding the assessment of billing errors influ-
enced the bills collection time. Such errors were increasing because of a rising
resort to overtime for checking meters: in fact, increasing overtime implied a higher
occurrence of errors by the company staff in checking actual consumptions.
In order to reduce the disputed bills collection time, a process similar to the one
previously noted (checking meters) was carried out. Precisely, a group of senior
inspectors was requested to verify possible errors in checking meters, and—when
necessary—to start the procedure for re-issuing the wrong bills.
In the utility, different areas had a joint responsibility for the fulﬁllment of the
previously described processes, i.e.: the periodical check of meters/bills issuing, and
the assessment of billing errors.
Activities underlying the above two processes were managed by three units, i.e.:
Commercial, Legal and Technical. The Commercial unit also consisted of ﬁve
ofﬁces: Customer complaints, Contracting, Invoicing, Meters installation and
Electronic Data Processing (EDP).
The invoicing process was started by periodical meters inspections by the
Invoicing ofﬁce. The same ofﬁce was also responsible of sending senior inspectors
to check meters in case of customer complaints about suspected billing errors. It
was also responsible for asking the ‘Meters installation’ ofﬁce to replace damaged
meters with new ones. Once water consumption was periodically ascertained, bills
were issued automatically by the EDP.
For those bills which had not been collected after 2 months from their issue, an
overdue debt was reported after 2 months in a new bill, together with the new
accumulated debt in the last period. If, after two more months, the accounts
receivable had not been collected yet, the ‘Invoicing ofﬁce’ would have commu-
nicated the total overdue to the ‘Credit collection ofﬁce’ of the Legal unit. This last
ofﬁce was used to send a letter to the client, to intimate payment of the overdue,
including accumulated interest. After receiving such letter, most clients were used
to complain about wrong billing at the ‘Contracting’ and ‘Customers’ ofﬁces. Some
of them were also used to ask the company to test the correct functioning of their
meter. This implied that the ‘Invoicing ofﬁce’ had to check meters again, in order to
verify possible billing errors; in some cases the ‘Technical ofﬁce’ was also asked by
the ‘Meters installation’ ofﬁce to replace old meters with new ones (Fig. 3.53).
These messy problems led the company to three main consequences: (1) a liq-
uidity crisis, due to the long delays in collecting overdue bills; (2) strong conflicts
between different units and ofﬁces, all of which felt themselves not liable for the
recorded inconveniences; (3) a low customer satisfaction, due to a lack of conﬁ-
dence towards the utility about the precision and reliability of recorded consumed
water.
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Although possible ‘solutions’ might seem obvious, if we analyze the problem
from outside the public utility and after events have taken place, the organization
was not able to perceive reality.19
Figure 3.54 shows that the company policy was to respond—after a delay—to a
rise into bills collection time by increasing staff overtime devoted to both checking
meters and uncollected billing errors. In the short term, for both processes, increasing
overtime allowed the utility to improve (i.e. to reduce) two important performance
drivers: meters inspection time and time to check billing errors. This, in turn, allowed
the utility to increase its output (in terms of checkedmeters and bills, respectively) and
to decrease the bills collection time (main performance driver affecting cash flows).
However, over a longer time span, the ‘uncollected bills’ problem emerged again.
In fact, overtime productivity was gradually decreasing, due to burnout. This was a
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Fig. 3.53 Main processes and organization units responsible for the ‘billing’ product in a water
public utility
19This phenomenon is due to a lack of coordination and communication between the different
(back and front-ofﬁce) units, and to a poor perception of delays. SD modeling can play an
important role in dealing with these problems, and fostering a process—rather than function—
oriented view of performance. A process-oriented view implies that each organization unit is made
accountable on a set of indicators pertaining to the ‘products’ resulting from each process to which
it contributes. It also implies that, for each process, the impact of other units on results, and the
effects generated by material and information delays are taken into account.
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major cause of more billing errors and a lower number of meters checked per hour,
which contributed to rise the meters inspection time again. Therefore, both phe-
nomena caused a new increase in the billing collection time. So,managerswere forced
to periodically resort to overtime, but this did not allow them to solve the problem.
Figure 3.55 depicts main performance drivers’ dynamics produced by the above
policy, as simulated through a SD model developed with the collaboration of a
manager of the utility, operating in the budgeting unit.20
Fig. 3.54 Unintended effects of overtime policies in a public water utility. Loop “B1” and “B2”:
symptomatic solutions to service problems (‘meters inspection time’ and ‘time to check billing
errors’, respectively); Loop “R1” and “R2”: unintended effects amplifying service problems over a
longer time span (billing errors and meters inspection time, respectively)
20The model was a follow-up of a previous DPM project based on a BSC embodying detailed
company data (Bianchi and Montemaggiore 2008). The aim of modeling was to analyze more in
depth a number of processes and inter-relationships that—in order to follow a same level of
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The periodic oscillations portrayed by the graphs demonstrate the structural
inability of the above policy to ensure company performance stability in the long
run.
Simulation helped the utility managers to detect major policy weaknesses and to
envisage possible solutions to the experienced problems.21
Figure 3.56 shows main feedback loops related to a sustainable policy. The
balancing loops B1 and B2 identify the number of needed workers (strategic
resource) to allocate to meters inspection and checking billing errors, in order to
meet performance targets. Based on the desired number of workers, the suggested
policy aims to ﬁll human resource gaps (balancing loops B3 and B4).
The feedback structure depicted in Fig. 3.56 was embodied in a new version of
the simulation model, in place of the feedback structure illustrated in Fig. 3.54.
Simulation results demonstrated the sustainability of this new policy.
Fig. 3.55 Main performance drivers’ dynamics from overtime policies in a public water utility
(Footnote 20 continued)
analysis for the different subsystems—were not included in the BSC model. However, this was an
insight model, including—as company real data—the number of bills, the real behavior of billing
collection time and the associated performance drivers, as well as main delays characterizing the
investigated company processes. The model was used to stimulate a dialogue between the involved
units and a better understanding of their role in affecting performance.
21For instance, it was remarked that a possible fundamental solution could have been to increase
the number of inspectors devoted to check meters. If necessary, also senior inspectors could have
been devoted to periodical checking, in order to reduce the backlog of meters to check, so to keep
the company on track with the ‘6 months’ average inspection time target. This would have allowed
the utility to reach a more reliable level of billing accuracy.
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Figure 3.57 shows how performance drivers were now showing a more stable
behaviour, which was proving the sustainability of the policy.
Decision makers in this public utility were not able to perceive the causes of
experienced oscillations in performance targets. This was because of the dynamic
complexity of the underlying system: more then 20,000 invoices were issued per
month and about 40,000 m had to be checked on average twice a year. Delays
between a step of the billing/collection process and the next one, as well as
interdependencies between different responsibility areas, and a missing
process-oriented vision, were also signiﬁcant factors inhibiting decision makers to
properly frame such an apparently simple and predictable system. The above
problems were also increased by the difﬁculty of the company management/
strategic control to perceive small performance changes.
Figure 3.58 provides a synopsis of how the main SD model’s stock-and-flow
structure supported the utility in detecting the causal relationships between ‘prod-
ucts’, processes, and strategic resources on which to act in order to affect perfor-
mance drivers and end-results, to foster accountability. Strategic assets are depicted
as stocks primarily affecting the system’s performance. End-results are modeled as
flows changing strategic resource endowments. Performance drivers are auxiliary
variables. Processes come from the analysis of factors impacting on the flows
B3
B4
B1
B2
Fig. 3.56 An alternative sustainable policy to ﬁx the billing errors and collection time delays in a
public water utility. Loop “B1” and “B2”: fundamental solutions to service problems (‘meters
inspection time’ and ‘time to check billing errors’, respectively); Loop “B3” and “B4”: strategic
resource adjustments sustaining fundamental solution to service problems (hiring needed workers
gap in checking meters and checking billing errors, respectively)
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Fig. 3.57 Main performance drivers’ dynamics from the adoption of a sustainable policy to ﬁx
the billing errors and collection time delays in a public water utility
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Fig. 3.58 A synthetic picture of the main feedback stock-and-flow structure supporting DPM in a
public water utility
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affecting stocks to which performance drivers are related (i.e. those concerning
meters and bills). Products are an outcome of the carried-out processes.22
3.5 The Subjective View of Performance
The “subjective” view provides a synthesis of the instrumental and the objective
view, because it makes explicit, as a function of the pursued results, both the
activities to undertake and the related objectives and performance targets to include
in plans and budgets for each decision area. This view requires that performance
measures—i.e., drivers and end-results—associated with the delivery of products
are made explicit, and are then linked to the goals and objectives of decision-makers
(Fig. 3.59).
Results originate in decision-makers’ activities as those are carried out in the
various fulﬁlled processes. Expected results provide a benchmark to which to refer
for setting goals and objectives for each responsibility area in a P&C context. Both
objectives and performance measures can be gauged on a corporate and strategic
business area level, or in the public sector on the level of governmental functions.
Both are related to the expected end-results and performance-driver targets
assigned to the various responsible areas in a ﬁrm, within a budgeting context.
Therefore, activities and the processes to which they are related can be associ-
ated with corresponding objectives and performance measures, in a consistent
action plan, from which resources are assigned in an organization, available policy
levers for each decision area are made explicit, and responsibility for expected
results is focused. A remaining crucial issue concerns the need to properly identify
performance measures so as to assign to decision areas for performance evaluation
in a budgeting and control process.
In this regard, the need for speciﬁc, measurable, achievable, relevant, and
time-related objectives (Conzemius and O’ Neill 2006) has been emphasized. Also
22Figure 3.58 is a synthetic picture of the SD model that was developed with the utility manager’s
support. The dotted links it embodies represent logical relationships between variables; therefore,
some of them are not included in the model in the same way they are presented here. For instance,
concerning the ‘meters inspection process’, in the simulation model the variable ‘Productivity’ has
been represented through an auxiliary variable named ‘Number of meters checked in an hour’. This
variable (multiplied by the number of worked hours) determines the ‘Checkedmeters’ flow. From the
ratio between the ‘Meters to check’ stock and the above said flow, the model calculates the auxiliary
variable named ‘Meters inspection time’. In the simulation model, this variable, in turn, affects the
bills collection time through the stock-and-flow chain regarding uncollected bills (which is longer
than the one depicted in Fig. 3.58). In fact, it determines the ‘Collected issued bills’ flow, which
affects the ‘New uncollected bills’ flow, which accumulates into the ‘Total uncollected bills’ stock.
The model calculates the bills collection time as a weighted average between four major delays
affecting bills collection, i.e.: (1) issued bills collection time (ratio between “issued bills” and
“collected issued bills”); (2) average time to check uncollected bills; (3) overdue bills collection time
and (4) overdue bills forwarded to the legal department collection time. The stocks of bills at each
stage of the described processes have been used as weighting factors.
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the risks associated with improper goal-setting have been analyzed, in particular by
focusing on behavioral distortions that it could generate for decision-makers. Such
phenomena are connected to:
• Unfocused goals, leading managers to maximize their own efforts towards a
subset of the overall relevant picture (Merchant 1997, pp. 454–541);
• Bounded attention towards non-monetary goals, leading managers to focus their
own decisions only on improving ﬁnancial results, rather than also on qualitative
factors impacting on performance;
• A distortion between means and ends, leading to an exclusive focus on the
constitution of resources, rather than also on their effect upon performance;
• A deliberate downgrading of performance standards, against which actual per-
formance levels will be compared when the performance cycle will be closed.
To provide the reader with a more practical understanding of how the
methodological framework outlined here has been applied in practice, the next
chapters will outline further examples and case-studies through which DPM will be
applied.
3.6 An Integrative Framework of Performance
The three performance views described here play a complementary role in a DPM
system. In fact, the objective view deﬁnes what the object of performance man-
agement is. The instrumental view identiﬁes how to affect the deﬁned object(s). The
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Fig. 3.59 The “subjective”
view of performance
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subjective view focuses on who is responsible for the accomplishment of activities
aimed at building and coordinating strategic resources, to affect performance drivers
and end-results, and to obtain an estimate of the volume and quality of
products/services so as to efﬁciently and effectively satisfy the needs of target
clients.
Objectives 
Activities Performance 
drivers 
Strategic resources
End-results Processes 
Products 
Internal client External client
Subjective view
Objective view
Instrumental view
Fig. 3.60 Synergies among the three views of dynamic performance management
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Fig. 3.61 The instrumental, objective and subjective views of DPM in action: a learning-oriented
approach
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Therefore, the interplay between the three performance views may support a
responsive and learning-oriented P&C (Fig. 3.60). This is particularly crucial when
organizations operate in dynamic complex systems, where a formalistic, static,
non-systemic and incremental approach to planning has proved to generate an
illusion of control leading to unsustainable growth and crisis (Brews and Hunt
1999; De Geus 1988; Mintzberg 1993, 1994a, b).
Figure 3.61 sketches a synthetic picture of the three previously described per-
spectives. It shows how, in a planning context, once the administrative products
have been deﬁned, it is necessary to move backwards, i.e., to outline the underlying
processes and activities, and then to deﬁne goals and objectives for each respon-
sibility area. Such objectives must correspond to the results and indicators that will
be achieved through actions aimed at managing a given strategic-resource system.
Both performance drivers and end-results should describe whether an organi-
zation is able to meet the various expectations (e.g. in terms of volumes, defects,
time, and cost) coming from internal and external clients, concerning delivered
products.
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Chapter 4
Applying Dynamic Performance
Management to Public Sector
Organizations
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will illustrate different examples of DPM applied to public sector
organizations.
As remarked in Chap. 2, applying SD to foster performance management and to
support effective decision-making in the public sector implies a number of challenges,
which are related to the speciﬁc complexity of this environment (Bianchi 2010).
Such complexity can be referred to four main interdependent sub-systems
(Borgonovi 1996, p. 105), i.e.:
1. Socio-economic system;
2. Political system;
3. Institutional system;
4. Organization system.
The design and implementation of programs aimed at fostering change,
accountability and the improvement of service to users, and to the wider commu-
nity, could be addressed by focusing predominantly on the organization system
(e.g. on processes, roles and responsibilities, planning and reporting, career and
reward/incentive schemes), and at the same time be hampered by a lack of attention
to the wider socio-economic, cultural/political, and institutional systems with which
an organization interacts in the public sector. Although such factors may be con-
sidered outside the scope of a traditional organizational intervention, ignoring them
may cause a failure in reaching the objectives stated. Such a failure may arise from
relying on the hypothesis that improving the organization system itself will cause an
improvement in the overall performance as well. However, this hypothesis may not
be valid for a number of reasons.
First, a public sector organization is connected with other independent (loosely
coupled) public sector organizations, whose policies may affect (positively or
adversely) the implementation of its organizational change programs (Bianchi
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2010). The rules and legislative schemes that deﬁne such relationships can be
referred to as the institutional system that deals also with relationships between the
public administration system and external actors (e.g. citizens and private sector
organizations).
Second, rules of conduct are not only ‘coded’ by the formal institutional system;
in fact, an informal political system deﬁnes how power is actually exerted and how
the different roles that are ruled by the institutional system are played. This is
affected by the hidden (social) rules of conduct leading to set political priorities in
the allocation of resources, and to outlining community goals. Ignoring such a
political system may signiﬁcantly tackle any change program that only takes into
account the managerial view of a public sector organization.
Third, since both the institutional and political systems are an expression of the
emerging (or leading) culture and values arising from the underlying wider
socio-economic systems, any public sector organizational change program ought to
take into account what opportunities there exist to affect, in the long term, such a
culture and values, possibly with the aim of changing the context (i.e. both the
institutional and political system) in which the management operates.
A number of challenges can be envisaged regarding the possibility to support
public sector performance management systems through SD modeling, i.e.:
– How can DPM facilitate a better understanding of the (often hidden) relation-
ships between the political and managerial system?
– How can DPM foster coordination between the two levels? How can it foster a
better communication and strategic dialogue between politicians and managers,
with the intent to improve policy-making and implementation?
– How can DPM support management to keep under control the key performance
variables driving to the success or failure of their organizations?
– How can DPM support policy makers to implement outcome-based performance
management, and to improve social reporting on the long-term effects generated
by implemented strategies?
– How can DPM improve coordination between different public and private sector
institutions operating in a local area?
The following sections will illustrate different cases and topics in relation to
which these problems have been framed.
4.2 Applying Dynamic Performance Management
to Public Utilities: Water Provisioning, Distribution,
and Wastewater Treatment
AMAP runs the municipal water provisioning and distribution service since 1950.
About one million people live in the area it serves.
With the intent of fostering public utility efﬁciency and effectiveness, in the last
decade the national government implemented a set of reforms. In particular, in 1994
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the management of water resources was reorganized in order to avoid waste and to
improve service quality.
Government regulations have been merging the sewer and wastewater treatment
management with city water provisioning and distribution management, making all
the municipal water service companies handle the so-called “integrated water
cycle”. In addition to this business re-engineering process, the regulator introduced
competition for the management of the water service. This led to a privatization
process, which implied the transformation of city water companies from public
agencies to joint stock companies.
In this new scenario, the regulator assigns the water management service for a
speciﬁc area to the company with the highest effectiveness (in terms of service
quality) and with the best efﬁciency (in terms of service costs).
The changes in the water provision service rules made AMAP perceive the need
to improve its performance in terms of both ﬁnancial end-results and quality of the
service supplied to customers.
Public utilities like AMAP, being joint stock companies, have a strong formal
independent status. On the institutional viewpoint, an independent Board of
directors outlines the company vision and main strategic goals. However, being the
Municipality the main shareholder of the utility, political parties take a leading role
in designating the members of such Board. This turns the utility’s external auton-
omy into a formal state only.
Members of the Board are often appointed on the basis of their ‘political afﬁl-
iation’ and rarely on their professional experience.1
In order to recover negative ﬁnancial performance, Italian public utilities cannot
autonomously set the water tariff. This is determined by a national law, based on the
investment plan adopted by the public utility, so to allow the utility to earn a 7 %
annual return on capital invested (Bianchi et al. 2010).
Among the internal factors affecting public utilities’ performance, the degrees of
internal autonomy and accountability, and customer orientation can be taken into
account.
The strategic decision making process in AMAP was highly centralized.
Although the company is organized in different departments, each head of these
units had a limited decision power and very bounded autonomy. The Board mainly
focused on strategic decision-making and the managing director focused only on
operational decisions.
The decisions that were typically made by the managing director, and authorized
by the Board, were those related to the approval of the procurement of goods and
services and the hiring of employees. As a consequence, those politicians who
appointed the board members could influence such decisions.
1This phenomenon is consistent with research conducted by Gutiérrez and Menozzi (2008) on 114
Italian public utilities in a 10-year period. In particular, the study demonstrates that unnecessary
staff is often hired, because of political pressures on the Board, and such decisions have a negative
impact on utilities’ performance.
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So, the company was lacking a shared vision of the mission as well as a coherent
strategy for its accomplishment. Furthermore, communication between the different
levels of the organization was almost absent and just a few of the middle managers
and line workers were aware of the company’s overall performance.
The low level of company internal accountability and transparency can also
explain the high level of influence of political parties through the Board on the
utility’s strategic decisions. For instance, the company did not adopt a robust
system to assess and manage organizational and individual performance.
Although some managers were used to undertake employees’ evaluations at their
own initiative, these evaluations were not structured. The formal respect of pro-
cedures was perceived as more important than meeting performance targets.
Furthermore, AMAP had a weak orientation towards customer service. Though
there were formal procedures in the company service charter on how to deal with
customer complaints, statistics on response times to complaints were not easily
available, and the use of available data for performance management was poor.
Furthermore, benchmarking was in its infant stage. It focused on tariffs, water
quality, level of services and efﬁciency. However, neither the utility managers nor
the Board used such data for decision making. Finally, although the company
introduced a service charter, it did not carry out any market survey to detect the
perceived customer satisfaction.
In synthesis, the company suffered from the following problems:
• Negative operating income flows were regularly covered by the Municipal
administration;
• Lack of coordination among managers was a cause of lack of awareness of how
each sector was contributing to the organization’s results;
• The management information system was characterized by the production of a
number of reports that were mainly responding to bureaucratic routines, instead
of strategic information needs;
• Performance evaluation was perceived as a “weapon”, through which managers
could have been blamed for bad performance, rather than as a tool to enhance
efﬁciency and effectiveness.
With the aim to create a shared vision of business strategy, to foster a deep
cultural change, to stimulate communication among managers, to increase com-
petitiveness and avoid strategy disconnections among the different levels of the
organization, a “dynamic” balanced scorecard (DBSC) was designed (Bianchi and
Montemaggiore 2008). This project involved the company key managers in mod-
eling end-results, performance drivers and strategic resources, and framing the
system structure behind the company’s performance.
The Board organized a number of meetings with top and middle managers with
the purpose of designing an information system that could be used to monitor
performance. The ﬁnal result was a long list of activity indicators, included in a
40-page report. Neither a common strategy was designed, nor were causal linkages
connecting these activity measures provided.
144 4 Applying Dynamic Performance Management …
With the aim of translating the produced list of indicators into a BSC map, the
project team conducted several interviews with AMAP’s key managers. These
interviews fostered the elicitation of their tacit knowledge about business processes
and causal relationships between policy levers, performance drivers (lead indica-
tors), and end-results (lag indicators). This allowed the project team to reduce
signiﬁcantly the long list of measures included in the initial report.
The proposed strategy consisted mainly in improving the company image by
promoting a higher efﬁciency and effectiveness in the provision of service. Such a
goal could have been achieved by increasing the availability of water sources (see
the driver “Reﬁnement %” and the end-result “Pumped water/day” in Fig. 4.1) and
hence, the volume of water distributed to households (end-result). In this regard,
AMAP was able to satisfy only 60 % of the standard consumption per capita stated
in the service charter. Therefore, an increase in the volume of distributed water
would have improved customer satisfaction, income, and cash flows (end-results),
through higher revenues and lower unit costs (since a larger volume of supplied
water would have reduced the overheads and the ﬁxed costs per cubic meter).
The improvement in customer satisfaction (by a better service) and of shareholder
satisfaction (by higher ﬁnancial results) would have enhanced company image.
For this reason, a great deal of effort was devoted to the search for new sources
and to the acquisition of the right to exploit a larger percentage of the existing
sources. With this purpose in mind, AMAP evaluated the opportunity to invest in
the construction of a puriﬁcation plant for the treatment of wastewater. Basically, in
Fig. 4.1 DPM chart showing reinforcing loops enhanced by reﬁnement investment policy
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the puriﬁcation plant, the sewage collected is subjected to a speciﬁc puriﬁcation
process so that it can be used for agricultural purposes. Because of this investment,
the company could have distributed the puriﬁed wastewater to farmers, thereby
increasing the volume of drinkable water distributed to households. Furthermore,
according to the company’s management, puriﬁcation of the wastewater would
have improved sea pollution conditions.
The planned investment, therefore, would have given evidence of the company’s
commitment to the cleanness of the seashore and, hence, to the improvement of the
community’s life quality. This, in turn, would have further enhanced the company’s
image and, therefore, its advantage over other potential competitors in the man-
agement of integrated water services in the area. Image affects the perceived
credibility of the ﬁrm in the ﬁnancial market and towards the local government
(performance driver). Therefore, an improvement in company image may allow the
utility to better negotiate funds to borrow from different stakeholders, and therefore
to increase cash flows to reinvest in reﬁnement capacity.
Decision makers were conscious that the puriﬁcation policy would have led to a
greater volume of distributed water and to lower sea pollution and, hence, to higher
customer and community satisfaction and, eventually, company image.
Nevertheless, they were still evaluating the adoption of this policy because of the
high investment and production costs, which would have had a negative impact on
company ﬁnancial results, reducing shareholders’ satisfaction and, consequently, the
image of the company as an efﬁcient administrator of the municipal water service.
The DPM chart in Fig. 4.1 shows the commented feedback relationships hidden
in the company vision.
However, a problem AMAP also had to face was the high leaking rate of its
pipelines. In fact, it was necessary to improve the quality of pipelines by replacing
the quite old existing distribution network. The obsolescence of pipelines caused a
high rate of leakage, which signiﬁcantly reduced the volume of water distributed to
households.
If the volume of pumped water grows faster and stronger than the distribution
capacity, an increase in distribution capacity utilization occurs and, consequently, the
leaking rate increases. In fact, the more water is pumped through the pipelines, the
higher is the pressure, and the bigger is the volume of leakage through the holes, joints,
etc. As a consequence of this, the cost per cubic meter of distributed water increases.
Therefore, the described phenomenon, on the one hand, contributed to customer
dissatisfaction, and on the other hand further worsened the efﬁciency of the dis-
tribution process and, hence, the company’s ﬁnancial results.
The balancing loop “B1” illustrated in Fig. 4.2 (which is a simpliﬁed version of
a portion of the stock-and flow model underlying the DBSC) frames the potential
diminishing returns of an investment policy that is only oriented to improve the
distribution capacity, without considering the quality of the distribution network.
The ﬁgure also shows that balancing reﬁnement capacity and distribution capacity
investments may allow the ﬁrm to pursue a sustainable growth.
As illustrated in Fig. 4.3, the obsolescence of pipelines was modeled as a driver
(“Pipeline quality ratio”) that can be affected by investments in distribution
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Fig. 4.2 Balancing loop acting as a limit to the growth in distributed water per day
Fig. 4.3 DPM chart showing effects on performance from a combined reﬁnement and distribution
capacity investment policy
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capacity. This driver affects the leaking % through a second performance driver, i.e.
the “Distribution capacity saturation ratio”. This is a variable that is affected by the
obsolescence and capacity of the distribution network, and by its usage (i.e. the
pumped water/day). The more water is pumped, the higher capacity saturation will
be. The more distribution capacity investments are done, the lower—other condi-
tions being equal—the distribution network saturation will be. The leaking % has
been modeled as a normalized graph function where a higher distribution network
saturation will determine a non-linear increase in the leaking rate. The leaking %
will reduce the volume of distributed water/day, which would be possible through a
given volume of pumped water/day.
Another reinforcing loop associated with distribution capacity investment policy
is related to the allocation of more auxiliary workers to the repair of breakdowns in
the distribution capacity system (end-result), caused by its obsolescence (perfor-
mance driver). As shown in Fig. 4.4, the higher the number of auxiliary workers
allocated to repairing tasks, the shorter the time to ﬁx breakdowns will be (per-
formance driver). This will increase service and customer satisfaction (end-result),
leading to higher company image and capability to negotiate funds to boost cash
flow (end-result). Higher liquidity resulting from increased cash flows could be
reinvested in hiring more auxiliary workers. A larger auxiliary worker staff will
allow the ﬁrm to further reduce the time to ﬁx breakdowns.
Fig. 4.4 DPM chart showing effects on performance from allocation of auxiliary workers to
promptly repair network breakdowns
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The stock-and-flow model was developed around four sectors,2 i.e.:
1. Distribution, which analyzes the supply and distribution process of the water
and the aging process of pipelines;
2. Sewer, which refers to the collection and puriﬁcation of wastewater;
3. Human resources, which describes the allocation of the auxiliary workers
between the maintenance activity and the activity of service suspension to
overdue clients;
4. Financial sector, where the dynamics of the net income, cash flows and other
ﬁnancial resources are framed.
Different causal linkages exist between the four sectors. In the ﬁnancial sector,
resources available for investments in distribution and sewer capacity are calcu-
lated, based on liquidity and the possibility of borrowing funds. First, the model
proportionally allocates such resources to replace old distribution pipelines and
decayed puriﬁcation capacity. Then, the residual resources are proportionally
allocated to increase both pipeline and puriﬁcation capacities.
In turn, the renewal of pipelines and increase in puriﬁcation capacity produce
costs and debts, which affect the company income, loans and liquidity.
Moreover, the “breakdowns” flow in the distribution sector determines the
maintenance backlog that the auxiliary workers have to reduce. The maintenance
activity generates an increase in the ﬁxed pipeline capacity, which enhances the
distribution capacity, and costs, which reduce the company income.
A business simulator, embodying both the SD and the accounting models por-
traying ﬁnancial statements, was built on the basis of the above-mentioned sectors.
By using this tool, managers can easily:
• Input the initial model parameters according to company data;
• Insert the company objectives in the different perspectives through a BSC chart;
• Experiment with different policies under various scenarios through a control
panel including policy levers and a scenario-setting board;
• Evaluate company strategy through several tables and graphs, reporting the
simulated impact of the interrelated set of policies according to the selected
performance indicators.
From the case discussed in this section it is possible to appreciate the beneﬁts of
DPM to support strategy design and planning in public utilities, where a deep
cultural change and major performance improvement are strongly required.
In the AMAP case, strategic mapping and simulation through the SD method-
ology has proved to successfully enhance managers’ learning and capability to
identify causal relationships between policy levers and company performance, and
better communicate strategy with stakeholders.
2More details on the structure of the model are in Bianchi and Montemaggiore (2008).
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4.3 Applying Dynamic Performance Management
to Public Utilities (Continued): Garbage Collection
at the City of Winston-Salem
The city of Winston-Salem is located in North Carolina (USA), with a current
population of about 200,000. With the goal to foster service delivery, the city
started performance measurement in the ‘80s. With the same purpose it started the
North Carolina Benchmarking Project (Rivenbark 2001) in 1995, in collaboration
with the UNC—School of Government, to compare the city’s performance and cost
data against other municipalities in North Carolina.
Data were compared from seven municipalities in the state across different
service areas (residential refuse collection, household recycling, yard waste, police
patrol, police investigations, emergency communications, and street maintenance).
The ﬁrst report showed a very low productivity in tons collected per full-time
equivalent (FTE) in residential refuse collection. One explanation of this result is
that Winston-Salem was one of three municipalities participating in the bench-
marking project that used backyard garbage pickup rather than curbside collection.
However, when Winston-Salem compared itself only to backdoor providers, the
city was still behind in tons collected per FTE (Ammons 2000).
During the FY 1997–1998 annual budget process, staff members from the
budget department and the sanitation division met with the city manager to discuss
options for reducing this performance gap in the service area of residential refuse
collection. They decided not to renew a private contract for garbage collection in an
annexed area of the city and to adjust current city routes to provide coverage within
existing resources. This policy increased garbage collection productivity by
approximately 30 % (Rivenbark et al. 2005). However, the performance and cost
data report for FY 2000–2001 showed that Winston-Salem remained inefﬁcient
when compared with the other participating municipalities in the service area of
residential refuse collection. A possible explanation of this performance gap is that
several of the other municipalities had embraced technology to productivity
(Rivenbark and Pizzarella 2002).
Based on the benchmarking data, in 2004 the city council decided to approve
voluntary curbside collection, with approximately 15,500 households agreeing to
participate in the new program.
In spite of this new policy, the city’s residential refuse collection program was
still inefﬁcient, with respect to the benchmarks.
The city ﬁnally made the decision to mandate curbside collection in October
2010. What prevented the city from making this transition in 2004 that would have
produced an annual savings of $1,800,000 (i.e. 22.5 % of the budget deﬁcit)? One
possibility is that an understanding of the complete system was not shared among
the involved stakeholders, which prevented an effective use of available perfor-
mance data to drive change.
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A conceptual DPM model was sketched in order to illustrate the hidden feedback
structure underlying the service delivery system’s performance (Bianchi and
Rivenbark 2014).
A major difﬁculty in developing such model has been the lack of explicit data
that can support the calibration of possible system structures that might explain
recorded performance data. We started by modeling population and collection
points of the city’s residential refuse collection system, where patterns over the
period 1997–2010 were well deﬁned by available benchmarking records.
The decision to start the analysis from such variables was also associated with
the fact that an increase in the collection points determines an increase in the
workload and—other conditions being equal—an increase in collection costs.
However, a decrease in the quality of garbage collection services or an increase in
taxation—due to higher garbage collection costs—may dampen the city’s attrac-
tiveness, and therefore may contribute to increased (though with a delay) population
outflows as shown in Fig. 4.5.
Both population and collection points were identiﬁed as strategic resources in
the system because they correspond to factors that primarily affect the performance
of the sanitation division and the city as a whole. The dynamics of collection points
were modeled through co-flows depending on population accumulation and
depletion rates and on the “average household size”. This parameter was estimated
Fig. 4.5 Mapping population and collection points
4.3 Applying Dynamic Performance Management … 151
based on a ratio between population and collection points using historical data. The
upper section of Fig. 4.5 highlights how an outcome perspective should charac-
terize the sanitation division’s policies.
In planning capacity and service provision, setting performance standards, and
evaluating results, the division should interact with other divisions in the same
municipality with a view to understanding different factors impacting workload
(total garbage to collect) and the driving forces affecting population flows. Relevant
to this point—though not explicitly linked to sanitation services—are policies
regarding: housing, infrastructure, education, healthcare, enterprise services, and
public safety.
In order to model the effects of the sanitation division’s performance on popu-
lation, we will explore now the factors impacting the outflow depleting the “total
garbage to collect” stock (tons collected per time). Such factors will affect service
efﬁciency (municipal ﬁnancial needs) and effectiveness (the perceived quality of
provided service).
Figure 4.6 shows how tons collected per week should be tracked as an end-result
that is affected by the performance driver “tons collected per working hour” and by
the “working hours per week” (capacity resource).
The variable “tons collected per working hour” gauges worker productivity,
which is in turn affected by the level of investments in service automation (strategic
resource) and by the backyard collection ratio (performance driver). This is the
percentage of collected garbage from backyards of the total (ratio between two
Fig. 4.6 Modeling worker productivity
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stocks). As the ratio increases, worker productivity decreases because fewer tons
will be collected per working hour and fewer tons of garbage will be collected each
week unless more staff is hired.
Another performance driver, which indirectly affects the tons collected per week,
can be referred to as the quality and consistency of incentive planning systems. This
variable is affected by investments into an intangible strategic resource stock. The
design of better human resource planning and incentive systems will be likely to
contribute to increased individual productivity.
A higher individual productivity would contribute (given a stock of available
workers) to increase the actual total working hours per week, which would increase
the tons of garbage collected per week. Therefore, the same result could be
achieved through a multitude of combined policies.
In this regard, DPM simulation models can support scenario analysis.
In order to track the perceived quality of provided service (effectiveness), the
perceived time to serve households was considered as a strategic success factor.
This variable can be modeled as a ratio between the “total garbage to collect” and
its outflow, as shown in Fig. 4.7.
A change in such ratio does not immediately affect the municipality’s reputation
toward its service users (perceived time to serve households). In fact, an infor-
mation delay smoothes changes in the actual time to serve households because it
may also take several weeks by citizens to change their mindset (strategic resource
generated by management routines) about the provided service.
Fig. 4.7 Modeling service levels
4.3 Applying Dynamic Performance Management … 153
A change in such mindset will contribute to change in the long run the overall
citizen satisfaction rate (outcome end-result), which will change the population
stock. The change in population (which is also an outcome end-result) is due to the
hypothesis that efﬁciency and effectiveness in residential refuse collection would
contribute to determine—in the long run—a decision by more citizens to move to
and from neighbor municipalities.
This case illustrates how DPM can be used to help local ofﬁcials move from the
adoption of performance measurement to performance management.
In applying DPM to the service area of residential refuse collection system for
the city of Winston-Salem several beneﬁts of using this methodology were iden-
tiﬁed that can play an important role in improving the quality of organizational
performance management systems and that can help local ofﬁcials use performance
data for making critical policy decisions.
They include framing trade-offs in time and space associated with alternative
scenarios, understanding how different policy levers impact the accumulation and
depletion of strategic resources, and determining how performance drivers affect
end-results. DPM also can help local ofﬁcials with establishing goals and objec-
tives, linking the political to the managerial level, and focusing attention on
selecting relevant targets and evaluating results.
The evaluation process is critical, where DPM is used to capture intangibles,
system delays, and nonlinear relationships and is used to avoid common errors of
causalities.
4.4 Applying Dynamic Performance Management
to Municipalities: Linking Strategic Goals
and Departmental Objectives Through “Dynamic”
Balanced Scorecards
Between the end of the ‘90s and the beginning of the 2000s, the town of
Hillsborough (with a population of about 6000), had been advancing its perfor-
mance measurement system. Departments were encouraged to develop and use
performance measures in planning and decision-making. Incremental budgeting
was replaced by a planning process embracing program budgeting, and a two years
ﬁnancial forecasting, aimed to anticipate future problems and needs (Rivenbark and
Peterson 2008).
The strategic priorities addressed quality of life, growth management, economic
development, superior services, and community safety.
However, the town needed an approach to link strategic goals and departmental
objectives. In November 2006, the board adopted the balanced scorecard (BSC) as
a methodology that could support these connections.
The board used the strategic priorities to guide the development of town
objectives (Fig. 4.8). The city manager encouraged each department to develop a
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robust set of performance measures that could allow the organization to understand
how departmental services ultimately affected the attainment of the strategic pri-
orities, mission, and vision of the organization. This approach aimed to combine
workload and outcome measures.
As shown in Fig. 4.9, it was found that the performance of an internal service
function such as motor pool fleet maintenance (which provides services to other
town departments) might affect town objectives in each of the four dimensions.
Furthermore, each motor pool fleet maintenance initiative may contribute to align
different town’s strategic objectives. They may range from those the department can
directly affect through its outputs (end-results), to those that it can affect through its
outcome end-results.
For instance, the initiative deﬁned as “Emphasize completion of Automotive
Service Excellence (ASE) certiﬁcation program” primarily aims to attain a given
target workload of ASE certiﬁcations. Such output measure affects the town’s
strategic objective named “Develop Skilled and Diverse Workforce”, that pertains
to the BSC “Learning and Growth” dimension.
By improving the employees’ skill level, through the completion of ASE pro-
grams, the department may also increase the percentage of services performed on
schedule; such measure is linked to the “Manage efﬁcient and effective preventive
maintenance programs” initiative, that aims to contribute to the “Excel at staff and
logistical support” town’s strategic objective (which pertains to the BSC “internal
processes” dimension).
If we frame the described causal relationships through the lenses of DPM, we
may observe that the percentage of services performed on schedule is a performance
index, rather than a measure driving the output end-result that could be referred to
the number of maintained vehicles in a give time span. Such performance index
cannot be used efﬁciently as a surrogate measure of the average time to manage
preventive maintenance, which is a performance driver of the vehicles failure rate
Fig. 4.8 Performance perspectives and town’s strategic objectives (from: Rivenbark and Peterson
2008, p. 34)
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(end-result). Such index cannot be used as a surrogate of the average maintenance
time since it has a dimensionless unit of measure. On the contrary, the time to
manage maintenance is a ratio between the backlog of cars under preventive
maintenance and the outflow of cars that have been maintained in a given time span,
which is also computed in the numerator of the index.
Figure 4.10a, b frame the effects of employee training policies on the department
performance, in terms of output and outcome, respectively. The ﬁrst DPM chart
illustrates how the employees’ skill level affects (together with other strategic
resources, such as staff and equipment) available capacity, which is measured in
terms of “productive” working hours. So the potential (or nominal) capacity is
related to available staff and equipment. Such capacity may either increase or
decrease, depending upon the staff skill level, which determines the productive (or
available) capacity. If such capacity is lower than the benchmark (i.e. desired
capacity), the preventive maintenance capacity ratio (performance driver) will be
lower than 1. This will imply a lower efﬁciency in performing maintenance, in
respect to the normal level. Such effect is modeled through a graph multiplier that is
called “Effect on time to perform a task” (see Fig. 4.10a).
Figure 4.10b describes the time to manage preventive maintenance ratio (i.e. the
fraction “actual/desired” maintenance time) as a driver affecting the vehicles failure
rate. Such driver is related to the average time it takes for the department to deplete
Fig. 4.9 Aligning departmental measure/objectives with town’s strategic targets: motor pool fleet
maintenance (adapted from: Rivenbark and Peterson 2008, p. 35)
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4.10 a Effect of employees’ skill building policies on the capacity ratio, time to perform a
task and number of processed vehicles under preventing maintenance (output measure). b Effect of
time to manage preventive maintenance on vehicles failure rate and quality of community service
(outcome measures)
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its backlog of cars under preventive maintenance. This variable is an effect of the
maintenance activity’s end-result that was previously described as affected by
available capacity. In fact, it is calculated as a ratio between the stock of cars under
preventive maintenance in a given time and the outflow of cars that have received
preventive maintenance in given time span.
If we apply this analysis to the internal maintenance services performed by such
department to the beneﬁt of the police department, a time to manage preventive
performance that is higher than the benchmark would imply a risk of a higher police
cars failure rate, in respect to the normal. This is an outcome performance measure
to which the motor pool fleet maintenance department could be made accountable.
The effect of such measure might be useful to shed light also on the indirect
contribution of the motor pool fleet maintenance department to the city strategic
target “Reduce Crime and Increase Citizen Safety”. As Fig. 4.10b shows, the effect
of an increasing volume of police car failures over a time span would reduce the
active fleet stock (strategic resource). This would reduce—other conditions being
equal—the police car ratio, which is a driver of a decreasing performed police
service rate. A lower service rate would giver rise (other conditions being equal) to
an increasing police service backlog to perform, which might mean a risk of an
increasing crime and a decreasing citizen safety.
Figure 4.11 frames the trade-off in time related to employee skill building
policies. An intensive training policy is able to increase average training time per
staff, which will drive in the long run a change in skills (outcome end-result).
Fig. 4.11 Trade-offs associated with employees’ skill building policies and related drivers, output
and outcome end-results in the short and long run
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However, in the short run this policy would decrease (other conditions being
equal) the capacity ratio, which would lead to a lower productivity, in terms of
processed cars under preventive maintenance (output end-result).
DPM, particularly if enhanced by computer simulation, can support decision
makers to frame these trade-offs and perform scenario analysis that may enhance a
feed-forward approach to planning and control.
4.5 Using Dynamic Performance Management
to Overcome a Myopic View in Designing
Performance Measurement Systems in Municipalities:
The Case of Policing
This section will illustrate the potential beneﬁts of applying DPM to the design of
performance measurement/management systems in the public sector to prevent,
detect, and counteract behavioral distortions caused by improper setting of per-
formance measures. A number of exemplary cases of municipal policing will be
discussed.
A problem that is often encountered when social policy programs encompassing
different interconnected sectors (such as immigration, education, healthcare, safety,
welfare, and housing) are designed and implemented is the focus of each player on
a limited set of output targets that are to be achieved without building on an
understanding of the process and factors that lead to them and generate outcomes in
the long run.
Behn (2011) has pointed out the difﬁculties and the risks hidden in the adoption
of performance measures as part of reward and incentive frameworks in the
implementation of social policy programs. Concerning this, he refers to the
“Campbell’s Law” i.e.: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for
social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures, and the
more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social pressures it is intended to
monitor” (Campbell 1969).
In this context, an inconsistent design of performance measures may generate
organizational behavioral distortions, whose dysfunctional implications imply a risk
of inverting means with ends, or of focusing on only a limited set of short term
targets, regardless the long term effects that the undertaken policies will generate in
the larger relevant system.
To describe the dysfunctional effects of performance management where phe-
nomena are characterized by a weak capability of performance indicators to mea-
sure and affect performance, the term “performance paradox” has been used by the
literature (Meyer and Gupta 1994; Van Dooren et al. 2010, p. 165)
Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002, p. 271) discuss the unintended effects generated by
the use of an aggregate performance measure of the percentage or number of crimes
solved by the Dutch police. If one focuses on only the percentage of crimes solved
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as a performance measure, a decrease in it might suggest that police performance is
deteriorating. However, the reduction in such measure could result from an increase
in the stock of crimes because of an increase in the volume of new crimes. The
absolute number of crimes solved might remain constant or even increase, yet the
ratio of inflow (new crimes) to outflow (solved crimes) could also increase.
Likewise, an increase in the crimes solved over a number of years should normally
lead to a reduction in the stock of criminals; thus making it more difﬁcult to
continue improving or even to keep the absolute number of crimes solved.
However, a reduction in this measure resulting from a drop in the stock of criminals
would not indicate performance deterioration (Fig. 4.12).
The DPM chart illustrated in Fig. 4.13 (Bianchi and Williams 2015, p. 409)
shows how police deploy staff and equipment (strategic resources) to address
inflows of crimes and criminals, converting them to outflows through solved crimes
Fig. 4.12 Unintended effects
produced by the use of an
aggregate performance
measure by the Dutch police
Fig. 4.13 Dutch policing DPM chart illustrating the unintended effects on performance outcomes
from a focus on a single performance measure
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and identiﬁed criminals. The purpose of these actions is to investigate and control
crime (performance driver) and thereby solve crimes (output end-result measure).
To counteract the problem of diminishing returns, the police might increase the
pressure on the community in search of a number of crimes to solve, eventually
reaching an intolerable level of intrusion into the lives of community members.
So in this example, the risk of gaming is associated with the possibility that
without a deliberate purpose, the police staff and other strategic resources might be
deployed to pursue performance drivers, such as the number of controls or inves-
tigations undertaken, with the intent to achieve numerical targets.
If solving crimes and reducing the corresponding stock of criminals affects the
community’s quality of life, an excess of controls and investigations may offset in
the long run the positive effects of the described policy, as shown by the second
effect on the right side of the end-results section of Fig. 4.13. This might reduce the
community’s quality of life (outcome measure). It could also generate both a
reduction in the population level and an increase in the inflow of new crimes.
Therefore, an excess of focus on a single policy might generate speciﬁc dysfunc-
tional effects over time. In this case, such effects could be related to an increase of
the number of crimes per inhabitant (performance driver), which would further
reduce the community’s quality of life, a vicious reinforcing loop.
By extending the boundaries of the observed system, one may reduce the risk of
performance paradox. For example, rather than focusing on only the crimes solved,
the police might also be made accountable on a set of outcome measures that would
describe the effectiveness of their crime prevention efforts. This would allow the
police to take an active role in designing and implementing broader social policies,
in coordination with others, such as schools, social services, nonproﬁts, and asso-
ciated stakeholders.
Figure 4.14 shows how DPM can help decision makers to extend the system’s
boundaries. It shows that, when considering additional end-results related to the
stock of criminals, two more flows should be taken into account: the new criminals
and the new potential criminals. Correspondingly, the stock of potential criminals is
added as a relevant strategic resource to include when formulating policies that may
contribute to sustainable community security. In addition, a second set of perfor-
mance drivers is included in this alternative context: the number of preventive
actions.
Other problematic behavioral distortions emerging from the “CompStat” pro-
gram and other similar programs adopted over the last two decades by different
public sector organizations around the world will be now framed through the lenses
of DPM.
CompStat is a statistics-based performance measurement system that the New
York Police Department adopted in 1994 to motivate employees, with a speciﬁc
focus on precinct commanders, and to sharply reduce crime (Behn 2003, p. 591).
Despite reports of success in ﬁghting crime, CompStat has been mentioned as a
cause of dysfunctional behavior and performance paradox.
The Campbell’s Law generates its own effects particularly in social contexts as
crime control: “False arrests have been identiﬁed as the result of arrest quotas…
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arrest quotas may encourage police to focus on less difﬁcult and important arrests at
the expense of more signiﬁcant and arduous arrests.” (Eterno and Silverman 2012,
p. 11). Manipulating or “fudging” crime data has been said as a recurring practice
adopted by the police to generate the expected numbers to report; for instance:
“misclassify crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, under-value the property lost to
crime so it’s not a felony” (Eterno and Silverman 2012, p. 27).
Figure 4.15 illustrates the distorted effects on reported crime produced by per-
formance measures and by a reward system focused on only short-term and “easy to
achieve” output measures.
The balancing loop “B1” would be the functional response of the performance
management system to the actual crime level. An increase of this level would imply
a higher effort to suppress crime, leading (after a delay) to a reduction of crime.
However, the use of an unbalanced set of performance measures and of short-term
“output-only-based” reward mechanisms could hamper the dominance of the
described balancing loop by fostering two other loops: the reinforcing vicious loop
“R” and the balancing loop “B2”.
The reinforcing loop “R” is generated by an increasing effort to solve “easy”
crimes (due to the existing set of performance measurement and rewards systems)
and, therefore, to report an increasing pattern of such kinds of crimes. This gen-
erates an increase in the distributed rewards, which in turn gives rise to a “search”
Fig. 4.14 Extended Dutch policing DPM chart
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for new “easy-to-solve” crime to deal with and report. Though this vicious loop can
contribute to reduce crime (in absolute terms), it might not generate the desired
effects in dealing with “hard-to-solve” crimes. On the other hand, the described
system could also affect the statistics regarding such crimes through data fudging.
The distribution of rewards may lead the police to reduce reported hard-to-solve
crime and shift part of it to the lower rank of “easy-to-solve” crime. This may
generate a further effort towards the suppression of easy-to-solve crimes. So while
the loop “B2” dominance replaces the loop “B1”, it is also the basis for the loop
“R” to further and progressively generate its dysfunctional effects.
The DPM chart illustrated in Fig. 4.16 frames the dysfunctional effects caused
by lack of alignment between performance management and rewards systems.
When such systems generate “false reporting” on “easy-to-solve” cases, perfor-
mance management becomes a means for the organization to reach the desired
rewards. In the described context, the performance management system takes an
ancillary role in respect to the rewards system. The use of strategic resources is
primarily diverted by the rewards system to the execution of controls and pre-
ventive actions on “easy cases”. This effort contributes to meet the output targets,
shown as flows of “easy cases” solved.
The described behavior generates two main effects. First, it allows the organi-
zation to distribute rewards based on the achievement of the target number of cases
Fig. 4.15 Distorted effects of short-term output measures
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to solve. The large volume of solved “easy cases” reinforces the process and leads
to an expectation of more similar cases, which implies that organization redirects
efforts to such cases. Second, although an increase in the outflow of “easy cases”
solved should lead to a reduction in the stock of “easy-to-solve” crimes, this does
not happen, because of the inflow of new false cases. This variable is shown as an
output of the rewards system at the bottom right of Fig. 4.16. The volume of false
cases is proportional to the effort on reporting false data, which is proportional to
the stock of targeted number of crimes to solve (Bianchi and Williams 2015,
p. 415).
Therefore, an abnormal behavior of the rewards system here generates a set of
end-results, which may allow the distribution of rewards regardless of organiza-
tional sustainable performance. A further vicious effect can be that unaddressed
serious crimes might allow an increase in hard-crime criminals, who become
skilled, leading to a gradual long-run reduction in the city’s quality of life.
The insights emerging from the previous examples suggest measures to coun-
teract these problems. Figure 4.17 shows that improving the performance man-
agement system may lead to greater reporting promptness and selectiveness. This
implies investing in performance measurement and information systems and also in
organizational design and human capital.
For instance, as shown in Fig. 4.15, improving the promptness and selectiveness
of reporting may allow decision-makers to design policies that better balance
Fig. 4.16 Detecting distortions in rewards and performance management systems through DPM
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capacity allocation in solving hard and easy crimes. Balancing the mix of achieved
end-results may contribute to the more sustainable development of a public sector
organization and the local area. This is shown in Fig. 4.13 through the outcome
measure for “change in community quality of life.” This variable is, in turn, affected
by a performance driver, the “crime seriousness ratio,” which is signiﬁcantly
affected by the stock of “hard-to-solve” crimes as a share of total crimes.
4.6 Applying Dynamic Performance Management
to Performing Arts: The Case of Municipal Opera
Houses
Nonproﬁt art ﬁrms, especially those in the performing arts, have to deal with a
difﬁcult problem: their costs tend to rise over time more rapidly than revenues, thus
generating a widening budget gap. This is why a key problem in performing arts is
on how demand can be increased in order to raise revenue, and what performing
arts ﬁrms can do to lower their production costs (Heilbrun and Gray 2001).
Fig. 4.17 Improving policies through DPM
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The argument can be summarized as follows: it takes 70 musicians as much
playing time to perform a Beethoven symphony today as it did when the piece was
written (Bianchi and Cognata 2010). However, at the same time, new
productivity-enhancing technologies have created huge increases in labor produc-
tivity in other sectors of the economy. Now, since wages tend to rise with pro-
ductivity all over the economy, the upward pressure in the ‘progressive sectors’
determines rising wages also in the ‘stagnant sectors’ (the orchestra). But since
musicians’ productivity has not changed, higher revenues do not compensate these
higher wages in orchestra. The result is that, over time, costs rise relative to
revenue.
According to this explanation, the only way for a nonproﬁt performing art ﬁrm
to deal with a widening budget gap is to increase external resources, for example by
actively seeking private grants and donations and/or asking for more governmental
funds.
Besides the “cost disease”, other arguments have been invoked to justify public
support to artistic activities. The oldest and most often invoked argument is that art
is a public good (Frey and Pommerehne 1989). According to this perspective,
performing arts do not only generate beneﬁts for those who pay an explicit price for
them, but also for all other citizens, who do not necessarily wish to contribute
voluntarily to art production and culture preservation. For instance, museums, opera
houses, orchestras and art festivals attract tourists and visitors and generate spillover
effects on hotels and restaurants.
DPM can contribute to support performing art ﬁrms to deal with the described
“cost desease”, and to combine efﬁciency with effectiveness.
An example of a “dynamic” BSC developed for a large Italian public theatre
(Bianchi and Cognata 2010) will be shown in this section.
The “Massimo Theatre” is the third largest public opera house in Italy. It
employs more than 400 people and has a budget of about Euro 42 million. More
than 90 % of the revenue comes from public subsidies; the remaining 10 % comes
from the box ofﬁce and the sale of other services. Salaries for full-time employees
represent more than 70 % of production costs.
In the ﬁscal year 2004 the Massimo Theatre was in a very difﬁcult ﬁnancial state:
losses of Euro 1.5 million, short-term bank debts of about Euro 26 million and
production at its minimum. A new management took over at the beginning of 2005
with the aim of preparing and implementing a 3-year plan to restore viable ﬁnancial
conditions.
As previously remarked, increasing the share of earning income relative to total
operating costs is essentially the main option for the opera management to deal with
its structural earnings gap. This goal can be pursued by either increasing revenues
or by reducing operating costs. On the latter side, the new management of the
Massimo Theatre negotiated a new contract with the labor unions on a flexible
basis, and negotiated a bank mortgage to reduce ﬁnancial costs. On the former side,
the strategy followed was to maximize the number of performances, given the
structural and organizational constraints.
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The ﬁrst constraint is that the theatre does not have enough facilities for
orchestra and stage rehearsals. Since one needs to use the theatre also for the
rehearsals, this limits the number of days one can uses it for performances. This is
especially true when production is organized according to the Italian system of
stagione (the season): a certain number of performances over several weeks, fol-
lowed by a rehearsal period for the next production after which that opera is
performed for the next several weeks, and so on. The typical “season” at the
Massimo Theatre is usually 10–11 productions, 8–9 of which are operas and 2
ballets. Opera productions are divided in three groups: at least 3 blockbuster titles
(each of which is staged for 8–12 performances), 3–4 repertory titles (7–8 per-
formances), and 1–2 rare and/or contemporary operas (4–6 performances).
Since clients subscribe for the whole season, a mix of repertoire is charged for in
the package and this can ‘cross-subsidize’ less popular repertoire with popular
operas. Each season, of the whole number of staged operas, usually the house
produces 3 new operas; the remaining are rented from other houses and/or re-used
from the Massimo Theatre’s stock of previous productions.
In order to support planning and performance improvement at the Massimo
Theatre, a program implying the development of a Dynamic Balanced Scorecard
was started.
A simulator was built to frame the logical sequence of the planning process for
opera production, as previously described. A three-dimensional analysis has been
done, i.e.:
1. The opera mix by type (blockbuster vs. repertory vs. contemporary/rare) is
planned, not only in percentage but also in absolute terms.
2. For each type of opera, titles by source are planned. For instance, it is planned
how many of the blockbuster operas will be made up by ‘new’, ‘rented’, and
‘re-used’ titles; and the same is for repertory and contemporary/rare operas.
3. The number of performances by opera type (blockbuster vs. repertory vs.
contemporary/rare) is then planned.
The planning time horizon is 3 years. Therefore, each year the number of titles
and performances to stage for the coming and the next 2 years is planned. Planning
in advance the next season is important to properly manage rehearsals and the
acquisition of resources; among them, human resources are the most crucial. In fact,
particularly concerning blockbuster performances, it is critical to promptly contract
best performers (so called “superstars”), in order to pursue a well-balanced
quality/cost ratio in the delivered service.
The SD model also supports an assessment of the ﬁnancial sustainability of the
planned seasons.
Though the planning time horizon is 3 years, the simulation time is 6 years. This
is due to the need to allow the user to ﬁgure out over a longer time span the possible
effects (i.e. the key variables’ behavior) of adopted decisions in the coming years.
This also allows decision makers to simulate—according a ‘rolling plan’ mode—
how past decisions might require future adjustments, based on the outcomes they
are currently generating.
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Therefore, by using the simulator, managers are able to adjust and better cali-
brate their strategies concerning the above three viewpoints, and so they are enabled
to review and discuss them. This contributes to their learning processes and to the
quality of communication.
Figure 4.18 shows three main stock-and-flow diagrams embodied in the model,
concerning the three aforementioned viewpoints that are relevant for opera planning
(i.e. opera mix by type; titles by source; performances by opera type).
The ﬁrst two structures are depicted as aging chains: the ﬁnal flow “Blockbuster
titles staged in the current year” depends on the ability of the ﬁrm to implement its
3 years plan (Fig. 4.18a). Lack of resources would have a ﬁnal impact on such
Fig. 4.18 a Planning opera mix by type. b Planning titles by source. c Planning performances by
type
168 4 Applying Dynamic Performance Management …
flow, both in volume and in quality of performances. Such quality is also affected
by the opera mix by type. On this regard, Fig. 4.18c shows how the same flow
determines the number of performances by type.
The three sequential stocks (and corresponding outflows) relate to the planned
season for the years (from left to right) n + 2, n + 1, n, where the last year is the
current (i.e. the coming year).
The stock-and-flow structure depicted in Fig. 4.18a determines the number of
titles by source (i.e. new, rented, reused), depicted in Fig. 4.18b. Here, the flow
“New titles to year 2” in turn affects (together with the planned ‘rented’ and
‘re-used’ titles) the flow of “blockbuster titles planned to year 2”.
Therefore, the three subsystems are strictly related to each other, and depend on
the decisions made by managers through the support of the simulator control panel.
As it is possible to see from Fig. 4.19, such panel depicts the same aging chain
structure previously described. Therefore, the planner is asked to deﬁne the number
of titles per type and related mix (new, rented and reused). The user is also asked to
set the number of performances per each type of title in the next 2 years, and (if
applicable) the change in the number of performances per title planned for the
current year.
Other subsystems of the simulator portray the dynamics of the company’s
human resources, the customer base, and ﬁnancial resources. As said, such
resources feedback into the opera production and performance subsystems, since
they may either support or hinder the implementation of plans for opera staging.
The DBSC chart embodied in the model portrays main indicators related to the
four BSC perspectives. A section, concerning the ‘customer’ and ‘internal pro-
cesses’ perspectives, is depicted in Fig. 4.20a, b. Both ﬁgures embody main
Fig. 4.19 The DBSC control panel
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Fig. 4.20 a Performance measures related to the ‘customers’ perspective. b Performance
measures related to the ‘internal processes perspective
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objectives, performance measures, related targets as well as the current level
achieved for each of these targets. While performance targets are input variables,
and therefore the corresponding value can be changed by the planner at the
beginning of the simulation, the ‘current situation’ values are results of the model,
and for this reason have been emphasized in a box with a different color from
targets, since they cannot be changed. Comparing targets with current results at
each simulation stage and for each set of strategic objectives supports decision
makers to make judgments on the way the system responds to the adopted policies.
In another section, the simulator separately portrays, through time graphs, the
behavior of the strategic resources affecting performance indicators. It also shows in
separate sections how such measures can be distinguished into performance drivers
and end-results. Also these two other sections consist of time graphs.
Figure 4.21 offers a synthetic representation of how planning opera production
may signiﬁcantly affect the future growth of the theatre.
In particular, the positive loop ‘R1’ shows how an increase in available resources
may allow the management to plan for more titles and performances, leading (other
conditions being equal) to higher revenues, liquidity and other available resources
to foster future growth. If the loop ‘R1’ is the growth engine of the theatre, the
negative loop ‘B1’ is a potential limit to such growth. In fact, the more opera titles
(and performances) are planned, produced, and staged, the more resources will be
consumed.
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If one particularly considers that opera production planning is characterized by a
3-year time horizon, this means that such phenomenon will reduce (other conditions
being equal) the resource endowment to fund the next year plan.
The loops ‘B2’ and ‘B3’ refer to the achievement of targets related to planned
operas and performances. In fact, the higher the gap from the current to the target
number of operas, the higher the number the opera titles to plan will be. This will, in
turn, decrease the gap in opera titles. The same is for the planning of performances.
The ‘R2’ loop shows the effect of opera planning on image and liquidity. A higher
number of planned and staged operas (and performances) will increase image. This
will help the theatre to attract ﬁnancial resources from private funders. This will
increase liquidity and the available resources to foster sustainable growth.
The loop ‘R1’ portrayed in Fig. 4.22 is similar to the same previously com-
mented about Fig. 4.21. In this case, the effect of perceived quality as a main driver
of customer loyalty is remarked. In fact, a higher production of opera titles will lead
(other conditions being equal) to a higher perceived quality by customers. This will
turn into a higher image, customer base, and liquidity. More ﬁnancial resources will
allow the company to pursue further growth. This will be possible by both
increasing the number of opera titles/performances and increasing the number of
contracted superstars that will perform blockbuster and repertory operas. This last
option will also allow the ﬁrm to strengthen growth (reinforcing loop ‘R2’).
There are a number of balancing loops to take into account, also in this regard. In
fact, an increasing number of operas planned in a season will raise costs. This—
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other conditions being equal—will reduce liquidity to plan for the next seasons
(loop ‘B1’). Likewise, an increase in contracted superstars will also raise operating
costs and determine a second potential limit to growth (loop ‘B2’).
The DPM chart in Fig. 4.23 provides a synthetic view of the effects on per-
formance generated by policies aimed to affect: (a) the time to launch titles; (b) the
percentage of staged titles on the total planned, and (c) the personnel costs as a
percentage of the contribution margin.
As previously remarked, planning in advance the next season is important to
manage rehearsals and the acquisition of resources. In particular, it is critical to be
able to offer enough blockbuster titles and to timely contract “superstar” performers.
As Fig. 4.23 shows, the time to launch titles affects quality through: (1) the number
of blockbuster titles on total, and (2) the quality of contracted performers.
So, the “time to launch titles ratio” is a fundamental performance driver affecting
another performance driver, i.e. the “performance quality ratio”.
In order to reduce the time to launch titles, management must improve and
properly combine two main strategic resources, i.e.: personnel and liquidity.
A second important performance driver illustrated by Fig. 4.23 is the percentage
of staged titles on the total planned titles. As previously remarked, this measure
affects the number of performances staged by the opera house (which also affects
image). An increase in the number of staged performances in a season (end-result)
Fig. 4.23 Effects on performance generated by policies aimed to affect: a the time to launch titles;
b the % of staged titled on total planned, and c the personnel costs % on contribution margin
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affects two other end-results, i.e.: the change in the customer base, and the number
of tickets sold in a season. The latter measure, in turn, affects income and cash flow.
Figure 4.23 also shows that the quality ratio affects the change in the perceived
quality of staged performances (end-result), that changes the stock of perceived
quality (i.e. a fundamental component of customer satisfaction, corresponding to a
strategic resource generated by company internal routines). The word-of-mouth
effect generated by such strategic resource may corroborate the acquisition of new
customers generated by the number of performances offered in a season.
The third performance driver illustrated in Fig. 4.23 (i.e. the Personnel costs
percentage on contribution margin) underlies a possible trade-off. In fact, increasing
the number of titles and reducing the time to launch them requires more and/or
skilled staff. This may provide a basis for generating growing revenues (income and
cash flows), and competitive performance. However, increasing staff may imply a
rise in ﬁxed costs, which would erode the contribution margin, and therefore
income and cash flows. Therefore, as previously remarked, efﬁciency in managing
personnel costs is critical to pursue ﬁnancial and sustainable competitive
performance.
4.7 Adopting an Inter-institutional Perspective
and an “Objective” View of Dynamic Performance
Management for the Effective Implementation of User
Satisfaction Programs
4.7.1 Introduction
Quality in delivering services to citizens and the community has been recognized as
a major issue challenging performance in the public sector. However, the design
and implementation of sustainable user (or customer) satisfaction programs is still a
controversial theme.
Conventional approaches to this topic mainly aim to gather data from public
sector user perceptions, which are captured through different methods (i.e. inter-
views, focus groups), and then treated through statistical techniques. Though such
data can be very useful in knowing possible improvement areas and achieved
results in public service delivery (as perceived by the interviewees), they represent
only a partial input to decision makers in order to design sustainable user satis-
faction programs. In fact, they often do not primarily take into account: (1) how a
given set of provided services is delivered; (2) who is accountable for the
achievement of results directly and indirectly associated with service provision, and
(3) what is the system ruling the distribution of roles, duties and competences
affecting a given public service.
Such programs usually focus only on the front-line activities performed by those
institutions operating in the last mile of a much longer service delivery system, in
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the public sector ‘value chain’. This runs the risk of adopting a too-bounded
viewpoint, which may generate a feel of disappointment, and lack of motivation in
front-ofﬁce units. Such feelings are often associated, for instance, with: lack of
coordination with upward public sector institutions; inconsistencies in the
‘roles/responsibilities’ system, or in process design and management, or in results
orientation—particularly in the back ofﬁce units.
Supposing that performance improvement regarding user expectations could
result only from efforts produced by those institutions operating in the bottom and
front-line level can be misleading. In fact, such institutions are, in turn, ‘clients’ of
other public institutions that operate at higher jurisdiction levels.
This section will outline a non-conventional view of ‘customer satisfaction’ in
public sector service provision. An inter-institutional perspective and an “objective”
view of DPM are proposed in order to map the overall value chain leading to the
ﬁnal product delivered to users.
4.7.2 Broadening System Boundaries to Deal with User
Satisfaction Programs
If one considers a “product-service” as an outcome of a value chain encompassing
different institutions (all of which are loosely coupled to each other) the formulation
of user satisfaction policies requires that the investigated system’s boundaries be
broadened.
For instance, in Italy, this is the case of performance improvement policies in the
execution of infrastructure funded by the European Union “Regional Operational
Program”. In this regard, each municipal administration operates as the last segment
of a long value chain, which is made up by several units operating in different
institutions, with ruling and monitoring roles, most of them are inside a Regional
Ministry of Infrastructure.
Likewise, concerning immigration policies, social and family assistance services
in the ﬁelds of council housing, education, or employment support are mutually
linked and affected by European, national and regional policies. One can see a
similar pattern in the policies undertaken by a Regional Ministry of Labor, con-
cerning Employment Exchange3 and training measures, both aimed to deal with
youth unemployment rates.
Particularly, unemployed youth education policies disclose interdependencies
between the national and the regional Ministry of Labor. Other interdependencies
are between the Regional Ministry of Labor and various ‘brokers’ such as: private
3In the Italian system, the ‘Employment exchange’ provides a national on-line data transmission
system, aimed to facilitate the free match between demand and supply of labor. It is an open,
transparent, free, and updated system, made up by a net of regional nodes, through which citizens,
enterprises, public administrations, and authorized ‘brokers’ can have access to share resources,
information, and inquiries on labor supply.
4.7 Adopting an Inter-institutional Perspective and an “Objective” View … 175
training centers, enterprises asking for qualiﬁed manpower, and graduates searching
for employment, and receiving training. In such a ‘service delivery’ system,
unemployed graduates are the ﬁnal clients, while private training centers are in-
ternal clients.
Similar arguments can be related to public policies on: water supply, waste
management, land and energy. In the European context, the Act n. 387/03 (art. 12),
under the European Directive n. 77/01, delegated to the Regions (second level
administrations in a State) the tasks of authorizing applicants (e.g. enterprises) for
the construction of renewable energy production plants. This authorization must be
in conformance with laws affecting various issues such as environment and land-
scape, historical and artistic heritage. For instance, the “Industry” department of the
Sicilian Region must call a summit Conference of Services for each received
application, within 30 days from its receipt. It must also conclude the single
authorization process within 180 days.
The range of institutions potentially involved in such conference of services is
signiﬁcantly broad. It covers different regional ministries (such as ‘Land and
Environment’ and ‘Public Works’), Superintendence for Cultural Heritage, Forest
Inspectorate departments, Municipalities, Industrial Development Areas, Local
Health Agencies, and other various institutions, like the Italian Company for Air
Navigation Services (ENAV), the Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC), Provinces, the
State Property Agency, the Air Force, other State Ministries (e.g. Communication,
Defense). In such a complex and multifaceted domain, the “Mines and Energy”
Service of the Industry department must operate as a uniﬁed desk. In this regard, the
capability of such Service to detect criticalities and inform and address the ‘client’
(concerning the identiﬁcation of needed or missing documents in the application), is
a ﬁrst important factor affecting performance. Another important factor is the prompt
and right identiﬁcation of institutions to call in the summit Conference of Services.
This particularly requires a good knowledge of laws and a capability to analyze
and diagnose problems, and to correctly bring them back to legislative frameworks,
rules, and related current interpretations. Even the capability to outline a reliable
time schedule of the needed conference of services calls is critical. Last, but not
least, the capability to deal with ‘political-cultural’ problems related to change
resistance by different involved public sector stakeholders plays a signiﬁcant role in
affecting performance.
4.7.3 Mapping “Products” and “Users/Clients”
In all the examples mentioned above, the identiﬁcation of “products” and
“users/clients” provides an important key to start a program to affect performance
from a user satisfaction perspective.
Such a perspective must ﬁrst identify the ‘user-client’, to whom the ﬁnal
products emerging from the fulﬁllment of administrative tasks are addressed
(Holzer and Kloby 2005). Starting from such ‘clients’ and ﬁnal ‘products’—and
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then moving backward through the value chain (Bouckaert et al. 2005) which links
different loosely coupled institutions—allows one to identify different internal cli-
ents in the public administration system. Internal clients are those public agencies or
organizations that receive from other units in the public sector a given range of
‘products’ from the fulﬁllment of their own administrative processes. They deliver,
in turn, the products arising from the execution of their own administrative tasks to
the beneﬁt of down-stream public agencies, with a view to reaching the citizenry,
i.e. the ﬁnal users.
The conceptual framework here described implies that—if one refers to a given
ﬁnal “product”—it is possible to identify, by moving backward, a system of
products resulting from the fulﬁllment of administrative processes by each decision
unit whose only “clients” are internal to the public sector.
For “products” which are both delivered to the beneﬁt of external and internal
“clients”, the identiﬁcation of factors affecting performance and customer satis-
faction requires an analysis of: (1) underlying processes and activities; (2) involved
responsibility areas; (3) related available policy levers, and allocated resources;
(4) performance indicators.
With a goal of gradually moving from synthesis to analysis, it is necessary—for
each institution—to ﬁrst outline the macro processes carried out by the respective
responsibility areas.
For each group of macro processes underlying the delivery of a given output, at
least one intermediate “product” must be identiﬁed. Such “product” is an autono-
mous result of administrative tasks fulﬁlled by ‘back ofﬁce’ units to the beneﬁt of
an internal “client”. Performance in delivering an intermediate product will affect
the performance of the internal “client” who will receive it, and will—in turn—
influence the performance of other internal clients who are sequentially located
along the value chain leading to the delivery of the ﬁnal “product”.
In order to make this analysis selective, it is worth focusing attention on the
top-middle management areas in each institution, i.e. on the second level units in a
department. They provide a crucial area for performance improvement. Decisions
made by managers having the responsibility of such units are a good compromise
between the need for synthesis and coordination of the detailed activities accom-
plished by lower level units, and the need to focus the speciﬁc processes behind the
acquisition and deployment of strategic resources needed to affect performance. The
focus on these organizational levels may foster the empowerment and account-
ability of managers operating under the supervision of the department’s director.
A missing analysis of such processes and of their critical issues can be an obstacle
to the identiﬁcation of the “levers” on which managers may act to affect the drivers
impacting on the end-results generated by fulﬁlled administrative tasks. It would
also hamper goal setting and negotiation, budgeting, the assessment of results,
reward and career systems.
The identiﬁcation of macro processes, of related intermediate products to the
beneﬁt of internal customers, and performance measures, strategic resources and
policy levers on which decision makers must focus their attention, provides the ﬁrst.
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A second step for implementing DPM to improve user satisfaction in the public
sector requires that—for each macro process—different single processes are made
explicit. The result of each single process is an output of administrative tasks. This
output can be referred as a 2nd level intermediate product, i.e. a result which is an
instrument—often together with other 2nd level intermediate products—for the
attainment of a 1st level intermediate product, as previously deﬁned.
Figure 4.24 depicts intermediate products as outputs of administrative tasks
fulﬁlled by second level units in a department of a public sector institution.
If we consider the overall value chain, one should take into account three
sequential areas for improvement:
– The ﬁnal “product”. It underlies outcome indicators, related to the overall value
chain, to the performance of several institutions, involved with different roles in
the delivery of the considered service to citizens;
– 1st level intermediate “products”. It underlies performance drivers, which could
be named as second layer indicators;
– 2nd level intermediate “products”. It underlies performance drivers, which could
be named as third layer indicators.
Figure 4.25 shows how outlining activities, processes, products and related
performance indicators, identiﬁes two opposite flows: an information flow and a
physical flow. The ﬁrst one allows the planner to map the above mentioned value
chain, by moving backward from the ﬁnal “product” to processes, and—from them
—to activities. The second one describes how the public administration system
generates or destroys value, in delivering a given service. Therefore, it supports the
identiﬁcation and calibration of performance indicators, and related intervention
ﬁelds, in a user satisfaction perspective.
Fig. 4.24 Final products and external clients, and related intermediate products delivered to
internal clients through the fulﬁllment of macro-processes inside an institution “α”
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4.7.4 Implementing User Satisfaction Programs Through
DPM
Implementing the approach here described requires a selective ﬁeld analysis, to map
the institutions that play a role in the value chain underlying the delivery of a given
product (or a group of related products).
Since the administrative activity of any public institution is to a signiﬁcant extent
governed by law, this analysis needs to ﬁrst outline the legislative framework and
the formal system of administrative rules that comprise institutional system at hand.
The formal rules providing the backbone of such system can be considered either as
a constraint or a lever to foster change and performance improvement. In the ﬁrst
case, one sees law as an external and unchangeable factor that requires compliance
by any customer satisfaction program. In the second case, one takes a longer view,
with the possibility to revise the legislative framework in order to redesign the
institutional system and the rules that govern it.
It is important that such ﬁeld analysis be conducted following the value chain
backwards. A reverse perspective implies a previous detailed analysis to build a
database of activities, roles and tasks fulﬁlled by each unit operating in an insti-
tution, to cover the universe of heterogeneous competencies and duties attributed by
law and administrative rules. According to such an approach, a massive collection
of data is often done through interviews and questionnaires delivered to the
employees working in each unit at all the organizational levels, with the intent to
know how they spend their working time. This analysis usually results in a col-
lection of data that are barely consistent and symmetric with each other when
compared against one another. Therefore, this approach runs a serious risk that it
Final
Product
1st level 
Intermediate
Products
2nd level
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drivers 
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Fig. 4.25 Activities,
processes, “products” and
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may be unfocused and too vague and useless to implement a performance
improvement program. Although it may provide a complete picture of what each
single unit in a given institution actually does, it might not be very helpful in
detecting delivered ‘products’ and related ‘clients’, as well as the processes through
which they are delivered, and the proper performance measures to adopt in order to
improve performance.
A top-down approach rather implies a more selective detection of the needed
data to feed information needs. Moving backwards in such analysis, i.e. from the
ﬁnal “products” delivered to external “clients” at the end of the relevant value
chain, ﬁrstly focuses the analysts’ attention over the macro-processes through
which intermediate products are delivered to internal “clients”, inside or outside a
public sector institution. Such analysis can be done through semi-structured inter-
views ﬁrstly addressed to department directors, then (more extensively) to managers
leading the second level units, under their supervision.
In particular, interviews should gather useful data about: (1) available resources
in each responsibility area; (2) the flexibility in their use; (3) possible constraints in
the acquisition of further resources (in addition to the available ones); (4) bottle-
necks and rigidity factors for performance improvement due to the activity of other
units, located backwards in the same or other institutions; (5) different factors
(waiting time, number of faults, allocated working time) about which it could be
possible to improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of management processes and
the quality of delivered “products”. The above data are also useful to calibrate
performance standards in a budgeting setting, and to support periodical analysis of
variances between actual and budget data, on which the control system feedback
mechanism is based.
When possible, such interviews should also be supported by periodic workshops
—involving different decision areas, operating in the adjacent processes or even in
macro-process different from each other. They could also involve decision makers
from different institutions—from the private sector and representatives of ﬁnal
‘clients’ too—belonging to the value chain. Participation in a workshop by people
from different institutions (and, more generally, different decision areas) can
stimulate dialogue, a better knowledge of respective goals, constraints and mind-
sets, the identiﬁcation of problems and related possible solutions, and the search for
continuous improvement.
To this end, it is necessary that such workshops be designed and implemented as
proper working sessions whose purpose is knowledge and strategic organizational
learning. Therefore, a learning facilitator should be the leader of such sessions. He
or she would have to use a scientiﬁc method to provoke and manage tension in the
participants group towards the detection of crucial issues underlying the delivery of
the “product” or the group of products taken into account. The process of analysis
should be focused on investigation of the causal factors affecting performance,
moving backward from end-results to performance drivers and strategic resources,
and the various available policy levers.
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4.7.5 Case-Study: Regional Department of Infrastructure
This section will illustrate the results of a project that was carried out with a group
of managers of an Italian regional department of infrastructure, with the goal to
improve efﬁciency in the exploitation of the measure n. 5.02 of the European Union
(EU)—Regional Operation Program (ROP), for the so-called “objective 1” regions.
The EU “objective 1” aims to promote economic growth and to enhance long-term
competitiveness in less developed areas. More speciﬁcally, in order to tackle social
marginality, the program aims to recover historical urban centers through the
construction or the modernization of parks, buildings, roads, schools, etc.
The local section of the Court of Auditors had been stigmatizing the regional
public sector for its low capability to efﬁciently use such funding. During the seven
years ﬁnanced by the EU through the program, the Region had been able to use
only about the 50 % of the total funding, while other Italian Regions had been able
to exploit around the 70 %.
Though spending does not measure outcomes, such statistics were providing an
important symptom of a low aptitude of the regional public sector to support the
building and delivery of proper infrastructure to the community.
The project aimed to outline: (1) the main ‘products’ associated with the ful-
ﬁllment of administrative tasks by the department, (2) the underlying
macro-processes, (3) the involved responsibility areas, and (4) performance
indicators.
Four macro-processes and different levels of intermediate administrative prod-
ucts were identiﬁed.
The main goal of macro-process (1) is to reduce the time it takes by the
department to publish the Decree authorizing the issue of the call for tenders related
to the public works projects by the Municipalities that will beneﬁt from the EU
funding.
Such decree is a “ﬁrst level” intermediate product delivered by macro-process
(1). Related to it, two “second level” intermediate products were identiﬁed, i.e.:
(a) the call for tenders that the regional administration issues to invite
Municipalities to submit projects to be funded through the EU funds, and (b) the
regional decree approving the list of funded projects.
The main performance indicator related to this macro-process is the
“actual/standard” time ratio to issue the decree.
Main activities and responsibilities, related to the fulﬁllment of this
macro-process are:
(a) Call for tenders is issued: Municipalities are invited by the regional admin-
istration to submit projects;
(b) Project proposals are received and selected;
(c) A decree approving the list of projects admitted to funding is issued;
(d) Copy of the decree is forwarded to the “Service n. 2” of the regional
department of infrastructure (this is a second level unit in the department);
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(e) “Service n. 2” may ask each beneﬁciary municipality to send supplementary
documents. In the meanwhile, each funded Municipal administration appoints
a project manager;
(f) The department’s director signs the decree authorizing funded Municipalities
to issue their call for tenders.
The main goal of macro-process (2) is to minimize the number of appeals ﬁled
by construction ﬁrms against the call for tenders issued by the Municipal
administrations.
The “ﬁrst level” intermediate product delivered by macro-process (2) is the
drawing up and signature of the contract between the Municipal administration and
the construction ﬁrm that will implement the infrastructure. Related to it, other
“second level” intermediate products were identiﬁed, i.e.: (a) the call for tenders
that the Municipal administration issues to invite construction ﬁrms to submit
projects for the implementation of the funded infrastructure, (b) documents for-
warded by the “Tenders Ofﬁce” of the Regional Department to the project manager
for the funded infrastructure at each Municipal administration.
The main performance indicator related to this macro-process is the
“actual/standard number of appeals” ratio. Also, since an important means to
minimize the number of appeals ﬁled against the Municipal call for tenders is
considered the standardization level of administrative processes and the quality and
size of databases on tenders, appeals and court verdicts, another performance
indicator is the ratio between the actual and the standard average time it takes by the
regional department to update databases.
Main activities and responsibilities, related to the fulﬁllment of this
macro-process are:
(a) The Municipal project manager for the funded infrastructure sketches the call
for tenders based on which construction ﬁrms will submit their projects to
implement the infrastructure. If the value of the project funding is higher than
Euro 1,250,000 the “Tenders Ofﬁce” of the Regional department will monitor
the process of sketching the call for tenders, and will support the project
manager for each funded infrastructure at Municipal level.
(b) After the Municipal administration has issued the call for tenders, the “Tenders
Ofﬁce” of the Regional department will receive the documentation from the
project manager of each Municipality. Such documents will be submitted to
the Project Evaluating Committee, whose members are selected by the
“Tenders Ofﬁce”. This ofﬁce also provides administrative support to the
Committee.
(c) After the committee has selected the construction ﬁrm that will implement the
infrastructure, the “Tenders Ofﬁce” will draw up the minutes of the selection
process and will forward them to the project manager at each funded
Municipality.
(d) The Municipality and the selected construction ﬁrm will sign the contract.
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The main goal of macro-process (3) is to minimize the time it takes to
implement the infrastructure. This target is considered as an outcome that the
regional department of infrastructure is not able to directly affect, since project
management is implemented at municipal level. So, the regional department mainly
focuses on targets impacting on the time it takes for the municipal administrations
to spend the EU funds allocated to build infrastructures.
The “ﬁrst level” intermediate product delivered by macro-process (3) is the
funding decree issued by the regional department of Infrastructure to the
Municipalities that will beneﬁt from project funding.
Related to it, the technical certiﬁcation of expenditure was identiﬁed as a
“second level” intermediate product.
The main performance indicator related to this macro-process is the
“actual/standard” time to issue the credit order, through which funds are made
available to the Municipal administration to implement the infrastructure. Other
performance indicators through which the regional department may monitor the
efforts made to prevent and correct problems that may slow down the process
leading to the issue of the funding decree are related to: (1) the ratio between task
force meetings done/planned to solve problems, and (2) the ratio between super-
visory visits to Municipal administrations implemented/planned by the regional
department.
Main activities and responsibilities, related to the fulﬁllment of this
macro-process are:
(a) The Service n. 2 of the regional department prepares all the necessary docu-
ments to issue the funding decree;
(b) The Municipal project manager forwards to the Service n. 2 a “Technical
certiﬁcation of Expenditure”, which summarizes the budgeted costs that will
be funded by the ﬁrst payment to the construction company;
(c) Such documents are checked by the Service n. 2, which support project
managers to ﬁnd solution to possible problems.
(d) The regional department of infrastructure issues the funding decree. Payment
for a ﬁrst fraction of the project is done.
The main goal of macro-process (4) is to minimize the time it takes to forward
to third monitoring institutions documents related to infrastructure implementation.
The “ﬁrst level” intermediate product delivered by macro-process (4) are mon-
itoring and reporting documents.
Related to them, statements of account, monitoring summaries, and certiﬁcates
of payment were identiﬁed as a “second level” intermediate products.
The main performance indicator related to this macro-process is the
“actual/standard” time to submit reports to third monitoring institutions.
Main activities and responsibilities, related to the fulﬁllment of this
macro-process are:
(a) Municipal project managers periodically forward to the Area n. 2 of the
regional department of infrastructure the documents proving payments for
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funded expenses (i.e. statements of account, monitoring summaries, and cer-
tiﬁcates of payment).
(b) The Area n. 2 of the regional department of infrastructure controls and vali-
dates the documents. Also, every two months it submits to the “Planning unit”
of the Central Regional Cabinet a report on the expenses for each project.
(c) It also forwards the same documents to the Service n. 2, to enable it to
undertake the necessary steps to speed up the project execution (e.g. through
meetings with municipal project managers, aimed at detecting and solving
problems).
4.8 Applying Dynamic Performance Management
to Local Areas: The Case of Environmental
and e-Government Policies
Though local government is a traditional ﬁeld of research and practice in perfor-
mance management, the governance of local areas is a relatively new topic. It
primarily requires a focus on a multi-organizational (i.e. inter-institutional) sphere,
where performance measurement/management is expected to foster coordination
among different players to pursue a learning-oriented strategic planning.
Local strategic planning is crucial for sustainable development. It implies the
implementation of ‘metropolitan governance’, i.e. “the process by which citizens
collectively solve their problems and meet society’s needs, using ‘government’ as
the instrument” (OECD 2000, p. 1).
The concept of competitiveness, when applied to local government, goes beyond
a mere aggregation of the competitiveness of companies or single organization
located in a region. Local areas can be considered as independent agents, which
may compete on a global scale, to attract and retain strategic resources (e.g.: mobile
investment, public funds, infrastructures, companies, population, human capital,
tourism, arts, and global events) that will allow them to further improve their
competitiveness, to preserve or increase quality of life and social wellness (Begg
1999; Jessop and Sum 2000; Lever 1999; Porter 1995). For instance, human capital,
companies, infrastructures, knowledge networks and the transparency of public
sector authorization processes, may further attract new companies, projects, and
skills. The capability of a region to attract, retain and deploy such resources may
foster the acquisition of further strategic resources that cannot be gained through
‘market-like’ competition such as: quality of life, social capital, citizen satisfaction,
trust in government, and reputation.
However, the governance of local areas is not that simple due to a number of
factors, such as: fragmentation of jurisdictions and lack of coordination among
them, blurred decision-making, chronic difﬁculties in ﬁnancial management and
ﬁscal policy making, lack of accountability and of outcome-driven vision (OECD
2000). Changing attitudes and developing a culture of governance is a pre-requisite
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to improve the capability of metropolitan areas to pursue local development (OECD
2001, p. 13). More inclusive and participatory governance approaches should
replace traditional “top-down” rule-driven systems (OECD 2000). This implies a
shift from “government” to “governance” (Cavenago and Trivellato 2010). In this
context, governmental institutions are expected to take an active role as leaders of a
change and learning process, implying a constant interaction, not only with other
public sector organizations, but also with the civil society.
A number of factors shape the speciﬁc complexity of this ﬁeld.
First, the planning effort is primarily focused on a geographic area. In this
perspective, as remarked in Chap. 2, the sustainable development of single orga-
nizations is tightly related to the sustainable development of the local area where
they are located.
Second, coordination between different institutions and an outcome view to
investigate how adopted policies will impact on the performance of the area are
needed.
Third, a trade-off analysis (in both and time and space) is needed: a strategy
might improve local performance in the short term, but it might also lead to
unintended outcomes in the long term. Also, it might improve performance in a
given industry to the detriment of another.
Fourth, a feedback perspective is needed. In fact, an input-output view may lead
to a bounded identiﬁcation of the relevant system generating local performance, and
therefore to a poor assessment of policy outcomes. This also requires a
learning-oriented approach: a cross fertilization between different professional
proﬁles participating into the planning process should contribute to capture the
systemic, complex and dynamic structure of the problem context.
A lack of perception of such complexity has been a major cause of the ritual
implementation of local areas’ governance (Razumeyko 2011, pp. 406–408).
Though urban studies are a tradition in the SD literature (Forrester 1969), the last
two sections of this chapter will outline a relatively new stream of research and
practice to propose DPM as an approach applied to local governance. This approach
builds on the work developed by Ghaffarzadegan et al. (2011) and by Kim et al.
(2013), where small SD models were used to enhance public policy and
decision-making.
Two exemplary case-studies will be illustrated through a DPM approach. The
ﬁrst refers to environmental and e-government policies. The second refers to a
strategic repositioning of a community’s ceramic industry. This section will focus
on the ﬁrst case.
The case study of Hammarby, referred to a district of Stockholm, Sweden
(CABE 2013), will be described. Hammarby is an admirable example of urban
transformation. Formerly a run-down part of town in Stockholm’s industrial area
affected by heavy pollution problems, it has become an environmental role model in
less than a decade. The city council developed an eco-cycle model to integrate
environmental results with strategic planning. An ambitious program to recycle
waste and wastewater to turn into renewable energy was introduced.
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Solid waste is disposed into a vacuum-based underground collection system,
which separates it into organic, recyclable and other forms. Organic waste and
bio-solids are converted into bio-fuels and combustible garbage is burned to supply
electricity and hot water with the use of heat and power plants and thermal power
stations. Also a high percentage of nitrogen and phosphorous is retained to be used
as fertilizer for local agriculture. The use of recycled water and waste not only has
affected a reduction in pollution; it has also transformed them into strategic
resources for the production of environmentally friendly electricity.
The initial success of the Hammarby model to bring forward the priorities of
integration of urban sustainability, information and communication technology, and
energy efﬁciency led to the recent establishment in 2011 of a Ministry for
Information Technology and Energy within the Swedish Ministry of Enterprise,
Energy and Communication. This is a notable example of how local governance
and e-government can support the coordination of sustainable development policies
across different urban organizations and stakeholders.
A DPM model framing such policies is displayed in Fig. 4.26 (Bianchi and
Navarra 2013).
The ﬁgure shows how waste depletion and the move towards environmentally—
produced energy are speciﬁc end-results for the project. They allow decision
makers to affect waste accumulation and the stock of environmental friendly
Fig. 4.26 DPM chart portraying the effects of Hammarby’s environmental policies on the local
area’s performance
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produced energy. Such end-results are affected by the recycling percentage (i.e. the
ratio between recycled and total waste). This driver is, in turn, affected by the
investments in wastewater treatment plants (strategic resource) and by the stock of
waste.
Figure 4.26 also shows how the stock of environmental friendly produced
energy affects a second driver, i.e., the percentage use of ‘clean’ energy. This driver,
on the one side affects the change in CO2 emissions in the region (i.e. a third
end-result); on the other side, it directly affects the local area’s attractiveness (i.e. a
third performance driver). In fact, a higher percentage of clean energy produced in
the area will not only affect the environmental pollution levels, but will also directly
generate less expensive electric power available in the region.
The previously mentioned performance driver—“local area’s attractiveness”—is
also affected by the stock of CO2 emissions in the urban area.
The outcome of the described policies is related to the effect of local area’s
attractiveness—other things being equal—on community satisfaction (i.e. pros-
perity and wealth) and on the stock of population.
This is likely to generate counterintuitive effects in the urban area’s performance.
In fact, on the one side higher achieved community prosperity will sustain more
investments to foster the described policy. This might also imply a stronger and
wider level of participation by several decision makers from different public/private
sector institutions. This would indicate a higher level of trust and cohesion in the
area. Therefore, such ﬁrst effect of the policy would underlie a growth-oriented
reinforcing loop.
However, on a longer time horizon, higher community prosperity might attract
more people to live or work into the city. A higher population—other things being
equal—might increase the level of waste. This might counterbalance the positive
effects generated by the reinforcing loop previously described. Therefore, an
increase in population might generate a shift in loop dominance, i.e. from a rein-
forcing to a balancing loop, acting as a limit to growth.
Policy makers might decide to counteract this loop by exploring alternative
scenarios and policies. For instance, they might increase the volume and quality of
investments in recycling equipment, with a view to keep stable the percentage of
recycled waste. They might also consider levying taxes on accumulated waste. This
policy might discourage further increases in population. However, it might level off
—or even reduce—the local area’s attractiveness, and community prosperity.
The role of e-government policies and systems in the production of the results
previously described is not the least important.
The Swedish administrative model, with its independently managed
central-government agencies, is considered to have had a major role on the rapid
development of digital applications and e-services within the public administration.
According to Lind et al. (2009) the historical reconstruction of Sweden’s efforts in
e-government point strongly towards the requirement for common standards to
establish a fully integrated networked public administration. Such standardization
has supported the creation of the Hammarby’s eco-cycle model.
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In 2001, the Swedish government appointed a forum for Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) and the environment, under the then Ministry
for the Environment. The idea was to create a natural platform for ICTs and
ecologically sustainable development. The project was implemented in a working
group consisting of representatives from industry, research, the Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency, ministries and environmental organizations. One
of the group’s tasks was to study the potential of ICT use in the development of
emerging infrastructures, products and services that are resource efﬁcient and less
environmentally harmful. The work continued in the form of the Government’s
Strategy Group on Information Technology (IT) Policy under the then Ministry for
Industry (Bianchi and Navarra 2013). Members of the group and its secretariat staff
were recruited from both the private and the public sector.
The monitoring and direct management of energy consumption, an emphasis on
services (such as e-commerce, teleworking and e-government) facilitated the
emergence of ICT solutions which are energy efﬁcient, such as “thin clients”, grid
computing and virtualization technologies.
In this context, partnerships between sectors have been introduced to accelerate
the development and wide-scale rollout of ICT-based solutions for monitoring,
managing and measuring energy-use and carbon emissions in energy-using activ-
ities. Finally, smart meters were introduced to enable feedback to be given to the
end-user, and instructive online solutions that encourage energy efﬁciency,
eco-visualization and energy simulations, to promote a more responsible behavior
in energy use and information transparency.
Last, but not least, the Swedish government promoted the development of
knowledge on energy issues in the construction and property sector in a wider
sense. A cooperation project was implemented by the national government with
other public authorities and the construction industry, involving training programs
focused on business operators in the industry.
Figure 4.27 presents a DPM model of the described e-government policy in
Sweden, with a speciﬁc focus on environmental issues.
The ﬁgure shows how e-government policies improved the transparency of
information (strategic resource) that was made available to different stakeholders
(e.g. enterprises, non-proﬁt organizations). This improved two main performance
drivers, impacting on the private sector participation to public governance projects,
i.e.: information capillarity (i.e. its availability to a wide range of stakeholders) and
information speed (i.e. prompt availability of available information).
Enhanced private sector participation further contributed to improve information
transparency (a reinforcing—growth oriented—loop). It also improved the local
areas’ attractiveness (performance driver), since more private sector organizations
were attracted to start projects in those areas (end-result). An improvement in
regional attractiveness was also facilitated by a reduction of “grey areas” in public
decision-making, i.e. a lower uncertainty for private investors in interacting with the
government.
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The ﬁgure also shows that an improvement in the stock of existing private sector
projects in a region (strategic resource) boosted the intensiveness of private sector
initiatives, which increased the employment rate. An improvement in the average
employment rate (strategic resource) in a region further boosted its attractiveness.
4.9 Applying Dynamic Performance Management
to Local Areas (Continued): The Case of Ceramic
Industry Revitalization Policies
In this section a case-study of ceramic industry revitalization policy making will be
discussed, with the goal to describe the weaknesses of a traditional approach to
local strategic planning in framing sustainable strategies and supporting policy
makers to implement them. Based on such analysis, the beneﬁts of DPM applied to
local strategic planning will be illustrated (Bianchi and Tomaselli 2015).
The case-study refers to the municipality of Caltagirone, a small town located in
Sicily (Italy). The city has a glorious past since it has been for over two millennia
the privileged stronghold of Byzantines, Arabs, and Normans. Rich in churches,
valuable palaces and eighteenth-century villas, in 2002 it was awarded the title of
World Heritage Site by UNESCO.
Fig. 4.27 DPM chart portraying the effects of e-government policies in Sweden
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In spite of its small size (approximately 38,000 inhabitants), due to its geo-
graphical position, the city has been a hub for a area located in the neighbor plains
of Gela and Catania. Such area overall counts about 325,000 inhabitants. It is
famous for its ceramics handcrafts, an industry that has been flourishing since the
era of the ancient Greeks.
A strategic plan was started in 2003, to identify and frame the factors impacting
on the local area’s performance. To draw up the plan, a team of consultants sup-
ported the Municipality of Caltagirone. Eighteen months were spent to collect data,
to identify main stakeholders in and outside the region and conduct interviews with
them, and to support the local administrators in outlining realistic goals and actions.
The plan deﬁned a set of “visions” for the future of the city and the surrounding
area. Such visions were then structured around a system of strategic goals, strictly
intertwined each other. The guidelines for development (missions) were listed as
follows: (a) develop and disseminate a strong culture of quality; (b) enhance the
history, traditions, environmental resources of the area; (c) embellish/make the city
more welcoming; (d) internationalize culture and trade relations; (e) adapt services
to international standards; (f) focus policies on an area wider than the city, as a basis
to increase the value provided by Caltagirone; (g) extend production chains;
(h) combine innovation and tradition, but also art and technology (Bianchi and
Tomaselli 2015).
The overall logic pursued by the plan was essentially based on framing the
“drivers” of such development. For instance: which role would have played an
improvement of key production chains, of local product and service quality, so to
make the area more attractive to outside investments? This analysis would have
involved the companies of the area in new projects aimed to generate a stronger
business culture and to foster the development of professional services to local
enterprises.
Ceramics plays an important role in the economy of the area. The city is pop-
ulated by a myriad of shops exposing the typical products of this ancient art (dishes,
jars, vases, tiles, candlesticks) engaging almost two hundred artisans.
After a period of strong growth, the industry entered into a stagnation phase, due
to a loss of quality and the failure in research on new techniques and materials.
Many competencies and professional skills related to the creation of the forms of
handcrafts had been lost.
The plan described the critical issues about the development of this industry in
the area. It was envisaged that most local artisans were dedicated mainly to the
production of traditional and low quality products. Main customers were occasional
travelers, tourists and a few residents.
The sector also produced floor and wall tiles for kitchens and bathrooms with
traditional design. This market segment required a set of key-competences, closer to
those of ‘mass’ than to ‘handcraft’ production, and therefore needed a proper
management of commercial issues and manufacturing techniques. In spite of these
requirements, local producers were still far from making a major shift from a
mass-market production to the use of advanced manufacturing and commercial
techniques.
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The State Institute of Arts was experiencing difﬁculties in interacting with local
producers.
The ‘controlled designation of origin’ recognition, which was attributed to
Caltagirone’s ceramics since the year 1993, never played the role of a driving force
for the development of quality, production reliability and innovation. The launch of
the Municipal Controlled Designation of Origin (DE.CO.P.) brand, by the
Municipality of Caltagirone, in order to support and protect heritage, knowledge
and experience of the ceramics handcrafting was still in its embryonic state.
It was necessary to recover the past values of art, and consistently connect them
to those related to design.
In order to face such challenges, the strategic plan identiﬁed three lines of action,
i.e.:
1. Pursuing a stronger coordination between actors. A new company was started to
promote the development of good practices along the supply chain and to
support local ﬁrms to refocus their design and commercial strategies, to better
understand market structure and needs. The company’s shareholders were the
Municipal administration, the government of Sicily, the local agency for
development, a local bank, the Institute of Art, and local businesses in the
ceramics industry.
2. Improving the artistic and innovation skills of local artisan ﬁrms. A deep
strategic reorientation of the Public School of ceramics, to restore its ability to
support the development of local ﬁrms, through the training of craftsmen and
professionals was needed.
3. Creating favorable conditions to improve product innovation and a marketing
effort to gain a good international reputation. This implied the need to support
startup ﬁrms in the ceramics industry in identifying their market segments,
choose marketing channels (e.g., antiques dealers, jewelers, retail chains of
high-class décor or design, high class hotels for higher quality products) and
focusing other key players in the industry value chain (e.g.: designers, engi-
neers, architects).
Although the efforts produced to draw up the plan were substantial, and the goals
and lines of action appeared to be consistent with the described challenges, the
implementation of the plan was poor. A weak entrepreneurial culture, fragmentation
of initiatives, lack of coordination among stakeholders, and cultural resistance
towards a local area perspective in policy making were major causes of such failure
(Bianchi and Tomaselli 2015).
However, though such causes may provide a clear explanation of the cultural
and socio-political difﬁculties inhibiting change, the main cause of the failure in
implementing the described strategy can be attributed perhaps to the static and
non-systemic view adopted by planners.
Though single strategic resources (e.g. infrastructures, knowledge, businesses,
cultural heritage) had been explicitly considered in policy design, the plan was not
able to capture the effects that adopted policies might have generated on their
accumulation and depletion processes, over time, according to alternative scenarios.
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Also, the plan could not capture delays between causes and effects. For instance, it
did not take into consideration the time that the designed policies to improve R&D
and artistic/innovation skills would have required in order to generate the expected
effects on ceramics quality. Furthermore, it did not consider the delays through
which the planned investments to improve the quality of the city’s museums might
have generated an improvement in the area’s image (Bianchi and Tomaselli 2015).
Such a static perspective underlies a bounded planning view, which is quite far
from a policy outcomes evaluation. This implies a risk of inversion between means
and ends. According to such view, building a strategic resource (such as knowl-
edge, infrastructure, R&D capacity, a controlled designation of origin recognition)
is implicitly considered as a goal to achieve, rather than a pre-condition to gain, in
order to carry out effective policies aimed to affect the area’s performance, in terms
of both drivers and end-results (i.e., outcomes such as: employment and investment
rates, or change in citizens’ quality of life).
Furthermore, although the plan mentioned possible trade-offs and/or synergies in
space, e.g. related to different industries (such as: ceramics vs. tourism, vs. agri-
culture) or to market segments (such as artistic vs. industrial), there was not an
attempt to measure the effects of planned policies on performance drivers and
end-results.
All these weaknesses in the adopted approach to local strategic planning might
have been overcome by using a DPM approach.
An example can be referred to the trade-offs between innovation and tradition in
ceramic handcrafting. For instance, in the short run, focusing policies on tradition
and continuity with the historical roots of the area is likely to consolidate the
product image and its identiﬁcation with the geographic area. This would increase
the value (e.g. in terms of sales turnover, proﬁts, or new jobs) generated by the
product, and might foster further efforts oriented to focus the local area’s policies on
tradition’s preservation (reinforcing loop “R1” in Fig. 4.28). However, focusing
policies on only this direction might generate product obsolescence in the long run.
In fact, new market trends might require a gradual adaptation of the product
characteristics to the evolving values and needs of new generations of customers.
A misperception of this need would increase the perceived product age, which
would reduce the product ﬁt with customers’ evolving needs. This would decrease
the value generated by the ceramics industry (balancing loop “B1” in Fig. 4.28).
On the other hand, in the short run, an aggressive innovation policy (e.g. aimed
to foster an hybridization of ceramic crafts to embody emerging artistic traits from
other cultures) could allow the product/local area to stay in an early maturity stage
of its lifecycle and to increase the generated value (reinforcing loop “R2” in
Fig. 4.28). However, in the long run an excess of focus on innovation might
undermine the product identiﬁcation with its area; this would reduce the value
created by the industry to the beneﬁt of the local area (balancing loop “B2” in
Fig. 4.28).
Therefore, a proper mix between the two sets of policies might trigger a path to
sustainable development. Actors must identify and analyze main feedback loops
between variables affecting the described system behavior. It also implies a proper
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methodological effort to identify and measure the performance variables related to
the designed policies.
For instance, in the example portrayed in Fig. 4.28, an effort is made to deﬁne
for each variable in the feedback loop diagram one or more corresponding per-
formance measures. Regarding such measures, a causal analysis is also done:
end-results are affected by ﬁrst level performance drivers, which are—in turn—
affected by second level performance drivers. In this case, the average age of
Fig. 4.28 Main feedback loops and performance measures associated with tradition versus
innovation policies
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product portfolio is the second level performance driver, which is influenced by an
aging chain of stocks depicting the number of ceramic models or forms in the area’s
“portfolio” (strategic resources) at each lifecycle stage (Fig. 4.29). An aggressive
product innovation strategy implies an increasing percentage of the new products
stock on the total. Such state of the system can be pursued by alternative policies. In
the Caltagirone strategic plan, the adopted policies were focused on a new company
startup to foster R&D and on the strengthening of efforts to revitalize the School of
ceramics. As remarked, the implementation of the two policies should not be
evaluated in terms of simple output measures (i.e. number of started or accom-
plished projects), but especially in relation to their outcomes. Such outcomes can be
detected based on the identiﬁcation and measurement of the indirect policy effects
on the identiﬁed performance drivers and end-results. A dynamic performance
management synthetic view of the described context is depicted in Fig. 4.29.
For simplicity, we consider here as an end-result only the ﬁnancial value gen-
erated into the geographic area by the ceramics industry. This can be referred as a
synthetic expression of the income or cash flows earned in a given time span (e.g. a
year) by companies in the area. On the one side, the accumulation over time of this
value contributes to increase the stocks of equity and ﬁnancial resources of local
companies. On the other side, it provides a basis for further investments in the area.
Such investments are here depicted as an accumulation into two different synthetic
Fig. 4.29 A DPM chart framing the tradition versus innovation trade-off
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strategic resources, i.e.: “R&D and Market development intensiveness” and
“Human Capital Development intensiveness”. The two stocks are an expression of
the quality and volume of investments done in the area to ensure that the devel-
opment activities focused on innovation and tradition will effectively impact on the
key-drivers affecting end-results.
Overall, an effect of the static and non-systemic view that was adopted in
sketching the Caltagirone strategic plan was a lack of attention on the role that an
individualistic culture, a fragmentation of jurisdictions and administrative processes
encompassing different public and private organizations in the area would have
affected in delaying and tackling the implementation of the change process
designed by the plan.
In the short term, a more realistic strategy might have been focused on the
pursuit of a gradual improvement in key-actors’ culture and knowledge, as well as
in organizational management processes (i.e. R&D, production, commercial skills)
along the ceramics value chain. A more open and collaborative culture and a
stronger key-actors’ knowledge of the historical roots of Caltagirone might have
encouraged the start of partnerships on innovating projects in the ﬁeld of ceramics,
e.g. to feed the use of new materials in production processes (performance drivers),
leading to the launch of new product lines, the search of new market segments,
leading to an increased value generated in the area—e.g.: sales volumes and rev-
enues, proﬁts, cash flows, employment rates, new companies (end-results). In the
long run, such results would have signiﬁcantly strengthened the socio-economic
structure of the area and therefore would have increased its relative attractiveness
towards an improvement in the net of partnerships, both on the international
markets and on other adjoining industries.
Figure 4.30 shows how such long-term effects of policies, aimed to combine
tradition and innovation in the ceramics industry, may improve the local area’s
attractiveness (performance driver). This would determine an increase in the stock
of companies operating in the area in the ceramics and other adjoining industries
(end-result). A higher number of companies located in a stimulating and compet-
itive geographic area would contribute—other things being equal—to increase the
intensiveness and inclination of players to network (performance driver). This
would, on one side, further increase the area’s attractiveness, which might also
positively affect the population rate. On the other side, it would also increase the
number of partnerships and the employment rate (end-results). Such effects might
further amplify the area’s growth rate, since a higher stock of skilled employees in
the area (strategic resource) would make the area more attractive to potential
investors. Also, a higher stock of companies located in the area might further
increase the intensiveness and scope of collaboration projects.
The capability of players in the area to frame and affect the driving forces of such
growth is a fundamental condition to ensure sustainable development. For instance,
limits to growth might gradually originate from an increasing population, leading to
saturation in the provision processes of different services in the area (e.g. housing,
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health care, police, education, trafﬁc). Ignoring such limits to growth might generate
a shift from a development to a crisis pattern in the management of the local area.
The analysis shows that a DPM view can support local strategic planning by
allowing decision makers to discern short from long-term policies; by supporting
the linkage of strategic goals to appropriate measures aimed at gauging expected
and emerging results. It also helps decision makers to clearly distinguish means
from ends, and to indentify different “layers” of performance measures, starting
from the identiﬁcation of end-results and of corresponding sequentially related
performance drivers. Overall, this approach may support decision makers to better
conceptualize the relevant system related to the investigated problem behavior, and
to better implement designed strategies.
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Chapter 5
Applying Dynamic Performance
Management to Enterprises
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will illustrate two examples of DPM applied to enterprises. Cases will
show how DPM can support a learning-oriented approach into the P&C processes
of business organizations.
From the examples that will be discussed, the reader will learn how DPM can
support business decision makers to frame the speciﬁc dynamic complexity of the
industry where their companies operate and to pursue a sustainable organizational
growth.
5.2 Applying DPM to Support Entrepreneurial Learning
in Business Startup and Restructuring Processes
In this section, a microworld using a DPM approach, to support strategic learning in
business startup and restructuring processes will be illustrated.
Microworlds (otherwise stated as: “interactive learning environments”, or
“management flight simulators”) are SD-based simulation models aiming to foster
policy debate. The use of such simulators, supported by a learning facilitator, can
help policy makers understand the dynamic relationships between strategic
resources and performance variables. In fact, the elicitation of the causal chain
between them may enhance decision makers’ learning processes and, thus, their
ability to comprehend how different strategies might affect organization results over
time. In particular, such simulators offer managers a “virtual world” where they can
test their hypotheses and evaluate the possible effects of their strategies without
bearing the costs and risks of experimenting with them in the real world (Morecroft
1987). Virtual worlds are effective if they enable learners in practicing “reflective
thought”, i.e. an ability to exercise a reflective conversation with the situation.
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When microworlds are used, this occurs in the mode of design, i.e. through a
“transitional object” (that is a model) which is able to act as a tangible aid to
imagination and learning, and to help people make better sense of a partly under-
stood world (Morecroft 2007, p. 374).
When “flight simulators” are used to support strategic learning processes of a
management team, each individual carries around an image of the organization
taken from the real world and ﬁltered through his or her own mental models. Such
images of the real world may vary according to the experience, organizational role,
ambitions, and objectives of each person. Through the use of a simulator—as a
“transitional object” providing a virtual world to play with—a learning facilitator
may support a group of policy makers to elicit and compare their own mental
models with the goal to: (1) improve the quality of their understanding of a dynamic
and complex world, (2) gain a common shared view of why, how, and when
performance is affected, and (3) improve the quality of their decisions.
The role and value of SD microworlds, in terms of supporting learning through
participating in simulated business management, has been widely described in the
literature (Morecroft and Sterman 1994; Davidsen et al. 2000). Romme (2004)
asserts that mature students (for example on MBAs), who may have signiﬁcant
business experience, are more likely to beneﬁt from microworlds than less mature
ones. Mohapatra and Saha (1996) describe simulator trials that they argue cor-
roborate their hypothesis that learning and performance are positively correlated.
However, whilst the potential beneﬁts of simulator use might be established as a
general principle, there are practical issues of validity and ease of use that relate to
an individual simulator such as the one described here, i.e.:
– In the development of any business enterprise simulator, its designers use the-
ories and business fundamentals drawn from their own knowledge and expe-
rience. Of course, because the simulation designers must choose speciﬁc
procedures and theories, their personal bias can become a factor and—as
Goosen et al. (2001) and Grossler (2004) suggest—the learning beneﬁts of a
speciﬁc simulation can thereby be affected by what is and is not chosen as the
knowledge base, which mostly depends on both the bounded rationality of the
learner and of the modeler/learning facilitator.
– The usefulness of any simulator to an entrepreneur (as opposed to a student) will
be a function of how easy he or she ﬁnds it to use and how realistically it
portrays his or her own business. Simulator developers typically look to prove
their simulators with representative user groups.1
1For example, Rouwette et al. (1998) proved their management game to introduce employees of
housing associations to new market conditions. Ford (1996) has described how his Snake River
water resources model was perceived by a group of 30 individuals gathered together. Both these
simulators, of course, reflected speciﬁc cases, either a particular industry sector or one actual
system, although Winch and Arthur (2002) have demonstrated that at the ‘insight’ level generic
models, possible parameterized with general values representing an individual company, can be
acceptable by users as sufﬁciently suggestive of their own actual ﬁrm.
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– The effectiveness of a SD-based microworld as a learning aid is subordinated to
the consistency of the adopted teaching strategies with the goal of fostering a
“double loop” learning process in a group of learners using a simulator. This
implies that a simulator is adopted as a vehicle to develop the learners’ ability to
perceive and map the hidden “structure and behavior” feedback relationships
underlying business performance. To this end, simulators are generally used as a
teaching support to a case-study. After discussing the case’s debating points, the
learners are engaged in a group simulation session, by using a microworld. This
puts the learners in a learning and ‘risk safe’ environment, where they can
experiment an organization and a decision context having the same features
described in the case. Proper use of a SD microworld implies that a facilitator
supports the learning process in both group and de-brieﬁng plenary sessions.
Such approach does not primarily aim to generate a competition between
groups, with the goal to maximize or minimize a set of targets—as it happens
when business games are used. The emphasis of simulation, teamwork, and
plenary de-brieﬁng sessions in this context is, rather, on supporting the acqui-
sition by the learners of a feedback view to enhance DPM.
The simulations described in this section reflect the efforts of the microworld
designer to ensure that it adequately reflects the reality of a small ﬁrm’s operations
and that it can produce a realistic and believable portrayal of how startup, business
restructuring and growth could arise, and of the possible scenarios for enabling
ﬁrms to move into long term sustainable growth.
5.2.1 Applying DPM to Support Entrepreneurial Learning
in Business Startup and Restructuring Processes
(Continued): CompuGames Dynamic Business Plan
Simulator
In this section the “CompuGames” case-study and simulator will be illustrated, with
the goal to show how the use of SD microworlds may support small business
startup and restructuring planning processes, according to a DPM approach.
“CompuGames” is a small business that was started about two years ago. It
operates in a market niche in the videogames and entertainment industry, on a
boundary between the real and the virtual world. Based on the multi-year experi-
ences of its two founders, the company is positioned in the industry as an inde-
pendent videogame developer. Its products are positioned on a medium-high price
level. Currently, after less than two years from its startup, its operations may only
rely on the capabilities and creativity of its two founders, who are supported by
three employees, i.e.: a designer, an assembler, and a sales agent.
Recently the company has adopted a new technology that enhances the so-called
“augmented reality” (AR): through AR visors and software, virtual
three-dimensional objects can be visualized in a very realistic manner in a virtual
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environment, so that the users can interact with them. Such technology can be used
in other industries, e.g.: construction industry simulation, medicine, cinema,
archeology, and industrial prototypes. This has allowed CompuGames to enter new
adjacent market segments, in respect to the original one.
Also, CompuGames has designed a transportable and easy to install projection
system, which is suitable to be carried to exhibitions and special events. Another
application the company is now developing is related to “life-size videogames”.
5.2.2 The Industry Where CompuGames Operates
The videogames industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors in the world: the
USA, Japan, and Europe are the most developed markets. According to the Year
Book 2003/2004 by ISFE (Interactive Software Federation of Europe), if one only
takes into account software sales, the videogame industry has reached a value of
Euro 15.3 billions worldwide. If one also considers hardware, sales turnover
reaches Euro 20 billions.
A home videogame consists of four main components: (1) console,
(2) audio/video output; (3) peripheral control devices, and (4) software. The console
is a kind of computer that uses a microprocessor, optimized for enhanced graphics.
It receives information from peripheral control devices, then it processes them, and
—based on the software game instructions—it transmits signals to a display
through an audio/video system.
Five main players are in the industry, i.e.: (1) content providers, (2) software
developers, (3) publishers, (4) console producers, and (5) retailers.
Content providers play a role when the videogame is not based on a completely
new idea, but is instead inspired to an existing product or other commercial idea.
The owner of the intellectual property of the topic on which a videogame can be
based may receive a royalty that approaches the 10 % of the product retail sales
revenues.
Software developers (such as CompuGames) are those ﬁrms that actually
produce the videogame. There can be three different kinds of software developers,
depending on which their ownership is held by: (1) a software publisher; (2) a
console producer; (3) an independent developer. Only a few independent devel-
opers are able to self-ﬁnance their own software development projects. For this
reason they are often forced to look for ﬁnancial support from software publishers
or console developers.
In this industry it is crucial to keep the Research & Development cycle time as
short as possible: on average around 6 months. Time to market and return on
invested capital are critical factors to succeed.
The product lifecycle is short: more than 50 % and sometimes up to the 80 % of
sales revenues is earned within the ﬁrst year from the introduction of a new product
into the market.
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Videogame publishers are used to ﬁnance new product ideas. Such companies
are usually larger than software developers. Main critical issues they must face to
manage their competitive position are related to marketing and to the management
of their relationships with console producers.
Promotional effort must start six months before the introduction of a new product
on the market. It may cost up to 5 times more than product development.
Console producers manage three main areas: (1) design, production and mar-
keting of the hardware on which the software game is based; (2) videogame soft-
ware development and publication, and (3) relationships with retailers. Most
console producers are large ﬁrms, whose competitive advantage is mostly based on
their capability to periodically generate a technological discontinuity, through
innovation, so to strengthen market entry barriers. For such companies, getting a
large market share through high promotional investments is an important means to
gain a sustainable competitive advantage.
Retailers are located in the ﬁnal stage of the industry supply chain. Hardware
and software videogame products are sold through different channels; the most
important are specialized shops and toy stores.
The analysis developed so far gives an idea of the challenges small independent
developer ﬁrms must face, particularly if they aim to publish their products with
their own branded logo.
5.2.3 The Dynamic Business Plan Simulator
The two founders of CompuGames were puzzled by the challenges imposed by the
company’s competitive system. They wondered whether in the next three-four
years their business would have been able to face and counteract the industry
challenges, and to develop a sustainable competitive advantage in the new market
segment, so to build on the knowledge base developed in the years before the
company startup.
With the aim to ﬁnd an answer to such question, the company founders decided
to sketch a dynamic business plan. Such plan could have supported them to frame
and overcome the risks for the company, in the next four years, to either: (1) be-
come a marginal player in the industry, due to a lack of resources that could support
new product development and sales growth, or (2) undertake a too fast and
unsustainable growth rate, which might transform it into a ‘giant with feet of clay’.
A business plan simulator based on a DPM perspective was built.
The model consists of ﬁve main subsystems: Commercial, Research &
Development, Production/Assembling, Internal support processes, and Financial.
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5.2.3.1 The Commercial Subsystem
If one takes a 4-year simulation time horizon, the product lifecycle of CompuGames
can be referred not only to the existing 4 videogames the company has on the
market, but also to the new products it will be able to launch by adopting the new
technology based on holographic displays.
The product lifecycle is on average 2.5 years long. Once designed, a videogame
stays in an ‘introduction’ stage for 6 months. Then, it enters in a ‘growth’ stage for
about 7.5 months. Afterwards, it reaches a ‘maturity’ stage where it stays for about
one year. In the next 6 months, the product enters in a ‘decline’ stage, before its
dismissal from the company portfolio (Fig. 5.1).
Main critical success factors in the market are related to those variables affecting
business image, i.e.: (1) product “quality/price” ratio, (2) delivery delay to retailers
(normal time is three weeks), (3) promotional spend (mainly through TV spots,
advertising on newspapers and magazines, and the participation to fairs), and
(4) commercial support through sales agents.
The used component parts affect product quality: the company may either pur-
chase medium or high quality component parts. Purchasing high quality parts
implies a 20 % cost increase, in respect to the medium, which is about €9.5/piece.
A new product must be introduced on the market at a price that is the 80 % of its
reference, which is referred to the maturity stage. When a product enters in a growth
stage, then its price will be increased to the 90 % of the reference. For those
products in a decline stage, price will drop again to the 80 % of the reference
(Fig. 5.2).
The company’s current average price is €250 per unit. Competitors are used to
set a price that may range from a minimum of €200 to a maximum €350 per unit.
Price may affect average sales orders per customer. Demand elasticity to price
may differ according to the product lifecycle stage. However, a low price strategy
may allow the ﬁrm to gain up to 50 % more than the reference price, in terms of
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market demand. At the same time, a high price strategy may imply a drop in
demand up to the 50 % of the reference.
Promotional spend is needed to sustain the product on the market: it may allow
the company to increase its customer base and sales turnover.
The promotional spend in the market may range from a minimum of €50,000
and a maximum of €200,000 per quarter. The business currently adopts a €100,000
promotional spend per quarter, to support its own 4 products, which are on a “late
maturity” stage, with an 8 % market share. According to market research and the
personal experience of the business owners, this budget would allow the ﬁrm—
other conditions being equal—to gain on average around 150 new customers (i.e.
retailers) in a quarter: however, the yield of promotional spend would signiﬁcantly
decrease with the acquisition of a higher market share. A 40 % market share would
drop the contribution of current promotional spend to 70 new customers/quarter.
This yield would further drop to around 5 customers/quarter, if the company market
share would approximate to 60 %.
The yield of promotional spend is also affected by the product portfolio age. In
fact, when the product portfolio’s average age is younger than the maturity stage,
the needed promotional spend to sustain the customer acquisition rate may increase
up to 30–35 % more than the normal level. For example, a product portfolio
characterized by an average “late growth” stage (corresponding to about a 1-year
product average age) would imply a reduction of the yield from promotional spend
of 10 % or more, in respect to its potential. Though this reduction may not seem
dramatic, if observed in relative terms, it is remarkable if one considers that the high
market competitiveness implies an 8 % normal customer loss rate per week (on the
company customer base) and that the net change in the customer base can be also
negatively affected by: (1) a low or dropping quality/price ratio, (2) a too narrow
product portfolio (i.e., less than 4 products), (3) an early growth or late mature/old
product portfolio, and (4) a delivery delay higher than the reference level.
Sale Price
Months
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
200
225
INTRODUCTION 
GROWTH
MATURITY 
DECLINE
250
200
Fig. 5.2 Sale price as a
function of product life-cycle
stage (example related to a
€250 reference price)
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While innovating the product portfolio is a vital strategy to pursue a competitive
advantage in this market (provided that product lifecycle is short), this implies a
number of ﬁnancial challenges for commercial strategies. In fact, a ‘young’ product
portfolio both requires a lower sale price and a higher promotional spend, in respect
to maturity. In principle, increasing the average product reference price could
indirectly fund aggressive new product launch policies. However, this would reduce
(other things being equal) the “quality/price” ratio, which would decrease market
demand.
A fourth commercial policy lever is sales agent support. Hiring salespeople may
affect new customers acquisition and sales turnover rates in a similar way to what
has been commented regarding the promotional spend. In fact, on average each
agent can contribute—other conditions being equal—to gain up to 12 customers per
quarter. However, the returns from a sales agents acquisition policy might diminish
due to: (1) an increasing company market share, and (2) a product delivery delay
higher than the reference.
For instance, a 20 % market share may reduce the normal returns—in terms of
customer acquisition rates—to one half of the reference level that can be reached
when the company market share is minimal. Such returns would drop to a 10 %
when the company market share approaches a 50 %, and would further diminish
with an increasing market share.
Similarly, a 6-months perceived product delivery delay by customers (i.e. twice
the reference level) would imply a loss of about a 20 % in the capability of sales
agents to get new customers (in respect to the normal). An 8-months delivery delay
would imply a loss of about 60 % in such returns, which would further drop if the
delivery delay would increase more.
CompuGames currently has only one sales agent. His gross salary is
€4000/month. To this cost, a 3 % commission on sales revenues must be paid to
him. Hiring new sales agents would require a 6-weeks time before they can be
productive, after training. In the industry, the average time to quit the ﬁrm by sales
agents is 4-years.
Also, word-of-mouth may contribute to customer acquisition. On average, for
each satisﬁed company customer, CompuGames may get a new customer (i.e.
retailer) every 5 months.
5.2.3.2 The R&D Subsystem
Research & Development is vital to launch new computer games.
R&D processes are carried out through three main steps, i.e.: (1) design,
(2) engineering, and (3) ﬁnal product conﬁguration. Quality control is also carried
out to support the ﬁrst two steps of the process. R&D defects may rise due to an
excess workload on the available staff (designers). Also, the capability of the ﬁrm to
detect defects in R&D processes is affected by workload. Excess in using overtime
working tends to increase the number of defects in R&D. This may lead to an
increase of the: (1) time to launch new products on the market, in respect to the
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reference R&D time (i.e. 6 months), and (2) percentage of undetected defects in the
R&D processes, leading to a higher probability of failure in new product
manufacturing.
An increase in the time to launch new products would contribute to increase
(other things being equal) the product portfolio average age. This would reduce the
effectiveness of commercial efforts, in terms of new customer acquisition, sales
orders and revenues rates.
A decrease in the quality of design would imply an increase in the used com-
ponent part costs up to four times of the standard level. For example, a 20 %
reduction in design quality would increase of about 50 % the cost of component
part; a 40 % reduction in design quality would double such costs. A 50 % reduction
in design quality would even triple them.
The company currently employs three designers. Their unit gross salary is
€5200/month. Overtime cost is €45/h. It is necessary to use overtime (up to a
10 h/staff/week) if the total available working hours are not enough to perform the
workload.
It takes 3 months to train newly hired design staff. In the industry, the average
time to quit the ﬁrm by design staff is 4 years.
5.2.3.3 The Production/Assembling Subsystem
The new models that are conﬁgured by the R&D processes can be launched on the
market, and promoted through commercial policies. Sales orders backlogs are
delivered through the production/assembling subsystem. The following resources
affect production and deliveries: (1) inventory, (2) assembly staff, and (3) assembly
machinery capacity.
Each product uses on average 10 component parts. Component parts are pur-
chased based on expected demand. Desired inventory levels are based on
the expected demand in the next three weeks. The minimum assembly time is
3 weeks.
The company currently employs one assembly staff unit. Her salary is
€4400/month. Overtime cost is €35/h. A maximum of 10-h per staff overtime can
be performed each week. Though overtime work may allow the ﬁrm to overcome
peaks in product demand, a prolonged resort to such policy may generate employee
burnout; in fact, overtime hour productivity may drop up to 60 % than normal
(which is equal to 5 component parts/hour).
Hiring new assembling staff would require a 3-weeks time before they can be
productive, after training. In the industry, the average time to quit the ﬁrm by sales
agents is 4-years.
The current assembly machinery capacity is 3000-component parts/week (i.e.
300 product units/week).
The investment costs associated with an increase of such capacity of an extra
100 product units/week are €270,000. In order to prevent obsolescence, machinery
must be replaced every two years.
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5.2.3.4 The Financial Subsystem
Figure 5.3 shows the company balance sheet, referred to the beginning of the
planning time horizon. It portrays a high percentage of ﬁxed assets over the total net
investments, and a quite high “debts-to-equity” ratio. This is due to the fact that the
two owners-entrepreneurs started the business by only investing ﬁnancial resources
from their own family’s assets and by exploiting available bank credits. The two
business owning families have subscribed and invested all the company’s equity.
CompuGames may rely on a €6.8 million maximum bank credit. Such credit
may change as a function of: (1) the value of business equity perceived by banks,
and (2) the investment turnover rate (i.e. the “sales revenues/net investments” ratio)
perceived by banks.
The initial personal assets of the business owning families is €15 millions. Such
stock is increased by periodical dividends withdrawals and salaries paid to business
owners/managers; it is depleted by the current family expenses. Therefore, new
equity investments from the business owning families’ assets will be possible as a
function of the existing family assets and of their inflows.
The two business founders receive a forfeit stipend of €3000/month (as members
of the company Board), and a salary as designers.
An increase in the salaries paid to business owners/managers increases the
business owning families’ satisfaction level about the business. An increase in the
salaries paid to business owners/managers will generate a gradual rise in the current
business owning families’ expenses. The founders’ families will increase their
dividend withdrawal requests, based on the perceived growth rate of the ﬁrm. Trust
by the business-owning families (in terms of change in the satisfaction level)
towards the company is an important factor in assessing CompuGames’ stakeholder
strategic performance.
In order to fund its ﬁnancial needs, the company may also increase its equity
through venture capitalist investments. Venture capitalists will be initially inclined
to fund up to the 50 % of the prospected discounted cash flows at a 20 % interest
rate on a perpetual annuity.
Venture capitalists expectations towards the company are affected by: (1) the
business capital value, and (2) dividends paid to equity owners. Venture capitalists’
trust (in terms of change in the satisfaction level) towards the company is another
important factor in assessing CompuGames’ stakeholder strategic performance.
Other ﬁnancial parameters are: (1) terms of payment allowed to customers (four
weeks), (2) terms of payment allowed by: (2-a) component part suppliers
(3.5 weeks); (2-b) machinery suppliers (1-year); (2-c) promotional service provi-
ders (8 weeks), and (2-d) administrative service providers (24 weeks).
Regarding the speciﬁc governance and ﬁnancial proﬁle of CompuGames, as an
example of a small business whose equity is fully owned by its founders, most
critical issues on which the use of the simulator may enhance decision makers’
learning processes are focused on challenging:
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Fig. 5.3 CompuGames initial balance sheet
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1. A misperception by the business owners of the ﬁnancial needs associated with
the size of capacity and current investments that surviving in a highly com-
petitive market may imply, and of the necessary resources that should (and
might) be funded by drawing liquidity from the business-owning family assets,
2. A bias in proﬁt and cash flow expectations leading to uncontrolled liquidity
withdrawals from company bank accounts to satisfy family (current and
non-current) needs, and
3. A lack of understanding by the business owners/founders of the business gov-
ernance2 implications that the subscription of the majority of the business equity
by venture capitalists may imply.
The described phenomena are particularly frequent in unlimited liability com-
panies, where owner/entrepreneurs and the members of their own families may
misperceive the difference between business and personal assets.3
By using the simulator, learners may ﬁgure out relationships between the ﬁrm
and the equity-owning family, particularly with respect to bias in proﬁt and cash
flows expectations leading to withdrawals by family members from the business
bank accounts, to cover current expenses. Learning how to pursue a balanced
growth, in compliance with both the business and family needs, is a concern for this
simulator.
Balancing withdrawals and investments to achieve an adequate business-owning
family and venture capitalists satisfaction that is compatible with business liquidity,
and matching competitive policies with ﬁnancial structure are the keys to survival
and growth and continuity of both the business and its relationships with its
ﬁnancial stakeholders.
5.2.4 A Dynamic Performance Management View Portrayed
by the Simulator
The interplay of the described business subsystems provides a sound basis for
identifying the main performance and resource measures through which a dynamic
business plan can support policy makers to assess the strategies that CompuGames
might undertake in the future to foster sustainable development.
2An example of this might be related to the business owner’s will to increase their own salaries or
to appoint other family members as board members.
3Another important cause of uncontrolled liquidity withdrawals from company bank accounts can
also be related to escalating behaviors originated by several family units owning business equity.
This is especially the case of family businesses that have reached the second or further succession
stages. Such ﬁrms are usually controlled by more than one family unit, as different brothers and/or
daughters or even cousins may inherit the entrepreneurial function. In these circumstances, it may
happen that deteriorating relationships between different equity-owning family units may give rise
to escalating imitative withdrawals aimed at pursuing individual goals, to the prejudice of future
business survival.
210 5 Applying Dynamic Performance Management to Enterprises
As shown in Fig. 5.4, which frames a simpliﬁed version of the CompuGames
dynamic business plan simulator, both the end-results and performance drivers
attain to the ﬁnancial and competitive dimension of business success.
We will start to analyze Fig. 5.4 by identifying the performance drivers, in order
to illustrate how company policies may affect them, and how they may in turn affect
the end-results, which will feedback on the strategic resources generated by busi-
ness routines.
Main critical success factors related to the commercial subsystem are:
(1) “quality/price”, (2) delivery delay, (3) promotional spend, and (4) sales agents
support. Figure 5.4 shows how such factors can be framed (and measured) through
performance drivers. The ﬁgure also shows how such drivers can be affected by
leveraging strategic resources. It illustrates that commercial performance drivers
affect sales orders and revenues, and the change in the customer base. More
speciﬁcally, sales orders are affected by the “quality/price ratio” and product
delivery delay. The change in the company customer base is affected by promo-
tional spend, the stock of sales agents, the “quality/price” ratio, and product
delivery delay. Market share is a ﬁfth performance driver related to the commercial
subsystem. It affects the change in the customer base: increasing the customer base
and market share may generate diminishing returns from commercial investments
(this implies the dominance of a balancing loop draining business growth).
If we now consider the R&D subsystem, performance drivers can be referred to:
(1) the design staff ratio, (2) the percentage of defective R&D models, (3) the
percentage of undetected defects in new product design, (4) the time to launch new
products, and (5) the product portfolio age.
Fig. 5.4 A DPM view of “CompuGames” business plan
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The design staff ratio measures the extent to which the company may rely on
enough product design staff (strategic resource), in respect to desired level, which
depends on the workload (i.e. to the stock of total models to launch). This per-
formance driver affects both the percentage of defective models and the percentage
of undetected defects. An “available staff/desired staff” ratio equal to or higher than
one indicates an aptitude of R&D processes to keep both performance drivers low.
The higher the percentage of defective models is, the more rework will be
necessary. This would reduce (other conditions being equal) the new conﬁgured
models ready to be launched on the market (end-result), which accumulates in the
stock of new models.
The percentage of undetected defects in new product design affects production
costs in the long run. In fact, a lower product design quality implies higher risks of
production failure and rework.
The ratio between the stock of total new models to launch and the new con-
ﬁgured models in a given time deﬁnes the time to launch new products. Both the
performance driver and the stock of new models on the market affect the product
portfolio average age (a lower level performance driver). In fact, the less the time to
launch new products, the younger the product portfolio average age will be. A too
low or too high product portfolio age (corresponding to a high percentage of models
in the early or late stages of the product life-cycle) reduces the sale price (in respect
to the reference—i.e. maturity—level) and (other conditions being equal) sales
revenues. Therefore, by keeping the product portfolio average age close to an early
maturity stage and by launching in due time new products that may replace those
which are approaching the obsolescence stage, the ﬁrm may effectively support the
commercial subsystem through R&D.
The main performance driver related to the production/assembling subsystem is
the assembling capacity ratio, i.e. a fraction between the actual and the desired
capacity (in terms of both machinery and staff). An increase in this driver may
foster an increase in the production rate (end-result), if the company holds enough
component parts inventory and sales orders backlog. The production rate accu-
mulates into the stock of product inventories (strategic resource). Holding enough
product inventories may allow the company to feed the desired product-shipping
rate. This will reduce the sales orders backlog and will affect the delivery delay.
Main performance drivers related to the ﬁnancial subsystem are: (1) the divi-
dends ratio, and (2) the capital value ratio. Such measures affect (and are indirectly
affected by) the following end-results: (1) income, (2) cash flow, (3) change in the
business capital value, and (4) change in stakeholders’ satisfaction.
Income and cash flow affect equity and liquidity (strategic resources), respec-
tively. Liquidity may feed the acquisition of physical and capacity resources. Equity
may allow the business to distribute dividends. Cash flow also affects the change in
the business capital value (end-results), which affects the capital value perceived by
ﬁnancial investors (strategic resource). Both distributed dividends and the business
capital value (in respect to the desired levels) are performance drivers affecting the
change in stakeholders’ satisfaction (outcome end-result), which in turn affects the
ﬁnancial stakeholders’ satisfaction level (strategic resource).
212 5 Applying Dynamic Performance Management to Enterprises
In the next section we will show an example of how using the CompuGames
simulator in entrepreneurial development training programs may empower com-
pany owners/managers in developing business planning skills, based on DPM, and
deal with dynamic complexity.
5.2.5 Playing with the Dynamic Business Plan Simulator
The CompuGames simulator is used in entrepreneurial training. The business
case-study is ﬁrst debated by participants in both team and a plenary de-brieﬁng
sessions, focused on the following debating points:
– How many new products (models) should CompuGames launch on the market
(and when)?
– What strategic positioning should the company give to its products, in terms of:
price, component parts quality, delivery delay, promotion, salesforce support?
– Should the company use different commercial policies according to the product
portfolio average age? How?
– What strategic resources will the business have to build up (and when), in order
to support its own commercial growth policies?
– When will the ﬁrm have to hire human resources to increase R&D and product
assembling capacity? How many people should be hired?
– When will the ﬁrm have to increase its machinery assembling capacity? How
many people should be hired?
– What effects will be generated on the company revenue and cost structure by an
increase in the “product portfolio”?
– How would changes in the company’s activity volumes and complexity level
affect the cost structure? How ﬁxed costs might change in the long run?
– How can one balance growth in the commercial subsystem with growth in the
R&D, Assembling, and Financial subsystems?
– What ﬁnancial needs would growth imply?
– Will it be possible (and realistic) to continue to fund such ﬁnancial needs
through the business-owners/founders family assets and/or bank credit?
– Would it be possible to raise equity capital from venture capitalists? What would
such decision imply for the business, for its founders and the equity-owning
families?
– What policies should the ﬁrm adopt in allocating internal flow of funds and cash
flows? What are their implications on funding growth and satisfying ﬁnancial
stakeholders’ expectations?
– What policies should the company adopt, in terms of stipends paid to their
founders and other family members who might be hired to cover formal roles,
e.g. in the Board or in key management areas?
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– What effects would the subscription of equity by venture capitalists imply on the
business founders’ freedom to set dividends and to involvement of their own
family members in key management areas?
– How will the dividend policy and the capital value of the ﬁrm affect ﬁnancial
stakeholders’ satisfaction?
– How to balance business sustainable development with ﬁnancial stakeholders’
satisfaction?
– How will satisfaction level affect the overall company image?
– How to increase the capital value of the ﬁrm?
Based on the debating points, the case-study debrieﬁng session has the main goal
to help participants framing the dynamic complexity of the system and perceiving
the need of a DPM approach to business planning.
After case debrieﬁng, the different groups of participants are requested to sketch
a 4 year dynamic business plan by using the CompuGames simulator. Team-based
simulation sessions have the goal of pursuing a balanced achievement of four main
sets of targets, i.e.: (1) business growth rate, (2) proﬁtability and ﬁnancial equi-
librium, (3) stakeholders satisfaction (referred to both the business owning family
and venture capitalists), and (4) business image (from both customers and stake-
holders’ satisfaction).
Through simulation, players can experience how complex it is to reach high
performance levels at the same time, for multiple targets. For instance, they can
perceive the trade-offs between business growth and stakeholders’ satisfaction:
distributing dividends may reduce company liquidity to the prejudice of business
growth. However, reinvesting proﬁts may reduce the level of trust by business
owners and venture capitalist towards the ﬁrm capability to generate a payback on
their own investments.
Similar trade-offs can be experienced regarding the relationships between
business growth and proﬁtability/ﬁnancial equilibrium: if the product portfolio is in
a mature stage, a low rate in new product and capacity investments may perhaps
keep stable or improve business liquidity and proﬁtability in the short term, but it
may also prejudice business growth and ﬁnancial results in the long run. On the
other hand, a too high growth rate, in respect to the ﬁnancial structure of the
business, may prejudice solvency and proﬁtability.
Such trade-offs are ampliﬁed by the complexity related to business startup, and
to the small size of the company in a market requiring continuous R&D and
commercial investments.
During the simulation sessions, learning facilitators support teamwork. Their
role is to help participants perceiving and modeling the feedback structure asso-
ciated with the system’s simulated behavior over different simulation runs. In
particular, participants are supported in framing the system causal structure
according to a DPM perspective, as previously illustrated (Fig. 5.4).
The dynamic business plan simulator based on the CompuGames case-study
consists of a start window (Fig. 5.5a) through which the players may have access to
three sectors, i.e.: (1) an “input parameters” window (Fig. 5.5b), (2) a ‘transparent
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box’ stock-and-flow model structure window (Fig. 5.5c), and (3) a control panel
(Fig. 5.5d).
The “input parameters” window allows one to set initial values for a number of
structural factors affecting performance, i.e.: market size (in terms of customers),
Fig. 5.5 a Start window. b Input parameters window. c Transparent box stock-and-flow model
structure window. d Control panel
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Fig. 5.5 (continued)
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length of product life-cycle stages, product price, and component parts unit pur-
chase cost.4
By changing input parameters, and replicating the same decisions previously
done with standard input settings, teams may perceive how the initial system
conditions may strongly affect performance.
The ‘transparent box’ stock and flow window allows participants to develop a
capability to perform a structure and behavior analysis, through simulation.
Figure 5.6a, b illustrate two examples of such model windows, related to product
portfolio and customer base dynamics, respectively.
Visualizing the stock and flow simulation model helps players to map the
feedback loops that are responsible for the experienced performance in the simu-
lation runs.
For instance, Fig. 5.7 frames main feedback loops associated with R&D and
commercial investment policies aimed to foster business growth. The reinforcing
loop ‘R1’ shows how launching new products may increase the product portfolio
size. After a delay, related to the time it takes for new products to enter in a growth
stage, this will increase sales orders and—other conditions being equal—revenues.
This will contribute to increase cash flows and liquidity, which would allow the
business to fund new product launching.
The described loop ‘R1’, which triggers cash flows from new product devel-
opment, can also be combined with two more reinforcing loops (‘R2’ and ‘R3’),
which may further boost business growth. Such loops are, respectively, related to
the reinvestments of cash flows in improving sales force size and market support,
through promotional efforts.
However, the dominance of the described reinforcing loops fostering growth can
be counteracted by the balancing loop ‘B’: a too intensive new product launch rate
may signiﬁcantly reduce the average product portfolio age. A too low product
portfolio age perceived by the market increases the promotional effort needed to
sustain new products. In this case, if the ﬁrm does not properly match its com-
mercial and R&D budgeting policies, an R&D overinvestment and a commercial
underinvestment may generate a promotion gap (i.e. a difference between desired
and actual promotional efforts), which would reduce the sales orders, revenues, and
cash flows, in respect to the budget. Negative cash flows would reduce bank bal-
ances. This would tackle aggressive R&D policies, based on intensive new product
launching.
The ‘control panel’ window allows players to make their own decisions, each
quarter. It also supports them to quickly visualize the current value of a number of
critical variables (e.g.: those related to capacity and income), and to access time
graphs, related to different sectors. The ‘time graph’ windows portray strategic
4Teams can change such inputs only based on learning facilitators’ instructions. If this occurs, the
same parameters must be changed in same way by all the teams. This is to enable, in a plenary
debrieﬁng session, a comparative analysis across the simulation results obtained by the different
groups.
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resources, performance drivers and end-results that are periodically updated by the
simulator after each quarter decision run.
After each simulation run, teams are asked by learning facilitators to draw a
DPM chart by linking the time graphs one another, so to visualize and better frame
the dynamics underlying business performance, and their causes.
At the end of each simulation run, the SD model automatically transfers results
to a spreadsheet accounting model, which portrays the company ﬁnancial state-
ments (Fig. 5.8a, b, c). This allows the players to reframe the simulated system’s
behavior through an accounting view, which complements the DPM perspective
and directly supports them to sketch a dynamic business plan.
Figure 5.9 shows some examples of pop-up windows that players may visualize
while using the simulator. The purpose of such windows is to generate in a virtual
Fig. 5.6 a Product portfolio stock-and-flow structure. b Customer base stock-and-flow structure
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environment—such as the CompuGames microworld—an emotional pressure on
decision makers about the perceptions of different stakeholders on business
performance.
As Fig. 5.9 illustrates, warning messages may refer to issues like: lack of pro-
duct promotional support, ﬁnancial or capital shortage, overhead and structural
costs dynamics, stakeholders’ satisfaction. Also pop-up windows are used to stop
simulation, if the company bankrupts due to bank debts higher than the maximum
bank credit or to an equity deﬁcit.
Teams should be able to use warning messages as a means to improve their own
abilities to explain the causal structure underlying business performance and, per-
haps, to adjust policies during a simulation run. However, such warning messages
may also generate reactive and emotional decision-making, leading to worse per-
formance. Analyzing the perils from emotional behavior and decision-making (and
the related causes) is an important discussion topic in de-brieﬁng sessions.
During the simulation, players can experience the level of complexity for
CompuGames to survive as a family-owned, small business in its competitive and
stakeholder systems. They can also perceive the long time it takes for the business
to build up a product portfolio and a market image that may provide the basis for a
future stable growth and proﬁtability, and a strong liquidity position. They may
experience that—in order to pursue business survival and development—most of
the 4-years simulation time should be characterized by signiﬁcant investments in
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Fig. 5.7 Feedback loops associated with R&D and commercial investment policies
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Fig. 5.8 a Balance sheet simulation results. b Income statement simulation results. c Flow of
funds simulation results
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R&D, production/assembling, and commercial subsystems, to build a set of
strategic resources generated by company routines, whose deployment may ensure
future proﬁtability, liquidity and a stable market share.
The beneﬁts of such learning process based on “virtual experience” can be
substantial to foster a major change in business-owners/entrepreneurs’ mental
models. Company failures often result from an inclination of their owners-founders
to underestimate the payback time for their investments and the ﬁnancial needs
associated with the development of those strategic resources that will support
sustainable growth. Regarding this issue, business owners-founders are often
inclined to underestimate the risks on the future business liquidity and proﬁtability,
related to an excess in the resort to bank credit. By playing the CompuGames
simulator, participants may experience the effects of the reinforcing loops produced
by a too high “debts-to-equity” ratio, and the related risk of company bankruptcy.
In the CompuGames case-study, contracting such risks may require the need to
accept that both the business-owning families and external funders (such as venture
capitalists) will invest into the business, perhaps through a substantial equity
increase. This policy may not be ‘pain-free’ for the business owners-entrepreneurs.
In fact, it may imply for them a much lower authonomy in decision-making on
Fig. 5.9 CompuGames simulator’s pop-up windows
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business governance and strategic management. They might need to learn and
practice new skills to communicate and share with venture capitalists their own
business ideas. They may also need to adopt a professional approach in recruiting
human resources: for instance, involving family members in business management
and governance would not be an automatic or easy option.
Figure 5.10 provides an example of a simulation run leading to a sustainable
business growth rate, which is compatible with proﬁtability and liquidity. This
policy aims to substantially increase the company size. Growth is pulled by strong
investments in promotional spend and constant sales agents and assembly staff hire
rates. Product innovation and launching is key in the adopted policy.
Fig. 5.10 a An example of decision data from a simulation. b An example of decision data from a
simulation (commercial graphs). c An example of decision data from a simulation (R&D/product
design graphs). d An example of decision data from a simulation (production/assembling graphs).
e An example of decision data from a simulation (ﬁnancial graphs). f An example of decision data
from a simulation (performance index graphs)
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Fig. 5.10 (continued)
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The graphs related to the commercial, product design, production, and ﬁnancial
subsystems show that it takes about two years for the company to turn into a
proﬁtable and cash flow generating business. This requires that a ‘no-dividends’
policy is adopted, to sustain the high growth rate of the ﬁrm: in the 4-years the
business experiences a 600 % increase in its “product portfolio”, a 500 % increase
Fig. 5.10 (continued)
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in its customer base, and a 400 % increase in market share. Though such policy
may generate good results in terms of growth and an acceptable proﬁtability and
liquidity in the long run, and the business capital value increases by about 300 % in
the four simulation years, it reduces the level of ﬁnancial stakeholders’ satisfaction.
5.3 Modeling Commercial and Financial Subsystems
Through DPM: Licari & Sons Case-Study
A second example of a SD model framing the interplay of ﬁnancial and commercial
processes in a small family ﬁrm will be illustrated in this section using the DPM
perspective.
The model was applied to provide an initial basis for analysis and discussion
with the two owners and the chartered accountant of Licari & Sons, a small
company operating as a regional wholesaler in the pharmaceutical industry. The
two brothers owning the business were simultaneously involved in strategic and
current decision-making. One of them was responsible for commercial activities,
the other managed relationships with banks. The market was characterized by the
strong bargaining power of large producers and a fragmented, standardized
wholesale supply, involving a strong competition on price, terms of payment
allowed to customers and delivery time.
The industry had been recently affected by unexpected structural changes,
related to the reduction of funds granted by the State to pharmaceutical companies
and the drastic reduction of State ﬁnancial contributions to citizens for the purchase
of medicines.
In a few years, such events led to a decrease in demand and were a primary cause
of crisis in many ﬁrms operating both in the production and distribution stages. In
the regional market where Licari & Sons operated, an increasing number of
pharmacies started to shift their ﬁnancial difﬁculties on wholesalers. They did this
by postponing payments of purchased goods beyond negotiated terms. On the other
hand, the fear of market share loss exacerbated competition between wholesalers; at
the same time terms of payment negotiated with producers were decreasing.
Like its competitors, Licari & Sons started to pursue a commercial strategy
aimed to keep (and, possibly, to increase) its customer base and market share. This
was accomplished through a progressive rise in price discounts and terms of pay-
ment on sales. Very often, when a new order was submitted, terms of payment were
re-negotiated with clients by phone. One of the arguments used by clients to per-
suade the ﬁrm to grant longer terms of payment was the availability of other
wholesalers to allow them higher payment delays. Clients also made emotional
pleas pressuring Mr. Licari, asking him to postpone the collection of their accounts
payable, in the name of their old commercial relationships.
The described policy gave rise to a sharp increase in both sales revenues and
income. It also generated a sharp ﬁnancial crisis, which was detected by the ﬁrm
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only after banks started to increase their pressure on Mr. Licari. This was done by
asking him to reduce the ﬁrm’s negative balances and to submit a business plan to
prove company solvency.
No formal planning was done by the ﬁrm. The only tools used were transaction
systems (e.g., inventorying, invoicing, etc.) and ﬁnancial accounting.
In order to help the business owners to frame dynamic relationships, the ﬁrm’s
chartered accountant supported a group of modelers to calibrate a simple SD model
(see Fig. 5.11) to past ﬁnancial statements.
The model depicts cash flow as the net change in bank balances. Current cash
flows result from the difference between internal flow of funds (i.e., income gross of
depreciation) and the change in commercial net working capital (i.e., inventories
+ accounts receivable − accounts payable). A higher income increases current cash
flows if the change in net working capital (corresponding to an extra current
ﬁnancial need) is lower than the increase in internal flow of funds. Furthermore,
current cash flow becomes negative if the change in net working capital (NWC) is
higher than the internal flow of funds. The total cash flow portrayed in the model is
calculated by adding to the current cash flow the direct change in equity (i.e.,
investments minus proﬁt withdrawals) and deducting monetary needs associated
with payments for machinery replacement. Total cash flow can be also analytically
calculated, i.e. from the algebraic sum of different flows impacting on bank
Fig. 5.11 A SD model framing ﬁnancial and commercial subsystems
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accounts (Accounts receivable collections—Financial costs—Payments referred to
accounts payable on purchased goods, shipping costs, long-term debts for
machinery acquisition and dividends).
Relationships were framed between terms of payment policies, income, com-
mercial NWC, and cash flows in order to understand limits to growth associated
with the company ﬁnancial structure and demand elasticity. The model calibration
process gradually involved the two business owners, as they started to be ques-
tioned on issues like: retailers and competitors’ reactions to changes in terms of
payment on goods sold, perception delays in available bank credit, etc.
Figure 5.12 frames the SD model through a DPM view. The ﬁgure shows that a
change in the terms of payment allowed to customers affects two main performance
drivers: (1) the terms of payment ratio, and (2) the net change in accounts receivable
and accounts payable.
The ﬁrst performance driver is the ratio between the company’s average terms of
payment and competitors’ terms of payment allowed to customers. A ratio of ‘1’
would imply no effect of terms of payment policies on sales orders. A ratio higher
than ‘1’ implies higher sales orders for the company (in respect to the standard
rates); a ratio lower than ‘1’ implies lower sales orders rate than the standard. The
effect of such performance driver on sales order (end-result) is modeled through a
sales orders multiplier.
The second performance driver is the ratio between the actual and budgeted
difference in accounts receivable and payable from a period to another. An increase
in such difference implies an increase in ﬁnancial needs, which involves—other
conditions being equal—an increase in the NWC and a decrease in the current cash
flows (end results).
Figure 5.12 also shows that sales orders are co-flows of other lower level
end-results, i.e.: sales revenues, which in turn affect the current income, which
affects the current cash flow.
Cash flow accumulates into the stock of bank accounts (i.e. liquidity); income
accumulates into the equity stock. Such stocks are strategic resources which
feedback into business performance through another driver, i.e.: the
“debts-to-equity” ratio. In fact, a negative cash flow will reduce bank balances. If
bank balances are negative, a reduction in their level will imply an increase of
current debts by the ﬁrm. Likewise, a negative income rate (i.e. a loss) will reduce
equity. Under both viewpoints, a negative ﬁnancial performance will increase the
“debts-to-equity” ratio (in respect to the target or budget standard). This will
generate higher ﬁnancial costs, due to both the higher debts and to the higher
interest rate that a lower company solvency perceived by banks may imply.
The described DPM view can be re-framed through the feedback loop diagram
illustrated in Fig. 5.13.
The ﬁgure shows the effects of gradual—but continuous—increases in the terms
of payment allowed by the business to its clients, in order to increase sales rev-
enues. As customers are sensitive to payment delays and the unit contribution
margin on goods sold is positive, such policy can successfully increase the income
rate. A higher income also raises bank balances, provided that cash flows are
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positive. The increase in bank balances raises perceived bank credit, thereby
encouraging the ﬁrm to gradually boost again terms of payment allowed to cus-
tomers (reinforcing loop “a”).
Fig. 5.12 A DPM view of the effects of terms of payment policies on sales orders, liquidity and
income
Fig. 5.13 Feedback structure underlying income, commercial net working capital and current
cash flow behavior associated to terms of payment policies
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There are, however, two main limits to growth to the sales revenues and income
rates, i.e.:
(1) Demand elasticity to terms of payment;
(2) Changes in the company ﬁnancial structure caused by higher sales revenues.
Concerning the ﬁrst limit, the model implies that effects generated on sales
orders by further increases in terms of payment allowed to customers can be
depicted by an ‘s-shaped’ curve. As shown in Fig. 5.14, this means that, when the
commercial policy lever is increased beyond a threshold level (in this case, about
13 weeks) the change in sales orders will decrease (balancing loop “b”).
Concerning the second limit, higher sales revenues will increase ﬁnancial needs
for both inventories and accounts receivable (the last effect is also ampliﬁed by
higher terms of payment allowed to customers). This raises the NWC, thereby
causing lower cash flows. If the change in the NWC is higher than income gross of
depreciation, cash flows are negative. This leads to a reduction in bank balances,
perceived bank credit and terms of payment allowed to customers (balancing loops
“c1” and “c2”). Such a limit to growth could be counterbalanced by higher terms of
payment allowed by suppliers on purchased goods, giving rise to higher accounts
payable and—other conditions being equal—lower NWC, higher cash flows and
bank balances (reinforcing loop “c3”).5
Fig. 5.14 Behavior of key variables generated by changes in terms of payment allowed to
customers
5Another possible way to ﬁnance sales growth could be associated with new liquidity investments
as equity, made by business owners.
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The above balancing loops prevail over the reinforcing loop “a” after about the
20th week, when bank balances start to drop. However, such a limit to growth is
not immediately perceived by the company, which continues to raise terms of
payments allowed to customers until about the 40th week. This policy both
determines a lower increase in sales revenues (caused by demand elasticity) as well
as decreasing cash flows and bank balances (see Fig. 5.14). An unintended
side-effect of this policy is also associated with higher ﬁnancial costs on negative
bank balances, leading to lower income and cash flows which reduce bank balances
again (vicious reinforcing loop “d”).
When the ﬁrm realizes the above limits to growth and risks they imply for
proﬁtability and solvency, it starts to reduce terms of payment allowed to cus-
tomers. If this happens before business proﬁtability has been prejudiced due to the
effects produced by loop “d” and if market permits, such policy allows the business
to attain a NWC reduction and an increase in cash flows and bank balances,
although both sales revenues and income decrease.
After about the 60th week the above policy has allowed the ﬁrm to improve its
ﬁnancial structure, so that it can rely on a positive available bank credit, which
fosters a new gradual increase in terms of payment allowed to customers, that
makes loop “a” dominant again, until the balancing loop “b” stabilizes the system.
Although the above relationships might appear commonplace, if only observed
through a post facto perspective, the dynamics they are likely to generate are often
counterintuitive and puzzling for many small business entrepreneurs. Among main
factors explaining such perception difﬁculties are:
• a counterintuitive behavior of key variables such as income, cash flows and
change in the NWC;
• inertial effects generated by decision makers’ policies, due to delays embodied
in the relevant system;
• SME entrepreneurs’ high emotional involvement in current operations, which
makes difﬁcult to perceive how continuous small changes in the short run are
likely to generate structural modiﬁcations in the relevant system’s structure;
• a static and discrete view of business phenomena often provided by accounting
reports to SME entrepreneurs;
• a weak relative weight of the ﬁrm in its market, especially towards suppliers and
distributors.
Figure 5.15 portrays accounting reports whose values are generated by the SD
model simulations previously discussed.
Embodying accounting variables in a SD model allows one to open the entre-
preneur’s mind on the processes generating forecasted and actual values depicted in
a balance ﬁnancial statement. For instance, rather than focusing only on income,
internal flow of funds, change in the NWC and cash flows, decision makers can be
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supported by SD models to understand policy levers on which to act in order to
affect key variables’ performance over time, according to a desired direction.
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